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The International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe (ILF) has initiated a new project on establishing a Youth Group of the Forum. The Group will comprise of young professionals from different countries that have an understanding of, and interest in, the issues of arms control, nuclear non-proliferation and security. While the final composition of the Group has not yet been established, its first participants have already had a chance to meet and work together within the framework of the annual ILF Supervisory Board Meeting held in Geneva, December 4-5, 2019
Understanding that 2020 will be decisive for the nuclear arms control system and consequently for strategic stability, recognizing the efforts of the above mentioned organizations to prevent nuclear catastrophe and having deliberated as a conference on June 4-5 in Rome and as a Supervisory Board on December 4-5 in Geneva, we propose the following Road Map for these most urgent actions
The participants of the 10th Anniversary Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe wish to communicate their extreme concern about the present state of international security
CNS Founding Director Dr. William Potter spoke with the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe about the future of Russian-US cooperation on nonproliferation under the new Joe Biden administration
The time has come to take the nuclear football away from this president-and all the presidents that come after him Anyone who watched the disturbing events on Capitol Hill and President Donald Trump’s outrageous role as ringleader of the riot, must comprehend a crucial and terrifying fact: The president of the United States is unhinged and a threat not only to democracy, but to our survival.
Within weeks of taking office, President Joe Biden and his team will be confronted with dozens of pivotal choices. An under-the-radar but consequential decision facing the new administration will be whether and how to move forward with Trump-era plans to expand the U.S. national missile defense footprint with new sea-based missiles that can shoot down long-range ballistic missiles.
China, India, and Pakistan are building out force structures. China and India are moving forward to employ their own assets in space that can be employed for nuclear as well as conventional warfare. Pakistan is likely to rely on commercial observation satellites and China for these purposes. Missile defense capabilities face a host of problems, and yet India is deploying them, much to Pakistan’s discomfort. There is ample evidence that the trend line of deterrence strengthening measures is growing steadily in Southern Asia
The irreversible aspects in connection to the restoration of the JCPOA include the additional centrifuge knowhow and engineering expertise acquired by Iran and new “non-nuclear” sanctions imposed by the US, which may be impossible to lift for domestic political reasons. The uncertainties on the political horizon will impose a narrow time frame for achieving at least a limited early success. It is important that all the parties abide by a certain set of principles
The conventional capabilities that have enabled the United States to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons have also increased the risk of misperception that could spark a nuclear war. The Pentagon’s newly released response is titled “Managing Risks of Nuclear Escalation.” This document is deeply concerned with one particular escalation risk: that the United States’ nuclear-armed adversaries — Russia, China and North Korea — may underestimate U.S. resolve or capabilities
The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the leader of Iran’s suspended program to develop nuclear weapon capabilities, was less about preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons than it was about embarrassing the current Iranian government and impeding it from negotiating a rapprochement with U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s incoming administration. The best that can be practically hoped for now is that Iranian leaders will resist temptations to play into the hands of the assassins and instead explore with Biden’s administration mutual steps to revive the JCPOA
The record of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime has been impressive, defying dire predictions of a world with many nuclear-armed states. Since North Korea acquired nuclear weapons nearly 30 years ago, no additional country has done so. Many factors explain that positive record, but one of those factors has been the ability of the United States to work constructively with Russia and China from time to time in support of shared nonproliferation goals.
Mark Fitzpatrick, an associate fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), says Donald Trump achieved “none of his goals” by quitting the 2015 nuclear deal, noting that Trump “only made the situation more dangerous.”
To the horror of experts, 30 years after the Cold War, the global risk from nuclear weapons is actually getting worse. Here’s how a new administration can turn that around As fires rage across the West and the coronavirus continues its deadly march, President Donald Trump tweets and fulminates but refuses to take charge. He denies climate change; on the pandemic, he leaves to the states his clear responsibility to protect the people of America.
George P. Shultz served as secretary of state (1982 to 1989) and treasury secretary (1972 to 1974). William J. Perry, former defense secretary (1994 to 1997), is founder of the William J. Perry Project on the threat of nuclear weapons. Sam Nunn, former Democratic chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (1987 to 1995), is co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative
It should be possible for the United States and Russia to reiterate in one fashion or another the basic tenet that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. If they are unable to lend their support to this fundamental principle, any comments they might make about the enduring value of the NPT at the next Review Conference will have a hollow ring, writes William C. Potter, Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS)