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Global Security Through Nuclear Non-Proliferation. 10th Anniversary Album of the Luxembourg Forum

Global Security Through Nuclear Non-Proliferation. 10th Anniversary Album of the Luxembourg Forum

Preventing the Possibility of Nuclear Weapon Use in Combat Actions in Ukraine

Preventing the Possibility of Nuclear Weapon Use in Combat Actions in Ukraine

2022

Prospects for Nuclear Arms Control

Prospects for Nuclear Arms Control

Proceedings of the online conference, 2021

The Intellectual Legacy of Academician Andrei Sakharov and the Issues of Strategic Stability

The Intellectual Legacy of Academician Andrei Sakharov and the Issues of Strategic Stability

2020

Middle East Crisis: Scenarios and Opportunities

Middle East Crisis: Scenarios and Opportunities

2020

Arms control: Burden of Change

Arms control: Burden of Change

Edited by Dr. Viatcheslav Kantor, 2019

Preventing the Erosion of Strategic Stability

Preventing the Erosion of Strategic Stability

2018

Topical Issues of Nuclear Non-proliferation

Topical Issues of Nuclear Non-proliferation

Paris, 2018

Revitalizing Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Revitalizing Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Moscow, 2017

Reykjavik summit: lessons for the future of US-Russian relations

Reykjavik summit: lessons for the future of US-Russian relations

Moscow, 2016

Preventing the Crisis of the Nuclear Arms Control and Catastrophic Terrorism

Preventing the Crisis of the Nuclear Arms Control and Catastrophic Terrorism

Washington, 2015

The limits of secure nuclear tolerance

The limits of secure nuclear tolerance

Moscow, 2014

Secure tolerance criteria for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

Secure tolerance criteria for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

Montreux, 2013

Perspectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Perspectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Geneva, 2012

Contemporary problems of nuclear non-proliferation

Contemporary problems of nuclear non-proliferation

Berlin, 2012

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First Declaration of the Youth Group of the International Luxembourg Forum: New Voices

First Declaration of the Youth Group of the International Luxembourg Forum: New Voices

The International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe (ILF) has initiated a new project on establishing a Youth Group of the Forum. The Group will comprise of young professionals from different countries that have an understanding of, and interest in, the issues of arms control, nuclear non-proliferation and security. While the final composition of the Group has not yet been established, its first participants have already had a chance to meet and work together within the framework of the annual ILF Supervisory Board Meeting held in Geneva, December 4-5, 2019

Final Declaration of the Supervisory Board meeting of the International Luxembourg Forum. Geneva, December 4-5, 2019

Final Declaration of the Supervisory Board meeting of the International Luxembourg Forum. Geneva, December 4-5, 2019

Understanding that 2020 will be decisive for the nuclear arms control system and consequently for strategic stability, recognizing the efforts of the above mentioned organizations to prevent nuclear catastrophe and having deliberated as a conference on June 4-5 in Rome and as a Supervisory Board on December 4-5 in Geneva, we propose the following Road Map for these most urgent actions

Final Declaration of the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum "Arms Control: the Burden of Changes". Rome, June 4-5, 2019

Final Declaration of the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum "Arms Control: the Burden of Changes". Rome, June 4-5, 2019

Final declaration of the 10th Anniversary International Luxembourg Forum conference in Paris, October 9-10, 2017

Final declaration of the 10th Anniversary International Luxembourg Forum conference in Paris, October 9-10, 2017

The participants of the 10th Anniversary Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe wish to communicate their extreme concern about the present state of international security

Final Declaration of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum "Ensuring Breakthrough In Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation".

Final Declaration of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum "Ensuring Breakthrough In Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation".

London, 2016

Final Document of the Joint Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

Final Document of the Joint Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

Washington, 2015

Resolution 2231 (2015), adopted by the UN Security Council and its 7488th meeting, on 20 July 2015

Resolution 2231 (2015), adopted by the UN Security Council and its 7488th meeting, on 20 July 2015

Final Document of the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing of Nuclear Catastrophe

Final Document of the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing of Nuclear Catastrophe

Stockholm, 2015

Final declaration of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

Final declaration of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

Prague, 2014

Declaration of the Round Table of the International Luxembourg Forum “Towards Progress In Nuclear Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation”

Declaration of the Round Table of the International Luxembourg Forum “Towards Progress In Nuclear Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation”

Geneva, 2014

Declaration of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

Declaration of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

Warsaw, 2013

Final declaration of the International Luxembourg Forum Conference “Safe Tolerance Criteria for Nuclear Non-proliferation Regimes”

Final declaration of the International Luxembourg Forum Conference “Safe Tolerance Criteria for Nuclear Non-proliferation Regimes”

Montreux, 2013

Final Document of the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing of Nuclear Catastrophe

Final Document of the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing of Nuclear Catastrophe

Geneva, 2012

Declaration of the Fifth Anniversary Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum “Contemporary Problems of Nuclear Non-Proliferation”

Declaration of the Fifth Anniversary Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum “Contemporary Problems of Nuclear Non-Proliferation”

Berlin, 2012

Declaration of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum.

Declaration of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum.

Moscow, 2010

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A New Nuclear Arms Race Is A Real Possibility

History suggests the war in Ukraine could put an end to arms control as we know it

Foreignpolicy.com, Sarah Bidgood | #PRESS

Statement by the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group (EASLG) Co-Conveners: Ukraine and Reducing Nuclear Risks

The Co-Conveners of the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group (EASLG) released the following statement:Reducing and eliminating nuclear risks that could lead to catastrophic consequences is a common interest for all nations and an enduring responsibility of the nuclear weapon states

European Leadership Network | #PRESS

New scientific review punctures myth of missile defense

The study found that US systems wouldn’t be effective against even a limited North Korean attack, let alone a more sophisticated one from Russia or China

Responsible Statecraft, Joseph Cirincione | ARTICLE
How to Prevent Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons and a War from Breaking Out in the Middle East

How to Prevent Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons and a War from Breaking Out in the Middle East

How events will unfold will depend on how firm the joint policy of the negotiators in Vienna, namely the United States, Russia, UK, France, China, and Germany, proves to be. The options, other than a quick diplomatic solution, include continuation of difficult negotiations and tougher sanctions, as well as cyber-attacks or military pinpoint strikes on Iran's key nuclear facilities in order to slow down the country's nuclear weapons development. Large-scale military operations eliciting Iranian retaliation cannot be ruled out either. In this case, given the cautious approach of the U.S., Israel believes that it may have to go-it-alone and conduct highly unpopular military actions involving human casualties

Viatcheslav Kantor, ILF President | #PRESS

Op-Ed: What Failed U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Talks Can Teach Us About Negotiating With Iran

The nuclear talks between the U.S. and Iran are a rare second chance to use negotiations to make sure Iran does not get a nuclear device. As government officials, we participated in high-level nuclear talks with North Korea more than 20 years ago. Based on those discussions, we believe now is the best - and likely only - opportunity to accomplish this task peacefully because Iran still does not have a nuclear weapon

Los Angeles Times, William J. Perry, Philip W. Yun | #PRESS

Fulfil the NPT: From nuclear threats to human security

An Open Letter to the States Parties of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

NoFirst Use Global | ARTICLE

Nuclear Command-and-Control Satellites Should Be Off Limits

Blowing up some satellites causes problems. Blowing up these could cause nuclear war

Defense One, by James Acton and Thomas MacDonald | ARTICLE

Clear The Nuclear Landscape of Impediments to Weapons Control

The extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and the summit between the US and Russian presidents have prompted numerous predictions and recommendations as to what Russia and the United States might do in the next five years to preserve shared principles of strategic stability beyond 2026

Vladimir Dvorkin, James Martin Center | #PRESS

Biden Should Endorse No Use And Reject No First Use In The Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review

The Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review, to be released early next year, has led to a pitched battle between arms controllers and deterrence strategists. The fight is over what President Joe Biden should say about when he would consider using nuclear weapons first in the event deterrence fails. U.S. declaratory policy hasn’t ruled out first use, mostly in deference to allies that seek shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella

Forbes.com | ARTICLE

Lessons From the Cold War on Preventing a U.S.-China Arms Race

After months of watching hundreds of new nuclear missile silos being dug in the dirt northwest of Beijing, it is welcome news that President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping seemingly agreed at last week’s summit on the need for strategic stability talks. Strategic stability - the idea that nuclear-armed countries should not be able to gain decisive advantage over one another - has taken on new importance as China expands and modernizes its nuclear arsenal

Politico.com, Rose Gottemoeller | #PRESS

Biden Should Do More to Prevent the Accidental Launch of Nuclear Weapons. Here’s How

On the morning of Oct. 28, 1962, the 13 days of the Cuban missile crisis came to an end with a broadcast on Radio Moscow announcing Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to remove Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba. What President John F. Kennedy referred to as “the final failure” - a nuclear war - had been averted. The events of 1962 may have brought us as close to nuclear war as the world has ever been, but there have been a number of other very close calls involving false alarms and faulty computers

Sam Nunn, Ernest J. Moniz | #PRESS

One Man Shouldn’t Control The Nuclear Button

Congress should require consultation, so generals wouldn’t have to break the rules to save the world Gen. Mark Milley is being criticized for taking actions to forestall the possibility of an inappropriate nuclear launch order by President Trump. The criticism is based on steps the general allegedly took, as described in Bob Woodward and Robert Costa’s new book, “Peril.” Gen. Milley was ostensibly concerned that Mr. Trump was unstable and might order a nuclear launch for political reasons. The general told Congress last month that because he believed China had unwarranted worries of a U.S. attack, he acted to “de-escalate” the situation and contacted his Chinese counterparts to indicate that no attack was planned.

William Perry | #PRESS

Iran and the Complicated History of the Nuclear Deal

In May of 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and in May of the following year Iran gradually began violating its commitments under the JCPOA. On December 1, 2020, the Iranian Majles passed the Strategic Action Plan to Lift Sanctions and Protect Iranian Nation’s Interests, a bill which demanded that the United States lift all sanctions against Iran by February 21, 2021. If the United States failed to do so, Tehran threatened to abandon the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and step up its nuclear activity. And that is exactly what happened. Today, Iran barely complies with the Additional Protocol.

Vladimir Sazhin | #PRESS

Leadership Groups Call on China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and United States to Jointly Reaffirm: “A Nuclear War Cannot Be Won and Must Never Be Fought”

Representatives of the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group (EASLG), the European Leadership Network (ELN), the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN), and The Elders call on China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to jointly reaffirm: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."

Europeanleadershipnetwork.org | #PRESS

Quo Vadis

Russia and the United States showed that, even during periods of increased tension, they are capable of mitigating the risks of military conflicts and the threat of nuclear war The Geneva meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Joe Biden had several dimensions.

Rossijskaya Gazeta, Igor Ivanov | #PRESS
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