Declaration of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe
TOWARDS A NEW ADVANCE IN NUCLEAR ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION
AND ARMS CONTROL
of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum
on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe
December 10-11, 2013, Warsaw
The members of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum approve the activity of the Forum for the year 2013 and endorse the efforts at finding ways of enhancing non-proliferation regime including the research of criteria on the security limits of nuclear tolerance, implemented at the Montreux Conference, held by the Forum in May 2013.
While the overall environment for nuclear arms control and non-proliferation has not matched the hopes and expectations widely felt in 2009 – 2010, following the successful negotiation of New START, two recent developments – in Syria and Iran – have given grounds for cautious optimism about the future of international cooperation in this critical area.
1. The first encouraging development is the Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons reached by the United States and the Russian Federation in September 2013.
We consider of special importance Syria’s joining the Chemical Weapons Convention and rendering its assistance in implementing the agreed Framework.
2. In relation to Iran the members of the Supervisory Board unanimously endorse the Joint Plan of Action elaborated by P5+1 at Geneva negotiations on November 24, 2013, as a first step towards peaceful solution of the highly controversial problems associated with Iranian nuclear program. International controversies over this subject have been one of the major sources of world tensions during the last decade, threat of a new military conflict in the region, and of the danger of disintegration of nuclear non-proliferation regime and process.
The members of the Supervisory Board consider of particular importance Iranian commitment:
· to provide specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iran's plans
for nuclear facilities and nuclear activities;
· to suspend enriching uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months;
· not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant,
Fordow, or the Arak reactor;
· to refrain from building new locations for the enrichment or from constructing reprocessing facilities;
· partly to convert to oxide and partly to dilute to no more than 5% the existing uranium which was previously enriched to 20%;
· the members of the Supervisory Board approve the decision of the E3/EU+3 to respond to the Iranian commitments by their obligation to suspend further reductions of Iran’s crude oil sales enabling Iran's current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil and to enable Iran the repatriation of an agreed amount of revenue held abroad.
Members of the Supervisory Board also support the decision of the E3/EU+3 to suspend the imposition on Iran of new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions or any new EU nuclear-related sanctions.
The beginning of this constructive interaction puts into practice many previous recommendations of the Luxembourg Forum and proposals of its Supervisory Board on peaceful step-by step resolution of this problem. This first positive step was possible only as a result of common diplomatic position of the E3/EU+3, as well as effective economic sanctions imposed by the United States, European Union, which enhanced the sanctions of the UN Security Council of the previous years. This should set the precedent of dealing with all possible future states in case of their violating the NPT or safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
Nonetheless, the signed agreement has a number of limitations:
· the Fordow enrichment complex has not been closed although it being built deep underground suggests its military role;
· Iran has not taken firm commitment to ratify the 1997 Additional Protocol to IAEA safeguards;
· the IAEA inspectors have not been given unequivocal right of access to Parchin site where nuclear weapons related experiments were conducted in the past;
· no mention is made of removing outstanding issues of Iranian past nuclear related activities with the IAEA;
· there is no mention of the limitation of Iranian missile programs, which were one of the subjects of the past UN Security Council resolutions;
· no limitation is placed on increasing the stock of 5% uranium, which has no justification by peaceful energy or scientific needs.
It is also a matter of concern that shortly after the agreement the Iranian officials started giving unhelpful interpretation of its provisions including those relating to the construction of the Arak reactor and notification of IAEA about nuclear related sites.
3. Considering the Joint Plan of Action an important initial step, the members of Supervisory Board call on E3/EU+3 and Iran to reach the final agreement no later than the agreed deadline.
The final agreement should have regard to the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council adopted during the 2006-2010 period, and address the above limitations and other concerns as follows:
· Iran should accept obligations to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related activities, which are not justified by its peaceful energy and scientific needs, and to refrain from constructing new facilities for such activities;
· Iran should take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors to resolve outstanding questions related to its past nuclear-related activities. Iran should not be punished by any new sanctions for possible past violations of the IAEA safeguards;
· Iran should ratify the 1997 Additional Protocol or take legally binding obligations to abide by its terms as an integral part of the final agreement;
· Iran should not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons;
· As a member-state of the NPT Iran is entitled to uranium enrichment and reprocessing – but only in strict accordance to its existing peaceful nuclear energy, scientific and medical needs;
· In response to Iran accepting and implementing the above provisions all existing sanctions related to Iranian nuclear activities should be lifted and Iran rendered full assistance in the development of peaceful nuclear energy in line of the NPT provisions.
The Geneva conference on the Middle East weapons of mass destruction free zone should be convened subsequent to successful resolution of the Syrian and Iranian crises, starting with a chemical and biological weapons free zone arrangement with appropriate attention to ensuring the security of all involved nations.
4. The members of the Supervisory Board note with the regret that US – Russian negotiations on nuclear disarmament are still deadlocked after the successful signing and ratification of the New START in 2010-2011. Hopefully capitalizing on successful cooperation on the above issues of Syria and Iran, the US and Russia will resume this process. In this context:
· Negotiations on the follow-on START Treaty providing, among other things, for the next phase of strategic arms reductions below the ceilings of the new START, should proceed without unjustified delay.
· The US and Russia should begin talks on limitations and confidence-building measures related to long-range precision-guided conventional weapon systems.
· Confidence-building and transparency measures related to strategic ballistic missile defense systems as well as possible geographic and technical guidelines for development and deployment of such systems should be negotiated by the parties with the aim of enhancing strategic stability.
· Simultaneously as a first step confidence-building and transparency measures should be elaborated by the two parties with regards to sub-strategic nuclear weapons storages.
5. The United States and Russia should engage other nuclear-armed states with a view to achieving nuclear arms transparency, confidence building and limitations.
6. Capitalizing on the progress on the Iranian nuclear issue, six-party talks on North-Korean nuclear arms and nuclear program should be intensified with the aim of eventual full denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
7. The major powers and all regional states involved should intensify cooperation in the field of counter-terrorist activities in view of the recent destabilization of the Arab world and potential consequences of the planned withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014.
Members of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum
President of the International Luxembourg Forum, Ph.D.
Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum, Chancellor of the Australian National University (former Australian Senator and Member of Parliament, Minister of Foreign Affairs).
Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum; Member of Presidium, Russian Academy of Sciences (former Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Science and Technology); Academician RAS.
Member of the Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum; Professor at Stanford University (former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense).