

INTERNATIONAL LUXEMBOURG FORUM  
ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE



## **PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT**

Proceedings of the Joint Conference  
of the International Luxembourg Forum  
and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy

**GENEVA, 2012**







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- I93      **Perspectives on Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament:** Proceedings of the Joint Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva, 2012/ National Institute of Corporate Reform. — M, 2013. — 144 pages.

ISBN 978-5-9901170-4-4

The book contains proceedings of the Joint Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (September 11-12, 2012, Geneva, Switzerland), which focused on perspectives on nuclear proliferation and disarmament, as well as developments in the situation with the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. The most authoritative experts from different countries participated in the meeting. In addition to various reference materials, the Appendices include the Final Document adopted by the participants in the conference. The publication is intended for experts on the subject, as well as for a wide readership.

UDC 327.37:623.454.8(06)

*The official website of the International Luxembourg Forum: [www.luxembourgforum.org](http://www.luxembourgforum.org)*

ISBN 978-5-9901170-4-4

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## **ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL LUXEMBOURG FORUM ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE**



The Forum was established pursuant to a decision of the International Conference on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe held in Luxembourg on May 24-25, 2007. The Forum is one of the largest non-governmental organizations uniting leading, world-renowned experts on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms and arms reduction and limitation.

The Forum's priorities are:

- to facilitate the process of arms limitation and reduction and counteract growing threats to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and erosion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including the escalating danger of nuclear terrorism and attempts by separate states to gain access to nuclear materials and technologies;
- to promote international peace and security through new approaches, and to propose practical solutions to decision-makers regarding critical non-proliferation and arms control issues.

The principal guiding bodies of the Forum are the International Advisory Council (IAC) and the Supervisory Council (SC).

The International Advisory Council consists of more than 50 leading experts from many countries. IAC members make proposals on the Forum's agenda, arrange events, and participate in drafting the Forum's final documents (declarations, memoranda, statements, etc.) to be circulated to top-tier politicians, heads of international organizations, and public figures around the world.

The Supervisory Council is a team of prominent politicians, public figures, and world-renowned scientists, including Hans Blix, former Director General of the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); William Perry, former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense; Gareth Evans, Chancellor of the Australian National University, former Australian Senator and Member of Parliament, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia; Rolf Ekeus, former OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities; Sam Nunn, prominent U.S. politician and Co-Chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative; Roald Sagdeev, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) and Distinguished University Professor at the University of Maryland in the United States; Nikolay Laverov, Academician and Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences; and Igor Ivanov, Corresponding member (RAS), President of the Russian International Affairs Council, former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

Members of the Supervisory Council advise on the activities of the Forum, a high-profile public entity aimed at strengthening international peace and security.

The Forum is headed by its President, Viatcheslav Kantor, Ph.D., a prominent international public figure, philanthropist, entrepreneur, and investor. Mr. Kantor leads a number of international public institutions.

On April 14, 2008, a Forum Working Group meeting was held in Moscow. Following alarming developments in the Iranian nuclear program, the meeting focused primarily on possible political and diplomatic ways of addressing the issue.

As an outcome of the meeting, the workshop issued a memorandum providing a number of practical steps toward nuclear non-proliferation. Like the previous Luxembourg Conference Declaration, the memorandum was circulated to world leaders and the heads of major international organizations.

The next event took place in Rome on June 12, 2008, in the form of a Joint Seminar of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. The seminar was dedicated to the results and prospects of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

The Supervisory Board of the International Luxembourg Forum met on December 9, 2008, in Moscow. Participants, who included William Perry, Hans Blix, Rolf Ekeus, and Igor Ivanov, summed up the results of the organization's activities in 2008 and outlined plans and priorities for 2009. The session addressed the most urgent nuclear non-proliferation and international security issues, both worldwide and in challenging regions. On the previous day, December 8, Luxembourg Forum representatives met

with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Vladimir Nazarov.

The work of the Forum in 2009, as before, was dedicated to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. On April 22, a Working Group meeting took place in Moscow devoted to the reduction of strategic offensive weapons and the prospects for the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

On July 2 another Working Group meeting was convened in Geneva, with one session focusing on the results of the 2009 Preparatory Committee and prospects for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and the other — on the development of the situation surrounding the Iranian and North Korean nuclear and missile programs. In keeping with the Forum's traditions, final documents on the outcome of the meetings were agreed upon and adopted and then sent to world leaders and the heads of international organizations.

On December 8, 2009, the meeting of the Supervisory Board with the participation of William Perry, Hans Blix, Rolf Ekeus, Gareth Evans, and Roald Sagdeev reviewed the activity of the Forum during the year and highlighted the principal directions for the work of the International Luxembourg Forum (ILF) during the next year. On the next day, Luxembourg Forum representatives met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Yuriy Baluevskyi.

The year 2010 was marked by the signing of the New START Treaty (Forum members called for this in a number of their statements), which attracted special attention to the whole scope of nuclear-related arms control and security problems. These issues were reflected in the work of the ILF and discussions that took place at the Forum's events.

On April 8-9, a Working Group meeting was held in Vienna devoted to the prospects of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. This discussion was especially important on the eve of the Conference itself. A number of the practical proposals addressing the pressing non-proliferation issues were summed up in the Working Group final document. The document, containing possible solutions to the acute issues of the Conference agenda, was forwarded to world leaders.

The ILF Conference in Washington (September 20-21) placed special emphasis on the stumbling blocks on the way toward ratification of the Treaty, analyses of the possible next steps in arms control, and the future of nuclear disarmament and non-

proliferation. The prospects for cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), as the principal possible area of partnership, were subjected to thorough analyses.

The ILF event attracted special attention from the political academic community and the public at large. The prominent American member of the Forum's Supervisory Board, Senator Sam Nunn, actively participated in the discussion and in the press conference that followed.

The traditional annual meeting of the Supervisory Board took place on December 8-9, 2010. In opening remarks, Sergey Ryabkov, Deputy Russian Foreign Minister, presented the Address of the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, in which the latter highly praised the activity of the Forum in strengthening the NPT Treaty, perfecting arms control mechanisms, and preventing the threat of nuclear terrorism. The President also provided assurance that the proposals and recommendations of the Forum were finding their practical implementation in the solution of these problems by the world community.

As usual the meeting took place with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, who presented his vision of world security and Russian interests and took into consideration the proposals of the Supervisory Board (SB) on practical solutions of the most acute issues of non-proliferation and arms control. Members of the SB also visited the Security Council of the Russian Federation (Deputy Head of the Council – Vladimir Nazarov).

In their Declaration members of the Supervisory Board paid special attention to and expressed their unanimous and strong support of the article by four Russian "wise men" (Y. Primakov, I. Ivanov, Y. Velikhov, and M. Moiseev), "From Nuclear Deterrence to Common Security," published in the Russian newspaper *Izvestiya* on October 15, 2010. Also the principal directions of the Luxembourg Forum's activities for the year 2011 were set. Among them was quite an innovative task: to elaborate "red lines" of abiding by the spirit and letter of the NPT, the crossing of which would entail effective actions by the UN Security Council, in accordance with articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter.

In Stockholm on June 13-14, 2011, a Joint Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) was held on the topic: "Perspectives of Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament after Entry into Force of the New START Treaty." In the course of the meeting the status of nuclear non-proliferation, prospects for the future reduction and limitation of nuclear



weapons, and cooperation in BMD were analyzed as key problems for future nuclear disarmament.

The annual meeting of the Supervisory Board took place in Moscow on December 12-13, 2011. In addition to the presentations by William Perry, Rolf Ekeus, and other members of the Supervisory Board and International Advisory Council on the acute issues of non-proliferation and arms control, the meeting was addressed by Anatoly Antonov, Deputy Defense Minister of the Russian Federation; Nikolay Spasskiy, Deputy Director General of the Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation; and Vladimir Leontiev, Deputy Director of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

On June 4-5, 2012, Berlin hosted the Anniversary Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe under the title "Contemporary Problems of Nuclear Non-Proliferation." Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov gave a welcoming address to conference participants. The participants included Igor Ivanov, former Russian Foreign Minister and Security Council Secretary; Nikolay Laverov, Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences; William Perry, former United States Secretary of Defense; Roald Sagdeev, Academician (RAS) and Distinguished University Professor at the University of Maryland; Jayantha Dhanapala, President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; Rolf Nikel, Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control at the German Federal Foreign Office, and other leading global experts and political figures.

Conference participants discussed the current state of and prospects for the reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons, as well as key aspects of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including the role of the UN Security Council and the IAEA. They also analyzed the effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty after the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Following the tradition, the Fifth Anniversary Conference produced a Declaration, which is now being sent to the leaders of nuclear states and heads of international organizations.

In its future plans, the International Luxembourg Forum is going to continue the approach that appears to be fruitful, involving penetrating expert analyses of the most pressing problems in non-proliferation, arms control, and international security, with the goal of producing proposals of practical value.





## **WELCOME ADDRESSES**



**Viatcheslav KANTOR, Ph.D.**

President of the International Luxembourg Forum  
on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe (Russia)

Dear colleagues and friends! Dear Mr. Tanner! It is a tremendous pleasure for me to welcome you all to Geneva, because Geneva is a city where I have lived for twenty years, and it's a city that I love. I feel like a true host, and I have a great desire to extend to you my warmest welcome here. I think that tomorrow you will probably have a chance to experience, and not for the first time, how much Geneva can surprise you, if you so desire, with its beautiful weather and great and truly Swiss sights.

Nevertheless, I would like to mention that we have gathered here today in Geneva to discuss extraordinarily important and topical issues related to the usual, traditional agenda of our Luxembourg Forum.

As you know, the topic of today's joint conference with the Geneva Centre is prospects of nuclear proliferation and disarmament. It's a rather general subject, but, as I emphasized, it's extremely topical for the issues that we are set to discuss. This includes the prospects for nuclear disarmament, which is once again encountering significant difficulties because of disagreements on missile defense. As previously, strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime remains, extremely relevant. The Iranian nuclear crisis is developing precipitously, and the prospect of de-nuclearizing the Korean Peninsula appears undetermined.

The process of implementing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is going as planned, and so far we have no reasons for concern. However, the United States and Russia have different interpretations of the meaning and binding character of the section in the preamble on the interrelation between strategic offensive and defensive

systems. There are profound disagreements between the parties on the scale, character, capabilities, and intended purposes of the phased approach of the United States and NATO to developing and implementing a missile defense system in Europe.

The Russian leadership still sees the phased adaptive approach as a threat to its nuclear deterrence capability, strategic stability, and the prospects for nuclear weapons control. NATO justifies the phased adaptive approach as a necessary, legitimate response to the growing threat of retaliation from Iran and other existing and potential radical regimes.

For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of a new offensive and defensive arms race has emerged. The development and deployment of a missile defense system by the United States and its allies in the Asia Pacific Region is a source of concern for China, which is likewise undertaking offensive and defensive counter-measures.

Russia rejects the position of the United States and NATO, which insist that an agreement must be reached on the reduction and limitation of non-strategic nuclear arms and nuclear weapons in storage as a precondition for the execution of a subsequent treaty on strategic offensive weapons. The problem of non-strategic nuclear weapons control is extraordinarily complicated, and it has yet to be undertaken as an official project. At present, the only conceivable solution involves a multistage process of consultations between the United States and Russia.

Two other paramount circumstances and the corresponding agreements are in a stage of profound stagnation. There is almost no hope that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty will become effective anytime soon, or that there will be any substantial progress on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Similarly, there are no positive signs of progress on the issue of preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space. Tests of suborbital and orbital weapons systems continue against this backdrop. There is the prospect of an outer space arms race, which could completely undermine strategic stability and liquidate arms control.

Despite all of the resolutions of the UN Security Council, sanctions, and the diplomatic efforts of states holding negotiations with Iran, it continues to pursue its nuclear program. Over the past three years, Iran has doubled the number of underground centrifuges at Fordow to 2140 and it does not admit IAEA inspectors into Parchin. If you recall, when we were beginning our movement five years ago, the total number of centrifuges in Iran was less than that number.

I believe that if negotiations are to continue, we cannot retreat to a prohibition on enriching uranium to 20 percent. Rather, we must demand compliance with UN Security Council resolutions that require that the enrichment of uranium to any level be stopped. Any retreat from that demand would signify an unprecedented blow to the authority of the UN Security Council.

In response to economic sanctions by the United States and the European Union, Iran is threatening to block the Strait of Hormuz and is conducting intensive military activities, which have provoked a growing U.S. military presence in the region and preparations for military action by Israel. Indeed, Israel is demanding that a red line be drawn, beyond which an Israeli attack on Iran will become a matter of fact, a decided issue.

The threat of a new war in the Persian Gulf area in the near future is greater than ever. Such a war could lead to catastrophic and unpredictable consequences.

The insistent efforts of North Korea to build its nuclear missile capabilities are the main cause of continuing tension in the Far East. Recently, this has been augmented by the growing military strength of China, the United States, and their allies, as well as territorial military tensions in the South China Sea.

The political and military contradictions among the states of the Asia Pacific Region are becoming a new and growing threat to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

In brief, those are the issues that we will discuss and for which we will formulate recommendations and proposals on ways to resolve them.

Tomorrow we will reach agreement on the Final Document with the members of the Forum's Supervisory and Advisory Councils. As always, we will present the declaration to the leaders of key states and to the leadership of the main international organizations, including the UN, IAEA, NATO, CSTO, OSCE, and others.

I will remind you that since the Luxembourg Forum was formed five years ago, we have held fifteen conferences, seminars, and working meetings in nearly all of the world capitals, including Washington, Moscow, Luxembourg, Rome, Vienna, Stockholm, and Geneva. Each time we presented specific proposals to designated addressees for the resolution of the most topical nuclear security problems. Practically all of the addressees considered the Luxembourg Forum's proposals in their work, as is evidenced in their responses. I hope that this will continue.

I wish great success for our conference! Thank you very much!



**Fred TANNER, Ambassador**

Director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy  
(Switzerland)



Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to open this distinguished meeting of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe.

I had the chance to attend the meeting in Berlin, where I met the president, Mr. Kantor, and all the various members of the Forum. I am very proud that the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) can host today's event, with the participation of the distinguished representatives of the Geneva International Community, missions, and think tanks, as well as representatives of the United Nations.

Allow me to say a few words about the Centre, as we are hosting this event today. We pursue three activities, which are professional training; promoting dialogue; and promoting networking and innovative research in the broad field of peace and security.

It is also important to note that Russia has been one of the GCSP founding members for the last seventeen years. The focus on disarmament is an important area of our activities. We have here with us today a number of colleagues from the Centre dealing with disarmament, including Dr. W. Pal Sidhu, who is the Head of our WMD and Disarmament Programme. We have Ms. Alexandra Tokareva, who is our Programme Coordinator. I am also glad that we have Dr. Gustav Lindstrom here, who is an expert on missile defense and the broader issues of security. Dr. David Atwood and Dr. Barbara Zanchetta are GCSP Visiting

Fellows on Disarmament, and Professor Catherine Kelleher is an Associate Fellow at our Centre.

I am confident that all our experts will be providing valuable contributions to today's and tomorrow's meetings. They have been driving our disarmament activities in Geneva and abroad, and have great expertise in the field. Our Centre offers about 40 courses per year in Geneva and elsewhere. The courses outside of Geneva include ones in New York, Brussels, Amman, Dakar, and Sarajevo. Actually, as we speak, we have a course going on in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. These are our partner hubs, where we provide courses in the field of peace and security, civil and military issues, and also disarmament-related courses.

For the first time this year, we featured an in-house course on disarmament, which was geared toward the Geneva-based disarmament community. We also had broad participation from the capitals of other countries, such as Moscow, but also from Algiers. Being located in International Geneva, and since Switzerland is a neutral place, we always attach importance to involving countries like Iran and North Korea in our Centre's activities involving dialogue.

In fact, we just finished a course on New Issues in Security in July, where we had two North Korean colonels and a South Korean official in the same class. I think it's quite unique that we make a contribution to promote the building of bridges among countries at risk or countries that need to improve their relationship, and that's very much a part of our mandate.

With regard to research activities, we are also running a project dealing with "Security in a World Without Nuclear Weapons," which is a joint project with New York University's Center on International Cooperation (CIC). The objective of the project is to better understand what would be the basis of security, particularly the institutional arrangement necessary to prevent great power conflict in a post-nuclear-weapons world.

The project is not about going to global zero, but it is really about what the geostrategic conditions should be once we get there. It's an issue of vision; it's an issue of hope, and we hope to be able to make a contribution in this context.

We also run an online course every year on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Disarmament. It's now the third year that we have an online course on this topic, and it is also very much a part of our effort focused on global community building.

Our philosophy with regard to disarmament is very comprehensive. We like to look at these issues in a broader strategic context. In the context of Europe, we are looking at disarmament in a broad pan-European security framework that should also include nuclear weapons, missile defense, and conventional forces.

But, of course, today in light of a very serious economic crisis, it is important to include economic factors in our analysis of disarmament. We don't know what the Europe of tomorrow will look like and what impact it will have on disarmament and on force postures in the near future.

Another activity that we are pursuing at our center is promoting dialogue. We hold public discussions; we enhance the exchange of views and ideas. We also help the Finnish facilitator, Mr. Jakko Laajava, in his important work related to holding a conference in Helsinki on establishing a Middle Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

Part of our platform is also to offer our Centre as a forum for the exchange of views and ideas. We will have Ms. Angela Kane, the High Representative of the United Nations, here on Friday for a VIP luncheon together with important organizations like UNIDIR, which is present here today, and others. I think this is an opportunity to really make sure that the difficult period of the Conference on Disarmament can be compensated for with innovative and outside-of-the-box thinking.

Allow me to highlight just one other event that will take place next year between April 22 and 24. It's the so-called International Security Forum, which will be hosted by the GCSP, together with four other organizations. We expect about 500 participants at this event, representing the members of the security policy community, who will come to Geneva.

During this period, the GCSP and three other organizations: Reaching Critical Will, the Monterey Institute for International Studies, and the CNND (the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Canberra), will also present a study, assessing the implementation of the Action Plan obligations of the NPT Review Conference. The event will be organized under the auspices of Mr. Gareth Evans and run by Professor Ramesh Thakur, who prepared the report and is going to present it during the ISF. It is really in this context that our Centre tries to make a contribution to advance the agenda of disarmament.

Finally, one word about our relationship with Russia. I mentioned that Russia is one of the founding members of our Centre. It is represented on our Board by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation here in Geneva. We have a Russian official and scholar on our Advisory Board — Mr. Alexei Arbatov. So far, 44 Russian officials, military officers, and diplomats have participated in our courses.

In addition, we have had participants from Russia in our short courses, as well as distinguished Russian guest speakers at our activities. Last December, we, specifically Dr. Gustav Lindstrom, organized a seminar on missile defense. On this occasion, we had Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin here as one of the speakers.

We have also organized several events together with Russian partners. Last March we held a public discussion on Russia's presidential elections at the GCSP. We also have a privileged relationship with the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow and have had participants from the Academy. Right now we are in contact to finalize a memorandum of understanding with the Diplomatic Academy for closer cooperation.

Moreover, we are working very closely with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on what we refer to as the Chambesy process. It involves meetings dealing with current security issues in a little castle here in Geneva, at which we always have a very high-level Russian delegation and an important delegation from NATO and other organizations dealing with security problems.

Finally, it's a privilege for us to work with the permanent mission of the Russian Federation here in Geneva. I'm referring, of course, to my friend and colleague here, Mr. Viktor Vasiliev. In this context, it is really an honor that we are having this conference here today, and I hope that our Centre can contribute to the success of this meeting.







## **SESSION 1**



Chairman –  
**Pal SIDHU, Ph.D.**

Head of the WMD and  
Disarmament Programme, Geneva  
Centre for Security Policy (India)



# Cooperation in BMD and its Role in Future Nuclear Disarmament

## **Victor ESIN, Ph.D.**

**Leading Researcher of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies RAS; former Chief of the Armed Service Staff – First Deputy Commander-In-Chief, Strategic Rocket Forces; Colonel General, ret. (Russia)**

Let me remind you that at the Russia-NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010, an agreement was reached to continue cooperation on missile defense. The NATO-Russia Council was assigned the task of determining the future framework for that cooperation. At the time, considering the “reset” underway in Russian-American relations, people began to expect a breakthrough on the missile defense issue. That breakthrough would open the floodgates for the establishment of a qualitatively new model of cooperation between Russia and NATO close to an alliance arrangement, which would also include many other areas of cooperation related to security in the European Atlantic region.

As a result of this expectation, in 2011 research projects were carried out by communities of experts in Russia, the United States, and other countries. Implementing those projects would have made it possible to put into practice the declared intentions of cooperation between Russia and NATO on missile defense. I will mention only those projects in which I myself took

part, along with many other Russian and American participants of today's conference. These include projects of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative and joint projects between the Institute of World Economy, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), and the Brookings Institution. The projects' teams of authors generally ended up with a more or less stable conception of the possible structure of a joint missile defense system in Europe, based on the compatibility of two self-sufficient missile defense systems belonging to NATO and Russia respectively, as well as a conception of the top-priority steps that must be taken in order to lay the foundation for cooperation on missile defense. This primarily involves creating cooperation centers staffed by personnel from Russia, America, and other NATO countries; working together toward the goal of forming a general picture of the spatial extent of missile threats; and working out measures to counter those threats on the basis of objective information supplied by the parties' respective missile attack early warning systems and outer space monitoring systems, as well as other sources. In essence, this is nothing other than a revival of the Russian-American project of 1998-2000 for the creation of a joint center for the exchange of data from missile launch early warning and notification systems, but at a higher level and with expanded functionality. The other top-priority step was to renew joint command table-top exercises in the area of missile defense. I am pleased to comment that, following a four-year break, those exercises resumed in March of this year at Germany's initiative. It is now important to expand their format, eventually moving on to field exercises at missile testing sites and involving the real firing of surface-to-air missile systems.

However, on the official level, negotiations that are being conducted by Russia-NATO and Russia-U.S. working groups in order to determine the framework for missile defense cooperation have reached an impasse. Moscow is insisting that it be provided with legally binding guarantees that the missile defense system being built by the United States and other NATO countries in Europe will not be directed against Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal. The United States and NATO as a whole are ready to give no more than political guarantees, which was confirmed at the highest level at the NATO summit in Chicago in May of this year. That is not enough

for Moscow. The lack of trust between the parties, which goes back to the Cold War and has yet to be overcome, has its effect. As a result, the problem of missile defense has become extraordinarily acute, which was clearly demonstrated in a discussion that took place at an international conference entitled "The Missile Defense Factor in Building a New Security Space," which was held in early May of this year in Moscow upon the initiative of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

I may be so bold as to assert — and I am not the only one in Russia to hold such an opinion — that the missile defense system that the NATO powers are building in Europe is not capable of having any substantial depreciative effect on the potential of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, as for the distant future, meaning 2025-2030, it is unlikely that this will change, since the new missile installations being built in Russia have enhanced capabilities for overcoming missile defense. But the thing is that the missile defense problem has developed from a largely military issue into a matter of political and psychological significance. This is how the apparently irreconcilable conflict arose. Domestic policy factors both in Russia and especially in the United States, as well as in other NATO countries, have had a powerful negative impact. So, the missile defense problem may remain a stumbling block in Russia-U.S. and Russia-NATO relations for a long time.

Generally speaking, both the missile defense factor and the anti-missile defense factor have become just as important as variables in the international security and strategic stability equation as strategic offensive weapons. It will no longer be possible to ignore this fact.

I do not wish to prophesy, but I am very worried that if a way out of the missile defense impasse isn't found, the process of nuclear disarmament, which made a leap forward when the Russian-American New START Treaty was concluded in 2010, will come to a halt and will likely experience a setback after 2020.

At the same time, the window of opportunity to find a way out of the missile defense impasse is still open. In June of this year, the presidents of Russia and the United States, Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama, declared at a meeting held on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Los Cabos,

Mexico, that "in spite of our differences of opinion, we agreed to continue to search together for solutions to the problematic issues in the area of missile defense."

In July of this year, the Institute of the United States and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences issued a scholarly report entitled "Ten Years without a Missile Defense Treaty," devoted to the problem of missile defense in Russian-American relations (the report has been made available publicly on the Institute's website). The Institute's director, Dr. Sergey Mikhailovich Rogov, headed the team of authors. I was also a member of that team. The final section of the report proposes a possible political compromise on missile defense. In essence, it boils down to the following propositions:

The solution to the missile defense problem should be sought on the basis of a pragmatic approach based on actually attainable possibilities of cooperation between Russia, the United States, and NATO on missile defense in Europe, and not on unrealistic expectations. Furthermore, the following premises should be taken as given:

First, both Russia and the United States/NATO remain bound by the Lisbon agreements of 2010 that commit them to cooperating on European missile defense.

Second, it is to be understood that the parties' lack of trust in each other's intentions and the continuing factor of mutual nuclear deterrence prevent the parties from creating a full-fledged joint European missile defense system. This is in spite of political acknowledgment that Russia and the United States and NATO are no longer enemies, but partners.

Third, we accept the fact that each party is currently creating its own self-sufficient missile defense system. Therefore, the only task we can possibly set for ourselves is that the two missile defense systems be compatible with each other. Neither Russia nor the United States/NATO will control the other party's missile defense system.

Fourth, having the parties participate in a joint missile defense project is the only way to raise the level of confidence between the parties, accommodate both parties' interests, address certain matters of concern, and avoid a confrontation.

Fifth, the impasse reached in missile defense cooperation cannot be fully resolved in a single stroke. The problem needs to be resolved in stages, beginning with ways to lay the foundation for practical cooperation and interaction on missile defense. I have already spoken about the top-priority steps, and I don't need to repeat that.

If the parties can reach a political agreement on the approaches described above, a potential version of the structure of a European missile defense system could be as follows:

- The United States and NATO will restrict themselves to setting up two SM-3 missile land bases, one in Romania and one in Poland. That means no more than 24 interceptors at each of the two bases.

- The United States will restrict itself to deploying no more than a total of ten ships equipped with the Aegis combat system and SM-3 missiles to be based in the Mediterranean Sea and North Sea (such ships are not to be based in the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, Barents Sea, or White Sea).

- Russia will upgrade its A-135 central industrial region's missile defense system and will rearm it with interceptor missiles with conventional warheads. Additionally, several dozen new S-400 and S-500 missile defense systems will be deployed in the European part of Russia, and ships with similar missile defense systems will be deployed in the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, Barents Sea, and White Sea.

Each of the parties will independently provide for the missile defense of its own territory and interact with the other party through cooperation centers.

In order to implement all of these plans, it will be necessary to institutionalize cooperation between Russia and the United States and NATO on their European defense systems by signing a corresponding political document. Of course, it won't be a legally binding treaty, which, for well-known reasons, would have no prospects for entering into force even if it were signed. It could be a political agreement in the form of a joint declaration establishing the principles of cooperation and interaction for missile defense, which will have a status similar to that of the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between the North American Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation.

The proposals of the Institute of the United States and Canada indisputably need to be worked out in greater detail. However, I do believe that implementing them will make it possible to create a mechanism for cooperation between Russia and the United States and NATO on European missile defense, make missile defense predictable, and thereby eliminate the looming threat of a confrontation capable of undermining strategic stability. Moreover, if the United States agrees to limit certain conventional precision-guided, long-range weapon systems that are capable of threatening strategic sites, then new agreements will become possible for the reduction and limitation of Russia's and America's nuclear potentials. That, of course, will be predicated on other states not building up their nuclear arsenals.

With that, I end my report. I thank all of you for listening, and I'm ready to answer whatever questions you may have.

**Gustav LINDSTROM, Ph.D.**

**Head of the Emerging Security Challenges Programme,  
Director of the European Training Course in Security Policy,  
Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Sweden)**

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be here and address the members of the Luxembourg Forum. The goal of my presentation is threefold: 1) to address the topic of our session, which is the potential role of missile defense in nuclear disarmament; 2) to examine cooperative missile defense and how it might impact disarmament; and 3) to highlight potential unintended consequences that may arise in the near future.

To commence, it is worthwhile to consider whether or not missile defense contributes to — or could contribute to — nuclear disarmament in the first place. It is a question that should be asked before delving deeper into cooperative missile defense. And what is very interesting to note is that you have at least two camps concerning this question.

In one camp are those who tend to argue that missile defense can be conducive to greater nuclear disarmament. Several arguments are offered. A rather counterintuitive argument frequently raised is the positive role missile defense could play as countries move toward a world free of nuclear weapons (Global Zero). As countries reduce their nuclear arsenals, missile

defense could play the role of an insurance policy, offering protection and confidence against countries that may want to keep a breakout capacity or might want to cheat. This would be of particular importance as countries move toward the fourth and final stage of Global Zero, presently estimated to take place between 2024 and 2030.

In addition, if missile defense is effective, it would decrease the utility of nuclear weapons — effectively encouraging disarmament. Also, countries that might be interested in pursuing the weapons in the first place might decide not to do so, possibly minimizing the scope of the future disarmament landscape.

From a different vantage point, there are also very strong arguments against missile defense and how it may impact disarmament. First, and as is noted in the preamble of the New START Treaty, missile defense may affect the relationship between offensive and defensive systems and weapons. If there is a perception that there is an effective missile defense system, some countries may try to take retaliatory measures. They may also be very unwilling to engage in disarmament.

There are also arguments noting that many confidence-building measures — such as de-alerting or de-targeting — could be impacted if there is the perception that missile defense changes the relationship between countries and their offensive and defensive capabilities.

Last, missile defense may encourage some countries to either acquire or develop new types of weapons. Some countries may likewise shift their policies to other types of weapons that are more difficult to stop with missile defense but that would have implications for disarmament.

Having painted this broad picture concerning the possible benefits from and arguments against missile defense as far as disarmament is concerned, I would now like to focus a bit more on cooperative missile defense. How might that impact nuclear disarmament? Here I would like to echo some of the comments made by the previous speaker, General Esin, that a cooperative missile defense system between Russia and the United States and NATO should theoretically facilitate disarmament efforts. I emphasize the word “theoretically” because I believe — and this is a personal belief — that the perceptions of and expectations for cooperation are currently very different



between the sides, and I believe that they will continue to be quite different for the foreseeable future. Still there are some silver linings. For example, if you look at the May 2012 Chicago Summit documents, there are indications of cooperation: a NATO-Russia missile data fusion center and a joint planning operations center to facilitate cooperation on missile defense.

Presently, the key challenge is harmonizing the expectations for cooperation. Should it be limited? Should it be extensive? And here the United States and Russia seem to have different views. The Russians are very keen on developing a cooperative system on equal footing, trademarked by an equal partnership. The Americans are more hesitant; they feel that they have invested a lot more in missile defense, and they don't want to give that up. They would much prefer to have a more basic type of cooperation.

This spills over into whether or not it should be a more shared system of cooperation, or indeed whether we can move to a joint system in the future, and I think there are different expectations on both sides of what the ultimate goal of this cooperation will be, and that, of course, has implications for disarmament in the future.

With respect to benefits, one can ask whether cooperation is beneficial to both sides to the same extent. And here there are different arguments on both sides. If the threat is from Iran or North Korea or some other place, and if you look at the ranges of the missiles, maybe Russia would be in a more precarious situation. If you are looking at the sectors of responsibility or how the system would work, you could perhaps again make the argument that Russia would be in the front line, so to speak, and that the United States and Europe have more of an opportunity to defend themselves. An additional twist to this, of course, is that the Europeans within NATO, along with the United States, have to figure out for themselves how they will develop their missile defense system. And that adds another wrinkle of complexity to cooperation with Russia.

Now, if I move beyond the idea of cooperation, the third point on the slide is that we cannot forget improvements in both delivery technology and decoys. This will perhaps limit the disarmament effect of cooperative missile defense.

You could argue that if countries develop delivery systems that can bypass missile defense, because they have advanced decoys — for example,

China is working on these at the moment — the potential benefits of missile defense to encourage countries such as the United States and Russia to disarm might be weakened.

We should not forget the fourth point on this slide, which is that missile defense goes beyond Russia and the United States. Cooperation and missile defense between Russia and the United States within the NATO system may impact the disarmament stance of third countries, and I will come to this point in my next slide.

Before I do so, I would like to refer to some statements that were made in the deterrence and defense posture review presented in Chicago. We need to keep these statements in mind when we think about the potential for disarmament. Let me just read one or two, given our time constraints. One states that “nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence.” It is a very strong and clear statement. Another statement reads as follows: “missile defense can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them.” A final statement: “NATO missile defense is not oriented against Russia.” So again you can read different things in these statements, keeping in mind the relationship between missile defense, the delivery systems, and what their intended effects are.

This is my final slide before the summary, and perhaps this also serves to broaden the picture a little bit for the discussion. It concerns potential unintended effects. There are several different things that may happen in the medium to long term, but I am highlighting four of them for you, and I think I have already foreshadowed several.

First, missile defense can have an impact on both existing and future treaties. It is not clear at this stage whether the successor to the current New START, which should be concluded at some point in February of 2021, will be undertaken in the same spirit as it was this last time, even though there were also some contentious issues then. Remember, however, around this time period, 2021, the EPAA or the European Phased Adaptive Approach is to reach its fourth and final stage. This is when we will see if there is a standard missile 2B. This is when we will see if there is a missile that can achieve a velocity of five kilometers per second or more. This is when we might have

an understanding of where some of these seaborne interceptors might be located. It will be a very, very interesting time.

Second, China is probably not going to sit on the sidelines and watch this evolution. In fact, they are currently working on their next generation ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and on submarine-launched missiles. And you may have read about the tests that are now being done on the Dongfeng 41. The Chinese are also allegedly looking into trying to have up to ten warheads on some of these missiles, including advanced dummies for their missiles. These are decoys with heat and electro-magnetic devices, which make it much more difficult for a missile defense system to be effective, and which will have implications for how other countries may adapt their disarmament postures and even their non-proliferation policies.

Third, it is important to remember that there may be ramifications for missile defense efforts in other parts of the world, and I would highlight here Asia and also the Middle East. It is interesting to note that there is a lot of attention being paid to missile defense in Europe, on the European Phased Adaptive Approach. There is much less attention given to what is happening in the Middle East, where there is effectively another phased adaptive approach taking place, involving the sales of a lot of advanced weapons to the Middle East, including other systems, such as radars. To illustrate, a lot of new Patriot missiles are being brought to the region; for instance, Kuwait is expected to receive 60 Patriot Advanced Capability missiles. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar are obtaining some advanced radar technologies.

And, of course, we have the situation with Iran. So again, what happens in one place may have implications for developments in other places, and this will have implications for disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Overall, we need to be clear that some of these effects may have unintended results that we need to be aware of, including the acquisition of weapons systems that can challenge missile defense technologies. One example is cruise missiles, which tend to be low-signature weapons. Missile defense is not ideal for dealing with cruise missiles, even though their ranges are already of a strategic nature, and they can have an impact at the regional level.

This concludes my presentation, and I look forward to the follow-on discussion.





## **SESSION 2**



Chairman –  
**Vladimir DVORKIN,**  
**Professor**

Chairman of the Organizing  
Committee of the International  
Luxembourg Forum (Russia)

# The State of and Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament

## **Hans BLIX, Ambassador**

**Member of the Supervisory Council of the International Luxembourg Forum, former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ph.D. (Sweden)**

Two years ago after the signing of the START Treaty, the Washington Conference on Nuclear Security, and a relatively successful NPT review conference, there was a good deal of hope about disarmament. The current outlook is dismal.

### **Armaments are currently increasing**

Rather than reducing their armaments, many countries in the world are engaged in upgrading their military power. According to SIPRI, the total military expenditures in the world are around 1.8 trillion dollars. Some 40% of this is made up by the U.S. defense budget, which is much larger than it was during the Cold War. Congressional pressure is strong for defense expenditures. In order to win the necessary consent for the Senate ratification of the START Treaty, President Obama had to commit his administration to a very costly program to maintain a high U.S. nuclear

weapon capacity in a state of readiness, and the construction of the U.S. missile shield has continued.

With more resources available through the phenomenal growth of its economy China is modernizing its military machine, not least its missiles and its navy. After a long period of decline in military strength, Russia is reorganizing and consolidating its armed forces. Beyond these three key players, many other states, including France, Germany, Japan, and the UK, are spending in a big way on the military.

Australia has announced a major strengthening of its defense, and an agreement has been reached under which the United States will be able to station forces in the country. India is likewise devoting more resources to defense, including submarines. In the Middle East, the nuclear program in Iran has led the countries on the Gulf to spend billions on missile defense and air forces. Israel is further strengthening its antimissile capacity and deploying submarines. The UK seems determined to proceed with a program for new nuclear-armed submarines to succeed the Trident. South Africa has bought fighter planes of the most modern generation. Why? To defend against Namibia?

My own country, Sweden, has just announced that it will spend large sums to build a more modern version of an indigenously constructed fighter plane. The government is not citing any specific new threat, but the decision is generally interpreted to have been made as a consequence of concerns about Russia's course following the war in Georgia.

Brazil has declared that it will build a nuclear submarine. I do not have information as to whether it is meant to be fueled with low or highly-enriched uranium. I think we can be sure, however, that it will be Brazilian enriched. I am less sure what threat Brazil perceives in its vast maritime economic zone.

In many cases the acquisition of new military hardware and the upgrading of military forces are clearly a response to perceived higher security needs. Sometimes one may wonder whether there is much justification for the perception. Are we perhaps seeing cases of excessive insurance?



## **The climate for disarmament has deteriorated**

What has happened since 2010 that has led to more pessimistic security perceptions? What can be done to justify new optimism?

In 2010, with the Iraq War still in memory and with little hope for a military solution in Afghanistan, more arms did not generally look like a promising means to solve political problems. Diplomacy and détente were the preferred mode. President Obama had said that he was willing to talk with anyone to solve conflicts.

In 2010, the applause was still loud and wide for the 2008 message from the four elder U.S. statesmen that the threat to world peace after the end of the Cold War no longer came from the United States and Russia, but from possible state and non-state nuclear proliferators, and that this new threat could only be countered by the United States and Russia beginning and leading the world's march out of the nuclear weapons era.

However, hopes at that time that military hawks had resigned or lost their claws were shattered by the resistance mounted in the U.S. Senate to ratification of START and by the minor grumblings that could be heard in Moscow. The fierce opposition in the United States made clear that it would be futile to resubmit the CTBT for ratification, and that the approval of further nuclear cuts would be difficult.

In the period after 2010 the paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament has continued, and despite a greater direct engagement by the United States and some Russian and Chinese support, negotiations with the DPRK and Iran have made no progress. Indeed, the lack of results in the talks with Iran seems to raise an acute risk of Israeli preemptive military attack.

Even the Arms Trade Treaty — to impede the illegal export of arms — was recently blocked. The Obama administration put it off, no doubt in order to avoid rubbing the powerful U.S. National Rifle Association the wrong way before the presidential election.

On the bright side, after 2010 there is little to register. Efforts to improve nuclear security have continued — with the second conference being held in Seoul earlier this year and with various practical measures achieved. The United States has announced its willingness to discuss a code of conduct regarding operations in space.

## What can be done to revive disarmament?

If we wish to revive disarmament — as we do — we must focus on a variety of political developments and armament policies in various parts of the world and ask how they could be changed to permit détente and disarmament. Let me begin with Europe.

The war involving South Ossetia raised suspicions that Russia might be bent on revanchism and suggested to European states that they should maintain military forces not only for international operations in support of the UN but also for their own territorial defense. By now the awareness that the war was initiated by Georgia has largely removed the suspicions and restored a readiness to welcome Russia into the circle of advanced industrial states, for instance through the WTO. Even so, current non-democratic and authoritarian trends in Russia are reviving reservations and preventing complete détente.

On the Russian side there remains understandable suspiciousness about U.S. and NATO plans for a missile shield in Eastern Europe — allegedly to protect against possible Iranian attacks. NATO has also not formally shelved plans to invite Georgia to become a member.

Under these circumstances, the idea of the withdrawal of some 200 American tactical nuclear weapons deployed under NATO in Europe and a similar withdrawal of Russian tactical weapons to central storage in Russia have been postponed. Worse, the old B-61 nuclear bombs will apparently be replaced by modernized ones.

The unwelcome mini-chill in the relations between the former parties to the Cold War needs be cured through prudent and pragmatic policies. The EU and the United States must welcome post-communist Russia as a part of Europe, and Russia must continue on the difficult path to becoming a well functioning modern state. Both must pursue the policies of a good neighbor.

How does the Arab Spring affect détente and disarmament? In, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen there is new popular participation in political life. This — and the difficult economic situation — might reduce the role of the military and military expenses. Whether it will reduce interstate tensions remains to be seen. Recent conciliatory steps by Egypt toward Iran might suggest a measure of détente.

A collapse of the Syrian regime might open the way for the eradication of chemical weapons in Syria and perhaps allow an explanation of the apparently nuclear venture that was destroyed by Israel. While it would serve to isolate Iran further and impede Iran's channel to Hezbollah in Lebanon, it would hardly radically affect the controversy about Iran's nuclear program.

That controversy, which is a source of both cooperation and conflict between members of the Security Council, could develop into war but could also, if resolved, contribute much to détente and disarmament. Iran itself, Israel, and the Gulf states have long spent vast sums on airplanes, missiles, and missile defense. Even Iraq — fresh out of the disaster of war and sanctions — is now spending billions on a new military aircraft.

On the whole, the perspective of war seems unlikely to me. If it were to occur, with the United States participating, I think it would not trigger military measures by Russia or China, but relations between these states and the United States would deteriorate dramatically and lead to an increase in armaments. A peaceful resolution, on the other hand, could ease tension in a major way in the Middle East and encourage further cooperation among the great powers, including on the Korean nuclear problem.

In East Asia there should theoretically be a strong common interest among the great powers to solve the North Korean nuclear challenge, because a continued failure could lead to further proliferation, including in Japan.

The potentially most serious differences in Asia relate to Taiwan and to the border between China and India. While these cases probably do provide incentives to uphold respectable military strength, they are fortunately handled with prudence and pragmatism. If they were allowed to be heated up by popular nationalist feelings, they would trigger arms build-ups and tension.

A good number of smaller bones of contention in the form of islands and borders at sea are spread among China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Viet Nam, and more states. While probably of limited economic importance (oil resources are not known to exist there), these cases have a good potential to reawaken and ignite nationalist emotions. They also risk stimulating thoughts of military measures and appeals to the United States to weigh in.

In my view, it is high time that the states in the region and the United States begin to defuse these conflicts by means other than the flexing of military muscles. Arbitration is a highly useful and much tested method for the solution of this kind of dispute. It occurs without much loss of time and without a loss of prestige.

The main responsibilities for developing and restraining the military build-up that we now see fall on China, India, Japan, and the United States.

A last comment: since 2010 the public and political attention has shifted from disarmament — and also from climate change — to the financial crisis. It would be appropriate to remind governments that they would be able to reduce not only risks for their peoples but also reduce their budgetary problems by pursuing policies that lead to détente and permit drastically lower levels of armaments. It is worth noting that not long ago the largest share of GNP spent on military expenses in Europe was by Greece.

# Strengthening the Non-proliferation Regime

## **Benno LAGGNER, Ambassador**

**Ambassador for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation and  
Head of the Division for Security Policy and Crisis Management,  
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Switzerland)**

First of all, let me thank both the International Luxembourg Forum as well as the GCSP for inviting me to speak. It's also a pleasure to address this gathering of eminent persons. Most of you are much more knowledgeable about the topic I will be addressing than I am, and of course, it is a great honor to speak after Dr. Blix. I would also just like to apologize for the poor state of my voice. I hope you can understand me. But I will be pleased to share with you some thoughts from a Swiss perspective on strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

The issue of non-proliferation raises crucial questions for international peace and stability. If nuclear weapons were ever to be used again — be it intentionally or accidentally — catastrophic humanitarian consequences would be unavoidable. More states with nuclear weapons would also mean a less secure world. Switzerland strongly believes that disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin and inextricably linked.

An effective international non-proliferation regime is a prerequisite to moving toward the stated goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. But

advancing nuclear disarmament is also necessary in order to advance the non-proliferation agenda. Although the NPT, which is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, has delivered clear results in terms of non-proliferation over the past forty years, progress in nuclear disarmament is not satisfactory.

As Dr. Blix has already mentioned, we are actually witnessing an upgrading of arsenals. We see quantitative and qualitative increases of nuclear arsenals. Thousands of nuclear weapons are still deployed today, and a significant number of these are still being kept on a high level of alert and ready to be used within minutes.

In addition, none of the nuclear-weapon states have called the notion of deterrence into question, and it is really the role, and the prestige and the value, attached to nuclear weapons that hasn't changed and that can also act as an incentive for other countries to try to acquire these weapons.

Finally, efforts toward nuclear disarmament seem to be random rather than systematic and coordinated, and often are more the result of budget cuts or technological developments than really being based on a genuine desire to disarm.

This has led to a perceived imbalance among the pillars of the NPT. And it is this perception of imbalance that also makes it difficult to rally broader support for measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

Now, let me be clear. Unsatisfactory progress on disarmament does in no way justify being soft on non-proliferation. I don't want to be misunderstood. All states, including the non-nuclear-weapon states that want to see more efforts in the area of disarmament, have an obligation to implement the non-proliferation commitments and also to address cases of concern. But it is equally clear that broader support for implementing non-proliferation measures, especially voluntary measures such as the Additional Protocol, would be helped if the nuclear-weapon states demonstrated in a more credible manner the implementation of their disarmament commitments that they have signed up to in the NPT context.

Let me now move beyond this complex relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation to highlight four other points that I think are important if we want to talk about strengthening the global non-proliferation regime.

First of all, there is, of course, the challenge of universality. The NPT is not universal, and the CTBT has still not entered into force. Several IAEA state members have yet to implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement. Other states have yet to ratify and implement the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism or the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment. So there is a lot of unfinished business that has to be taken care of.

We therefore need more rigorous efforts to achieve universal adherence to the key international legal instruments that are part of the non-proliferation architecture. But — and here I would like to add a more personal comment — of course, we always see every NPT Review Conference exhorting the non-NPT nuclear-weapon states to join the NPT. But we all know this is not realistically going to happen. So I think we also need to develop some creative thinking. How can we draw the nuclear-weapon states that are outside the NPT into the framework of standards and norms that the NPT states have subscribed to? I don't have an answer to this question, but maybe some of the eminent persons around the table have some ideas how we could approach this.

Second, we should spare no efforts to strengthen the tools that we already have and to better implement them. As regards non-proliferation, the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference has 23 actions that deal with non-proliferation. We have to implement them. In this context, Switzerland has launched different initiatives to optimize and make the IAEA safeguards system more effective.

Last year, we funded a study, which was also presented at the General Conference in Vienna, with the title "Optimizing the IAEA safeguards system," the idea being that the resources of the Agency really need to be directed where they are needed and that we have to move away from a mechanistic across-the-board approach to really focusing the resources where there are cases of concern.

The Agency is working on what is called a state-level approach. Now this, of course, is a very delicate issue. How do you differentiate without discriminating? But this is definitely a challenge that has to be addressed and looked at. In a few days, we will organize another workshop in Vienna

on the issue of strengthening the cooperation between the IAEA and the national and regional authorities in charge of safeguards implementation.

Such initiatives we hope will contribute to a concrete strengthening of the existing tools. One important tool that I would also like to mention is nuclear-weapon-free zones. They play an important role in promoting and safeguarding regional and international peace and stability, and they support both non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. One of the main challenges facing the current NPT review process is the holding of a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMDs in the Middle East.

Switzerland fully supports the efforts of the facilitator and hopes that the states in the region would recognize that this really is an opportunity for them to get over past grievances and to think of a future of interdependence and common security interests. And, definitely, progress or the lack of progress on this issue will have a severe impact on the atmosphere of the next NPT Prep Com and the next Review Conference.

Third, we also need to deal effectively with cases of non-compliance. We need to, on the one hand, also equip the IAEA with the instruments and the resources it needs to be able to detect cases of non-compliance. And then of course, there has to be action by the international community. I know that there will be a session that will be specifically devoted to Iran and North Korea later on.

I would just like to state that the Swiss view is that we need to look for a diplomatic approach to these cases of concern in order to find a long-term acceptable solution for all sides. But they are a challenge, because they threaten to undermine the effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime.

And my fourth and final point: we also need to strengthen the regime by developing new instruments. In this respect, I would just like to highlight the discussions on a fissile material cut-off treaty. This would be an important way of having a framework that would include both the NPT nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon states outside the NPT.

Switzerland still believes that the Conference on Disarmament is the best venue for negotiating such a treaty, but of course, I don't want to deny that the Conference is facing serious challenges and problems.



So to sum up, Mr. Chairman, I think strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime first of all requires that we develop a common interest in it, that we see it as a common interest to strengthen this regime.

We have to move beyond entrenched positions and discussions of whether we ought to have disarmament first, or which area should be given more priority — disarmament or non-proliferation — to see that both issues have to be pursued. We have to be creative; we have to strengthen the existing instruments, but also think how we can develop new instruments. And of course, the most significant thing is — this is not technical work. It requires political will and commitment.





## **SESSION 3**



Chairman –  
**Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV,**  
**Ph.D.**

Director of the Institute for Strategic  
Assessments (Russia)

# Iran's Potential Nuclear Catastrophe

## **Mark FITZPATRICK**

**Director of the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Programme,  
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (United States)**

When discussing nuclear catastrophes, there is good reason to focus on Iran.

It is important to recognize the realities of the threat that Iran poses, but not to exaggerate them. Iran is not at the verge of producing a nuclear weapon. It is still months away from being able to make a successful break-out from the NPT if a decision were made to also break the fatwa against producing nuclear weapons. The production of 20% enrichment is worrisome, but half of the product has been converted for fuel, out of harm's way for the time being. Meanwhile the missile program has been seriously affected by sanctions. Iran cannot reliably import ingredients for solid fuel for the Sajill-2 missile, which poses the most concern because of its reach and short launch preparation time.

Concerns that Israel would strike prematurely this autumn have abated. President Shimon Perez recently joined security establishment notables in opposing a strike. In the words of academic Shai Feldman, the internal debate in Israel is now over. Defense Minister Ehud Barak has also changed his tone, expressing confidence in U.S. military readiness vis-a-vis Iran in the

Gulf. It seems that Israel has taken the message from the United States and the UK that a premature, unilateral strike would be counterproductive.

Israel was pleased at the strength of the international reaction to Iran's nuclear program. Sanctions imposed this summer by the United States and EU are truly biting, and they will further tighten. Amazingly, Iran's oil sales have been halved without a rise in the global oil price, so Iran was not able to offset the loss. Canada's decision to suspend diplomatic relations was ominous and countered the optimism Iran felt a few days earlier in hosting the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. NAM members lent Iran political support, but not many will be putting their money where their mouth is.

Sanctions are causing high inflation, unemployment, and a further fall in the value of the rial, which lost 50% of its value last winter and recently began another free fall. The Iranian people are putting the blame on their own government. As yet there are no signs that discontent will erupt into street protests in Tehran akin to the Arab Spring, but Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has to worry that, as elsewhere, economic trouble can spark political unrest.

Despite some good news, Iran's nuclear program has not been stopped, nor even slowed. Both the pace and accumulation of enriched uranium continues to grow. One cannot ignore the many reports of weapons-related work. I cannot understand why Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov claims Russia sees "no signs" of a military dimension to Iran's nuclear program. The IAEA's report last November detailed 65 paragraphs of activity of a "possible military dimension." Most of the reported activity was in the past, pre-2004, although some apparently continued. The IAEA's evidence is not conclusive proof of activity related to nuclear weapons, but it is certainly evidence of "signs."

Diplomacy is seen to be failing. The optimism that greeted talks in the spring soon faded, as neither side was willing to give much. What the E3 + 3 demanded was only a set of confidence-building measures. They temporarily set aside full suspension demands and focused on the urgent issues of 20% enrichment and operations at Fordow. The Six asked Iran to "stop, ship, shut" — to stop 20% production, to ship out the accumulated 20% stockpile, and to shut down Fordow. Iran was only willing to stop, for which

it asked for the moon: an end to sanctions and the right to enrichment. Those concessions can come only in exchange for dealing with the overall enrichment problem, not just the temporary confidence-building measures that were requested.

If Iran had any inclination to make a serious deal, it would probably wait until after the U.S. election. But it may not move from its negotiating position until after its own election in June, if then.

Israel wants the United States to set a deadline for military action. This would mean changing Obama's red line, which is not to allow Iran to build a nuclear weapon. Israel puts the red line at no weapons capability, whatever that means. It is uneasy about putting security in others' hands, and Fordow is the biggest concern because the centrifuge cascades 80-90 meters underground are out of Israel's reach.

Obama will keep to his red line of no nuclear weapons production, rather than pledging to go to war over an ill-defined incremental expansion of operating centrifuges. But there is a danger that Iran will miscalculate and get too close to a break-out option. If the timeline gets too short, Obama's red line becomes too faint. The danger of a war or of an Iranian break-out will heighten next year. It could present the most difficult and fateful decision for whoever occupies the White House.

# The Iranian Nuclear Crisis – Present Status and Prognosis for the Future

**Barbara ZANCHETTA, Ph.D.**

Visiting Fellow on Disarmament of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Italy)

Let me start with a few introductory remarks.

First, I think the sense of imminent crisis that has characterized the Iranian nuclear “file” is not a positive factor. It can hardly create an atmosphere for productive negotiations; it deepens the divide between the two sides — that is, the West vs. Iran — and the mutual mistrust between the two; and it emboldens the Iranians while weakening the West’s credibility.

Second, the level of attention that the international community dedicates to the Iranian issue and the escalation of this sense of crisis at times seem exaggerated. Currently, for example, there is a much more imminently severe crisis unfolding in neighboring Syria, which would require the same, or if necessary, a higher level of attention and readiness to intervene.

These considerations are not intended as a means to downplay the implications of the Iranian crisis, but are simply an effort to bring some perspective to the issue. Moreover, I would like to stress that I believe that the potential *implications* of this crisis, rather than the mere facts, are the real



issue. It is these that — in the long term, more than in the immediate — could have far-reaching consequences for the region and the world.

Passing on to assessing the crux of the matter, I believe that it is crucial to better define the terms of the issue. In other words, what is this crisis *really* about?

Is it actually about the nuclear program? Is it about preventing the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons? Is it thus part of a general goal of the international community to reduce, and *not* increase, the number of nuclear-weapon states? If this were the main objective of the international community, then the Iranian issue would have to be part of a bigger, much more coherent strategy. Technical means, though limited, do exist to address a potential proliferation case, but these would be all the more credible and effective if they were part of a strategy that is not perceived as one-sided and inherently “unfair” by many countries in the Middle East, including Iran. Moreover, the Iranian crisis is not inserted into a broader regional context, and it is dealt with in isolation. It is the only issue that has remained in the spotlight for over a decade, with the sense of repeated and escalating crisis mentioned above.

But perhaps the problem goes deeper. Is this crisis about the Iranian regime, rather than about its nuclear program? It is not so much or not only a problem of a state potentially acquiring nuclear weapons, but is it the *type* of state that could become nuclear-armed that is causing this high level of alarm? A state with a fierce anti-Israeli rhetoric that supports terrorists and has persistent conflict in its relationship with the United States and an increasingly questionable domestic legitimacy? In this case, we are not just facing a potential proliferation problem, but we are in the midst of a severe political crisis with potentially global ramifications.

On the basis of these considerations, the first indispensable step toward addressing, and hopefully peacefully resolving, the Iranian issue is a clarification of the terms of the matter and a clear-cut definition of the kind of crisis we are facing.

To me it is obvious that the problem is more political than technical. The Iranian crisis is *not* only about nuclear non-proliferation. By focusing exclusively on the endless technical details of Iran's quest to master the

uranium enrichment process, we have created a cat and mouse situation with seemingly no way out. Even in the moments of cautious optimism — between 2003 and 2005 and again at the beginning of the Obama administration — mutual distrust eventually prevailed, causing repeated setbacks and a renewed sense of crisis.

So, where do we stand today? What can be done to escape this cat and mouse situation? The progress made by Iran in enriching uranium, the often uncooperative attitude toward the IAEA, and the disregard of UNSCRs seem to indicate that Iran's intention is to acquire a nuclear weapon capability that will put it in a position to be able to assemble nuclear weapons *if and when* the Iranian leadership makes this decision. Until now — considering also the Supreme Leader's Fatwa prohibiting nuclear weapons — it seems that the political decision to "go all the way," that is, to "go nuclear," has *not yet* been made in Tehran. In this situation, therefore, the central questions are: how to induce Tehran to stop short of weaponization? What steps can be taken by the international community to bring about this *political decision* in Iran?

I will suggest three points that — if actually implemented — would represent an authentic new approach of the international community and of the Western countries in particular in dealing with the Iranian crisis.

First, a comprehensive shift in the psychological framework of the negotiations is needed. Instead of exclusively focusing on worst-case scenarios, the possibility that Iran wishes to acquire a nuclear weapon capability in order to be better positioned in future negotiations should at least be considered. In this context, and especially considering our Russian audience, it is important to recall the Soviet Union's attempt to negotiate "from a position of strength" in the late 1960s. Moscow never considered entering arms control negotiations with the United States until it was in a position that forced Washington to acknowledge the Soviets' status and respect their demands. This was at the basis of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and of the success of these and future negotiations between the superpowers.

Second, it is useless and counterproductive to insist on positions that are no longer feasible. Iran's progress cannot be ignored, and neither can Iran be "forced" back. Consequently, at this point, the only way forward

might be an offer of implicit acknowledgement of potential nuclear weapon capability, and thus legitimacy of Iranian uranium enrichment, in exchange for verifiable guarantees from Tehran that it will not weaponize. I do not see any other choice.

Third and finally, it is futile and short-sighted to envision solutions to the Iranian crisis without addressing the crux of the problem: the United States of America. The United States remains central to the Iranian insecurity dilemma and thus to the motivations behind the nuclear program. Iran is still waiting for America to accept the legitimacy of the regime and the outcome of the Iranian revolution. I have seen many authentic documents dated either just before or right after the departure of the Shah in 1979, in which the new Iranian officials demand recognition by America of past mistakes and acknowledgement of a new, independent government in Iran. Some of these same requests — charged with the same rhetoric — continue to come from Iran, and still remain unaddressed — at least not in any long-term, strategic way — by Washington. It is for this reason that I believe that the key to solving this crisis is in Washington, *not* in Tehran. Only a redefinition of the U.S.-Iranian relationship will address the deeply-rooted insecurity dilemma behind the Iranian nuclear program and, ultimately, lead Iran to renouncing the nuclear weapon option.

The problem is that in *both* countries this topic — the U.S.-Iranian relationship — continues to be a highly charged domestic political issue. In the United States, it is difficult for any American president to gather support for an authentic shift in policy toward Iran. And in Tehran, continuing to depict the United States as the “great Satan” provides a much needed “outside” enemy and threat that keeps together an increasingly de-legitimized autocratic regime. Consequently, any positive change will take time and patience.

As a historian, I cannot only focus on what will happen next year. I am much more interested and concerned about what will happen in ten or twenty years’ time.

A military intervention — whether by Israel alone or sponsored by the United States — might delay the development of Iran’s nuclear program for a few years, but in the longer term it will further deeply exacerbate the

tensions and lead to an even worse escalation of the crisis. According to current assessments, the situation now is already on the verge of breaking into war. Assuming that this is the case — and that such scenarios are not used as a political strategy to put pressure on Tehran — then this is the moment in which, necessarily, the stakes are higher. To avoid war, broader, not narrower, visions are needed.

In the long term, the continued isolation of Iran from regional affairs is not feasible. Iran has a potential role to play in all major issues in the region — from the stabilization of Afghanistan and Iraq, to the future of Syria and of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. And the ongoing discussions on the creation of a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East would become meaningless without the participation and active contribution of Iran.

In conclusion, I would like to say — sadly and simplistically — that there is no easy way out. As already mentioned, it is hard to imagine any kind of progress without a clarification of the international community's real objectives. A *political* more than a technical solution is called for. This will take time and creative diplomacy. The current sense of persistent and imminent crisis does not help.

The U.S.-Iranian relationship must be addressed, since it is difficult to imagine a real solution to the nuclear issue if this prolonged diplomatic stalemate continues and is further exacerbated. No serious bilateral negotiation can or should be public; the "Nixon to China" option, however inconceivable in today's globalized world, still seems to me the only way to test the ground.

The broader steps I outlined have yet to be taken. For this reason, I would like to see — and I would energetically call for — a shift in the attitude of the United States and of the West in general. We should acknowledge that not all options have been tried, and that creative diplomacy and statecraft have been lacking when dealing with the Iranian crisis. Such acknowledgments should take place *before* even hinting at military "solutions."

# The Current State and Future Prospects of the Six-Party Talks with North Korea

## **Alain GUIDETTI, Ambassador**

**Diplomat-in-Residence of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy,  
former Swiss Ambassador to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan  
(Switzerland)**

Just a remark: we are shifting now from the Iran issue to the North Korea issue, and there are two elements of continuity I would like to mention.

The first one is that we have the chance to have a colleague from the Iranian mission here for the debates, whereas there are no North Koreans here for the continuation of the debate. And the second element is that we have discussed the Iran nuclear issue based on the assumption that it is presumably the most urgent issue, but looking at the North Korean issue, we are actually much more advanced with the North Korean model than with the Iranian one.

The negotiation process on the North Korean nuclear issue has been in a stalemate since December 2008, so it has been almost four years now. With political transitions in Washington, Seoul, Pyongyang, and Beijing, and related uncertainties, the time is ripe for renewed thinking as to how to get out of the current situation.

Whereas North Korea is continuing to pursue the development of its nuclear program, many options can be considered, from a possible return to the negotiation framework of the Six-Party Talks centered on the nuclear

program, to a possible methodological shift toward a peace-centered approach. But eventually any move toward negotiations will depend on several variables of which three are most significant.

The first is the evolution of the North Korean regime during a period of transition. The second is the position of the new U.S. administration in 2013 on negotiating with North Korea. And the third is the advancement of the nuclear program itself.

Of course, many other factors have varying degrees of impact on this issue. China, the closest ally to North Korea, is, besides the United States, the most influential player in the region. But China decided in 2009 to prioritize stability over denuclearization and the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It did so in the aftermath of Kim Jong-il's first talk that triggered the succession process in Pyongyang.

Since then, China did a lot to prevent the risk of a regime collapse in Pyongyang and strongly backed the North Korean leadership economically and politically, sometimes at a high cost. Remember, for instance, how China was criticized for refraining from condemning North Korea's military actions in 2010. Thus, China's influence is constrained over the North Korean nuclear posture, although it remains formally the guardian of the Six-Party Talks negotiation process.

Another factor is South Korea, whose policy toward the North has oscillated over the last twenty years between sunshine and containment. By the end of the year, South Korea's presidential election is likely to produce a shift in Seoul's North Korean policy toward a more conciliatory tone. Nevertheless, even a return to some kind of sunshine policy might not have a direct impact on the North Korean nuclear strategy, at least in the short to medium terms.

We could also mention, of course, Japan and Russia — very important players in the region — as well as the developments in the China Seas as additional factors that may to some degree contribute to shaping the pursuit of the North Korean nuclear strategy.

Going now to the first variable: the transition of power in North Korea, it has been seen as an opportunity to defuse the tension on the Korean Peninsula. Since the death of Kim Jong-il, his son Kim Jong-un is well in charge, at least formally, in accordance with his father's plan.

Obviously the regime has not collapsed. And Kim Jong-un has gone through this first stage of the post-Kim Jong-il transition and has been confirmed in his leadership, since he has quickly been appointed to the leading positions of the party and the army. No major turbulence has emerged in Pyongyang, despite some significant changes at the top of the military over the last couple of months.

So, for the regime and for the ruling family, this preliminary phase has been successfully completed. The leadership has control over the transition process, and stability has been granted for now. This was only possible thanks to the support of the three core players of the regime: the sister of Kim Jong-il, Kim Kyong-hui; her husband, Jang Sung-taek; and Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, Director of the General Political Bureau of the current People's Army.

Furthermore, this would hardly have been possible, as said before, without the full backing of China. Now Kim Jong-un, who has lived in the West, seems to want some change and in that he is supported by his mentors. He has said publicly that he wants "a happy and prosperous people, better living standards for all, and modern technology for his country."

His subordinates recognize that the economy is "facing weaknesses and shortages," which is an unusual recognition for a country that always claimed the contrary against any evidence. But more important, there is now this totally new narrative: "We must see the new reality of the world," something unthinkable some years ago, perhaps even a year ago.

And here is another piece of the new official narrative: "Kim Jong-un wants to now put the people at the center." Notwithstanding the rhetoric, could it be that behind the dogma, which puts the army first, one would try to shift the order of priorities?; that one wants to put development in the name of people as a first priority, and in this case, at what price?

Well-informed sources said that some circles within the army have already shown some discontent, and the recent changes at the top of the military may be related to that.

Pessimists will say that North Korean leaders have always dreamed of economic developments, but the system is simply unable to deliver, and that is true. But isn't there something new in the equation, when a new

North Korean leader says that the happiness of the people is the goal — that the people (and not the army) are at the center, and that we must see the new realities in the world?

More than one million cellular phones are circulating in North Korea, and computers are spreading. The most prominent location in Pyongyang besides official buildings is now a new district with completely new architecture based on the model of Southeast Asian modern cities. Perhaps even more revealing is the expression on the faces of the people in the streets. They look relaxed and smiling, something I had never seen in the 2000s. Perhaps they feel some reason for hope.

The presumed willingness of the new leaders to change, if it can possibly be confirmed and is sustainable, is just a necessary precondition. The test will come when translating the ideal into reality. It is already what prevented Kim Jong-il from moving toward some reforms. The cost of the reform was likely to surpass its possible benefit if the stability of the regime was perceived at stake and a breakdown was a possible outcome.

Now Kim Jong-un is facing the same dilemma. We don't know his strategy, but he is perhaps willing to open Pandora's box, that of the reality of the outside world. The failure of sixty years of closure and the absence of meaningful reforms may have shown the new leader that change is a prerequisite for economic development.

But the question remains, as before: how to strike a balance between reform and stability, and how to ensure the loyalty of the military, in particular, when its very position seems to be at stake? This is the challenge that the new leadership is facing.

So, what could be the impact of these developments on the nuclear program? Most observers say that North Korea will not abandon its nuclear program. They may be right, but the more isolated and disconnected the North Koreans are from the world, the more likely "army first" will continue to prevail, and the more adamant North Korea will be to advance its nuclear program.

With priorities and attention turned to the development of one of the poorest societies in the world, the North Korean leaders might well have less time to prepare for an unlikely war, be it conventional or nuclear.



And eventually they may be all the more interested in striking a broad deal with the United States, as was actually Kim Jong-il's aim over the last fifteen years.

The second variable will be the position of the new U.S. administration in 2013 on the resumption of negotiations with North Korea. The "Leap-Day Deal" agreement signed between the United States and North Korea was the first substantial step since 2009 to revive the negotiation process.

Both sides agreed on a moratorium on nuclear and missile defense testing, the suspension of operations at the enrichment plant in Yongbyon, and the return of IAEA inspectors in exchange for food aid. This marks a major advancement after a three-year absence of formal negotiations. Anyway, such a moratorium is likely to be the best that can be expected, as long as fundamental issues for North Korea, i.e. security guarantees, a peace treaty, and normalization of bilateral relations with the United States, are not addressed.

The problem is that the agreement is presumably dead since the failed missile or satellite launch of April 12. The circumstances of the controversy between the two sides are not entirely clear, but the ambiguity over the understanding of the other party's commitment could possibly permit, if taken constructively, a new start for negotiations in 2013. The North Koreans have already been sanctioned by not receiving food aid promised by the United States.

Under those circumstances, the stakes would shift to nuclear. Basing their analysis on the 2006 and 2009 precedents, many observers predicted a nuclear test in the aftermath of the missile launch and again recently, shortly after the publication of an expert report, indicating that the North Koreans were technically able to make a test on short notice. But the circumstances may be different today, as Pyongyang confirmed last June that in principle it would not proceed with a nuclear test.

Many things may have happened by 2013, but assuming that no test takes place, the conditions would be better for both sides to envisage a resumption of some more formal dialogue. The North Koreans have been saying for a while that they are open to dialogue without preconditions.

The February 29 Agreement still forms a basis for negotiation. Other options would be possible, but this agreement, the Leap-Day Agreement,

constitutes after all an attractive deal for the United State, since it provides for a nuclear/missile freeze and the return of IAEA inspectors at a very reasonable price.

Therefore, in 2013 we could hope that a new Obama administration might have more margin to maneuver and feel more inclined to shift from a posture of strategic patience — or strategic inaction or strategic ambiguity — to a more active one of resuming the dialogue with North Korea, possibly on the basis of the Leap-Day Deal agreement.

This could in turn pave the way toward a further step, i.e., the restart of the Six-Party Talks, in order to address broader political, economic, and security issues. But it could also lead to a methodological and political shift in Washington toward addressing the conditions for a peace treaty for the Korean peninsula, which could be negotiated in parallel to the denuclearization of North Korea.

This might seem a better avenue for success, but it would obviously require a shift in U.S. strategy and priorities. As the Republican candidate seems to support a more hawkish position toward North Korea, this might not only prevent the resumption of negotiations but also produce more tension, particularly in the event that Washington pushes for further sanctions against Pyongyang.

In the absence of a clear commitment from Beijing to enforce sanctions — and we know its reluctance in this matter — they would hardly reach their ultimate goal, as was demonstrated in the past. However, they might prompt contrary reactions from North Korea, for instance, in the form of a new nuclear test — a good reason, perhaps, for not doing so right now. This could only trigger a new wave of instability in the region.

How the scenario would interact with the U.S. rebalancing strategy in the Asia Pacific Region remains an open question. But it seems that further tension in the Western Pacific and a renewed prospect of a nuclear North Korea would only boost U.S. arguments for further implementing the pivot to Asia and expanding the missile defense program in the region.

Finally, the last variable is the advancement of the nuclear program itself, as already mentioned. In the absence of an agreement, Pyongyang is free to develop its nuclear program. North Korea shut down its 5MW

plutonium production nuclear reactor in 2007, but according to the IAEA's assessment, North Korea has enough plutonium for four to eight weapons.

Furthermore, North Korea has been pursuing a uranium enrichment program, presumably since the end of the 1990s. Its capacities are unknown, but considered to be limited. In addition, Pyongyang is further developing its missile program. The last test in April of this year shows, as did the previous ones in 2006 and 2001, that its capacity to develop a long-range missile still faces some hurdles. However, it is likely to move ahead anyway, in order to have a vector that could eventually target the United States with a nuclear missile. For the time being, according to IISS, it has not been able to miniaturize a nuclear charge to adjust to a long-range missile. This might be the purpose of a further nuclear test.

So, all these brief considerations show that it should be urgent for the next U.S. administration to seriously consider the resumption of dialogue with North Korea. To be sure, a sea of difficulties lies ahead. But it's likely the price of maintaining the prospect of a more stable Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

# North Korea's Nuclear Missile Potential and International Security

**Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV, Ph.D.**

Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments (Russia)

## **The North Korean crisis: why?**

The heightened attention to North Korea's nuclear missile program relates not only to North Korea's achievements in the development and creation of nuclear weapons and missile technologies. To a significant extent, the high degree of concern results from Pyongyang's aggressive policies, actions, and declarations.

It is obvious that what is happening is a combination of the North Korean state's existing nuclear missile potential with its actual and declared adventurist policies, which can be described figuratively as balancing on the edge of a precipice. The methods by which Pyongyang developed its nuclear program are also notable. Having acquired all of the privileges of a party to the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty, Pyongyang withdrew from the Treaty, thereby revealing its intentions and simultaneously clearly pointing politicians and experts toward the gaping hole in the non-proliferation regime.

For those who have a sense of the character of the North Korean regime, it is also obvious that constantly imposed tension is the best way for the

country's leaders to strengthen permanently their position by speculating on an external threat. This method, tried and tested by authoritarian rulers, has been successfully applied over and over in international relations.

At the same time, in this way the country's leaders solve the task of disguising their own political bankruptcy by hiding behind stock ideological formulas. It also deflects attention from the state's flawed system of economic management and its inability to provide normal living conditions and the basic conditions for a normal life for the population.

In justification of its actions, the North Korean regime constantly promotes the theory of an American threat. There truly is no question that regimes of the North Korean type absolutely fear the policies of the United States, which, particularly during the pre-Obama period, did not hesitate to conduct armed interventions in disregard of international law.

In the North Korean case, it is even possible to trace through time the reactions of the country's leaders to Washington's actions. When the U.S. invasion of Iraq occurred in 2003, the last remaining IAEA inspectors were sent out of North Korea, and 8,000 fuel rods, which had previously been kept in storage, were removed from the Yongbyon complex. George Bush's inclusion of North Korea in the so-called "Axis of Evil" added further fuel to the fire.

Due to Pyongyang's constantly provocative policies and actions, tension remains high on the Korean peninsula. There also has been a failure to take advantage of the attitudes of Obama, who, unlike his Republican predecessor, is much more inclined to conduct a dialogue, as opposed to exerting forceful pressure.

After the third nuclear test conducted by the North Korean regime in February 2013 and the sharp reaction of the international community (in particular, the passage of a UN Security Council resolution and the conduct of military exercises by South Korean and U.S. forces), Pyongyang has set out to further escalate the situation. A statement of the so-called Committee for the Peaceful Unity of the Homeland issued by the Korean Central Telegraph Agency related that under present conditions, "any non-aggression agreements between North and South involving the renunciation of armed force, the prevention of inadvertent confrontations, the

peaceful resolution of conflicts, and border issues have lost all meaning." North Korea also announced that it considers the joint declaration with Seoul on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula to have "long ago lost its force."<sup>1</sup> Additionally, Pyongyang has communicated that it has cut off the sole emergency telephone hotline between the military offices of the two Korean states in the negotiations point at Panmunjom, located in the demilitarized zone between them. As a result, the situation on the peninsula has become even more explosive.

## **North Korea's nuclear missile potential**

North Korea's nuclear missile program is characterized by extraordinary secrecy and lack of openness. Pyongyang has chosen the preferred tactic of constantly balancing on the verge of escalating tensions with the countries of the region and the world's leading states.

Not wishing to admit IAEA inspectors to several sites that raise serious doubts about their peaceful purposes, Pyongyang announced on March 12, 1993, that it was withdrawing from the IAEA. That withdrawal took place in 1994. The situation escalated even further after the United States made a number of accusations that uranium was being enriched in North Korea and then suspended the supply of fuel to North Korean electric power stations. This resulted in Pyongyang's official announcement in late 2001 that it was renewing its nuclear program, and in North Korea's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 2003.

That rather easily accomplished unilateral withdrawal by one of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty raised a number of paramount questions. The most important of them is obviously the overdue need to at least provide for a responsible withdrawal procedure that could not simply be carried out upon the withdrawing party's own initiative and without making that party subject to any kind of penalty. This is especially obvious, considering that each of the parties to the treaty enjoys substantial advantages in the form of access to technologies and organizational solutions that help it

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<sup>1</sup> "KNDR otkazalas' ot vseh soglasheniy s Yuzhnoy Koreey o nenapadenii" [The DPRK has rejected all non-aggression agreements with South Korea," March 8, 2013, (<http://ria.ru/politics/20130308/926399893.html>).

develop its peaceful nuclear capacity. Under the current Non-Proliferation Treaty provisions, a state can obtain those advantages and then withdraw from the Treaty, thereby acquiring an advantaged starting position in creating a military nuclear program that violates the Treaty's provisions.

According to the conclusions of a report composed in 2011 by a group of experts operating under the aegis of the UN Security Council, North Korea has been conducting a uranium enrichment program over several years or possibly even decades. Currently available assessments by independent authorities indicate that by late 2010, North Korea possessed approximately 30 kilograms of plutonium extracted from the spent fuel of an ostensible research reactor in Yongbyon. That quantity is sufficient to create approximately eight nuclear warheads.<sup>2</sup>

There is an array of evidence showing that the creators of North Korea's nuclear weapon systems made ample use of designs and materials obtained with the assistance of a so-called underground network established by the "father" of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, A. Khan. Nevertheless, the problem of reducing the size of the warhead still remains unresolved. By now, the North Korean regime has already conducted three underground tests of its nuclear weapons, in October 2006, May 2009, and February 2013.

The steady advance toward the creation of nuclear weapons has also been accompanied by the active development of missile technologies. According to the approximate estimate, by the end of 2012 the ground forces of the Korean People's Army had at its disposal three separate divisions of Nodong-1 medium-range ballistic missiles (range up to 1,000 km, 9 launchers), one separate regiment of operational tactical Scud-type missiles (range up to 550 km, 28 launchers), three separate divisions of the KN-02 missile complex (range up to 120 km, 12 launchers), and six separate divisions of "Luna-M" tactical missiles (range up to 65 km, 21 launchers).<sup>3</sup>

The combination of missile technologies with nuclear technologies and their active development are bringing North Korea closer to acquiring a military nuclear potential and are destabilizing the situation in the region and the world to a greater and greater extent. Nevertheless, there

<sup>2</sup> SIPRI Yearbook 2012. *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 343.

<sup>3</sup> [http://www.imemo.ru/en/conf/2013/28032013/280313\\_result.pdf](http://www.imemo.ru/en/conf/2013/28032013/280313_result.pdf).

are serious reasons to suppose that this potential will once more be used as a bargaining chip in order to obtain large-scale aid and security guarantees, and to simultaneously shore up the North Korean government's position within its own country.

## **The North Korean threat: what next?**

### **Certain consequences of the current crisis**

The realization of the scenario considered above is not inevitable. At present, the policies of the North Korean leadership are leading to intensifying military-political tension in the region and in the world. Such policies create additional incentives for an arms race, including the development of a missile defense system in Southeastern Asia as a whole, and in North Korea's neighboring countries — South Korea and Japan — in particular. This creates additional tension in connection with the deep involvement of the United States in the region. A substantial part of the technical and systemic solutions used in the field of missile defense are imported from the United States or are carried out jointly with Washington.

It is not a coincidence that the *Defense Strategic Guidance*, the United States' guiding document for defense strategy published in January 2012, declares the strengthening of security in Asia to be a top priority. That means an intensification of military preparations, which the countries of the region in turn will see as an incentive to increase their own military activity. North Korea most likely will take advantage of this turn to fuel its campaign over the growing threat of the United States and its "South Korean puppets."

The deployment and build-up of missile defense systems will likewise engender growing concern and responsive action on the part of Asia's greatest power, China. As a result, yet another destabilizing factor will reach the international level and may affect strategic stability on the central axis — U.S.-Russia relations.

North Korea's actions are not only undermining the non-proliferation regime. The very foundations of that regime are under threat. The following aspects appear most obvious:



- North Korea has set a clear example of the ease and impunity with which a state may withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- As in the case with Iran, the international community's inability to handle the situation by relying on well-established international institutions and traditional approaches is being demonstrated clearly.
- The non-proliferation regime is being directly undermined through the transmission of nuclear materials and technologies.

### **Russia's efforts**

The level of concern evinced in Moscow and Washington, which was actually quite low for a long time, has also had an effect on prospects for resolving the crisis. Despite calls upon North Korea's leaders to stop their "lawless acts," comply strictly with "all resolutions of the UN Security Council," repudiate their nuclear missile programs completely, and return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the regime of all-encompassing guarantees of the IAEA,<sup>4</sup> Russia's leading politicians and experts never felt an excessively high degree of alarm regarding Pyongyang's actions. In Moscow, a confidence that North Korea's nuclear missile programs were not aimed at Russia has not only been present. It has, in fact, predominated.

This confidence is founded not merely on a residual perception of North Korea as a "brother country" inherited from Soviet times. Moscow has tried on multiple occasions to establish special relations with Pyongyang. On February 9, 2000, a Treaty on Friendship, Neighborliness, and Cooperation was signed by the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On July 20 of that year, a Russian-Korean Joint Declaration was made between Moscow and Pyongyang during a visit to the latter capital city by the newly elected President, Vladimir Putin.

Both the Treaty text (article 2) and the Joint Declaration (paragraph 2) contain serious commitments, such as, for example, "opposing all occurrences of the politics of aggression and war, undertaking active efforts aimed at arms reduction and ensuring a stable peace and security throughout the world." The documents also expressed a readiness such that in the

<sup>4</sup> Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on North Korea's new nuclear weapon test, February 12, 2013, ([http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rasia.nsf/1083b7937ae580ae432569e7004199c2/c32577ca\\_0017458644257b100033db4b!OpenDocument](http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rasia.nsf/1083b7937ae580ae432569e7004199c2/c32577ca_0017458644257b100033db4b!OpenDocument)).

case of "danger of aggression in relation to one of the parties," or "a situation that threatens peace and security," the parties would immediately enter into contact with each other.<sup>5</sup>

Subsequently, the North Korean leader visited Russia twice, concluding with a high-level meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in the closed military town of Sosnovy Bor in Buryatiya on August 24, 2011. No documents were signed on that occasion.

As subsequent practice has shown, Pyongyang has not bothered itself much over performance of its commitments under Article 2 of the Treaty and Paragraph 2 of the Joint Declaration. During a meeting between Putin and the North Korean leader in Vladivostok in August 2002, the latter expressed a readiness to stop nuclear tests. As reported by trustworthy sources, the same assertion was made during the meeting with Medvedev. However, the tests were continued under various pretexts.

### History lessons

Some temporary victories were achieved in the course of the peculiar multiparty and bipartite "intermittent dialogue" with Pyongyang. For example, Pyongyang and Washington entered into direct dialogue in the early 1990s. The talks were initiated through an unexpected visit to North Korea by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

During a June 1994 meeting between Kim Il-sung and Jimmy Carter, the two sides managed to construct the main provisions of a future agreement. As a result, the United States and North Korea signed the so-called Agreed Framework in October of that year in Geneva, which stipulated that the American side would construct two light water reactors, and until the reactors were completed the United States would supply fuel oil to North Korea. In turn, Pyongyang would freeze and later dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors, and inspections of other North Korean sites would subsequently resume. North Korea was to participate actively in implementing the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which had been approved in 1992 by both North and South Korea.

<sup>5</sup> *Joint Declaration of Russia and North Korea*, June 20, 2000 (in Russian), (<http://архив.президент.рф/events/articles/2000/07/125179/125177.shtml>).

Furthermore, North Korea undertook the obligation to remain a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and perform the agreement on IAEA guarantees. The most important provision for the North Korean leadership gave North Korea official guarantees of the non-use of force or threats of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States. For the other countries among the six parties to the talks, the important result was that North Korea's nuclear programs were to be frozen, and inspections were to be made possible.<sup>6</sup>

The lesson of 1994 is that Western and Russian experts and politicians, engrossing themselves in the development of various attractive arrangements that seemingly should have interested Pyongyang and should have once more brought its nuclear potential under control, sometimes fail to consider subjective factors that have a special meaning in the East. Thinking in a deeply rational way, the West frequently forgets about qualities that are highly valued in Asia, such as a respectful and courteous attitude toward the other side. Jimmy Carter's visit to Pyongyang did demonstrate such an attitude and temporarily untied the tight knot of contradictions around the North Korean nuclear program.

### **Negotiations: one step forward, two steps back. . .**

The Six-Party Talks, involving representatives of China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, began in August 2003 as the result of a diplomatic initiative of the People's Republic of China and acted as an additional confirmation of Beijing's interest in resolving the North Korean crisis.

However, the talks have yet to achieve any success. There are fundamental disagreements between the parties that remain unresolved. Pyongyang has declared its readiness to return to the negotiations table, but without having to perform any preconditions. In turn, South Korea and the United States have insisted that North Korea end its uranium enrichment program and apply a moratorium to the development of its nuclear weapons program and the conduct of nuclear tests as a precondition before the talks are to resume.

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<sup>6</sup> A.B. Carter and W.J. Perry. *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America* (Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

The talks have been broken off on multiple occasions. North Korea promised several times to return to the negotiations table. As noted above, after Dmitry Medvedev's meeting with the North Korean leader, Pyongyang announced that it was ready to enact a moratorium on the production and testing of nuclear weapons and missiles, but within the context of resumed talks.<sup>7</sup>

In late 2011, it became known that North Korea would agree to suspend its uranium enrichment program in exchange for food aid from the United States. In practice, this would mean a revival of the 1994 plan, including a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests and the freezing of the uranium enrichment enterprise in Yongbyon in exchange for food aid and security guarantees from the United States. It is telling that by early 2012, preliminary consultations had gone so far in a practical direction that there were discussions on the amount of food that the United States could provide to North Korea.<sup>8</sup>

However, the coming to power of a new, young leader in North Korea, Kim Jong-un, has marked not an easing of tension, as many expected, but rather a new stage of the crisis. Two missile tests were conducted followed by a nuclear weapon test.

Whatever the domestic policy causes of these actions, they were followed by an entirely predictable sharp escalation of the situation. New sanctions were adopted in the UN Security Council; South Korean and U.S. armed forces held joint exercises; mutual accusations and threats were made; the raising of the combat readiness level was declared, etc. The prospects for a renewal of the Six-Party Talks once again became dim.

### **The possibility of an agreement: there's still a chance**

Despite the seriousness of the situation that has come about on the Korean peninsula, no one is interested in an extreme escalation. In the worst-case scenario, the North Korean leader risks losing power and the country. However, the West and South Korea also have no desire or intention to effect such a scenario. Therefore, in any possible development of events, the conflicting parties will retain strong incentives to end the conflict as soon as possible, even in the event of military actions.

<sup>7</sup> D. Dyomkin, "North Korea ready to discuss nuclear moratorium: Kremlin," *Reuters*, August 24, 2011.

<sup>8</sup> "U.S., N. Korea agree on 240,000 tons of food assistance: source," *Yonhap*, December 17, 2011.


Thus, the prospects for negotiations may seem unclear, but they are not entirely hopeless. Previous experience demonstrates that Chinese and Russian leaders possess a certain degree of authority in the eyes of North Korean leaders, but the United States is still the main source of concern for them. Therefore, ultimately, a positive result can be achieved through once again arranging a tête-à-tête dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington and through a demonstration by the United States that it is prepared to make concessions, primarily by providing security guarantees. The deterring factor for Washington's policy here is the domestic policy aspect — the real prospect of a sharp intensification of criticism directed at the Obama administration for undertaking such actions.

After the situation on the Korean peninsula has returned to a more or less normal condition, success can be achieved by more than just a repeat of Carter's 1994 mission, but by also having a high-level international political leader (possibly under the aegis of the United Nations) hold a series of consultations with the North Korean leadership following the shuttle diplomacy model. In the process, the other members of the Six-Party Talks should have their concerns duly addressed. It is apparent that in spite of the hopes previously invested in it, Beijing, for its part, does not aspire to take a very active part in resolving the current conflict situation.

Applying such a strategy in practice may open up prospects for continuing the Six-Party Talks. The agenda of those talks will be to return IAEA inspectors to Yongbyon. The highest aspiration of the talks would be to possibly close down the Yongbyon facility, shut down import channels of materials for nuclear weapons production, bring nuclear fuel reserves under control, etc.

Politically, the North Korean regime must sense that international cooperation is more promising and may be used more effectively for it to strengthen its own position than constant escalation of the situation with unpredictable consequences. To put it simply, Pyongyang must distinctly sense that the advantages of renouncing its military nuclear program can substantially outweigh the benefits of maintaining it. Realizing such a scenario may become the basis for fundamental positive changes and a bolstering of security on the Korean peninsula and in Asia as a whole.





## APPENDICES

## **APPENDIX 1**

### **Final Document of the Conference of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe (September 11–12, 2012, Geneva)**

The members of the International Advisory Council of the International Luxembourg Forum express their gratitude to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy for its cooperation in holding a joint session on Perspectives on Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament, in Geneva on September 11-12, 2012.

The members of the International Advisory Council of the International Luxembourg Forum express their concern over the present state of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. After the positive achievements of 2010-2011, particularly the entry into force of the New START Treaty, the dialogue on strategic arms control has not made further progress. Negotiations on other issues of arms control and disarmament have been deadlocked. There is no progress on the key issues of nuclear and missile non-proliferation, foremost on the resolution of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear and missile crises. Moreover, disagreements within the UN Security Council on these two issues, as well as on the Syrian civil war and other crucial issues, have become deeper.

Participants of the Conference believe that urgent steps on the part of the great powers and other leading states as well as international organizations are needed to achieve a breakthrough and to reverse current negative developments in the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.



The Conference of the Luxembourg Forum expresses its concerns about the following:

1. The process of implementation of the New START Treaty is going on as planned and up to now has not provided any reason for concern. However modest the actual reductions of strategic arms may be, the Treaty has prevented the break-up of the strategic arms control process and preserved the transparency and predictability of the strategic relationship between Russia and the United States.

However, in the United States and Russia the meaning and binding nature of the Preamble paragraph of the Treaty on the relationship of strategic offensive and defensive systems are interpreted in very different ways.

2. What is worse, there is deep division between the parties on the scale, nature, capabilities, and mission of the U.S./NATO European Phased Adoptive Approach (EPAA) to ballistic missile defense development and deployment. Russia still considers the EPAA a potential threat to its strategic nuclear deterrent capability, to strategic stability, and to the future of nuclear arms control. Accordingly, Russia is warning the West about its possible military and political countermeasures. Meanwhile Russia is building up its own defensive capability ("Air-Space Defense"), which is openly designed to counter U.S. offensive systems.

In NATO, the EPAA is justified as an indispensable and legitimate response to the growing missile threat posed by Iran and other potential rogue regimes. The Russian reaction is considered excessive and non-constructive.

For the first time after the end of the Cold War the possibility has emerged of a new offensive-defensive arms race.

3. The development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses by the United States and its Asian Pacific allies has provoked profound, albeit less vocal, concern by China, which is responding with its own offensive and defensive countermeasures. The offensive/defensive arms race between Russia and NATO may be supplemented and exacerbated by an arms race between China and American allies in the Pacific.

4. The priority that the United States/NATO give to an agreement on the reduction and limitation of non-strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons in storage as a precondition for any follow-on START Treaty is flatly rejected by Russia.

5. Two other crucial agreements are in a state of stagnation. There is not much hope of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the nearest future or much further progress toward a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

6. There are no signs of any movement toward preventing the weaponization of outer space. The testing of sub-orbital and orbital weapon systems goes on. There is a risk of an arms race in space, which would undermine strategic stability and arms control.

7. The regime of conventional arms control in Europe, principally the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), seems beyond repair. At the same time, there is no framework or negotiation to replace CFE with a new regime.

8. Despite all the resolutions of the UN Security Council (UNSC), as well as sanctions and diplomatic efforts of the states negotiating with Iran, that country's work on sensitive areas of the nuclear fuel cycle continues to expand. The developments in its enrichment program in particular are bringing Iran closer to a nuclear weapon capability as each day passes.

Tensions in the area have increased, given threats coming from high-level Iranian sources about closing the Strait of Hormuz, the build-up of U.S. military forces in the region, and the debate in Israel and elsewhere about potential military action against Iran.

The threat of a new war in the Persian Gulf area in the near future is increasingly acute. Such a war would bring dire consequences.

9. North Korea's persistent development of nuclear and missile capabilities is a main reason for continuing tensions in the Far East. This region

has also recently seen a growing military build-up by China and the United States and its allies, as well as territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Diplomatic efforts to resolve these problems continue, but these tensions hinder prospects for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

The Conference of the Luxembourg Forum recommends:

1. The United States and Russia should proceed without further delay with the next phase of START negotiations without preconditions. The goal of an immediate follow-on START Treaty should be the reduction and limitation of operationally deployed strategic offensive arms (nuclear and conventional) down to a level of no more than 1000 warheads.

2. A new search for compromise on ballistic missile defenses should begin with a U.S./NATO-Russian discussion to craft a new understanding of the concept of strategic stability and the ways of incorporating U.S.-led ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs as well as Russia's Air-Space Defense. In particular, there should be agreement on criteria for stable strategic and theater defenses. In parallel, multilateral consultations with China, India, and concerned states in the Middle East should be initiated on this subject.

Such a new understanding should provide the basis for appropriate confidence-building and transparency agreements between the U.S./NATO and Russia as well as possible agreements with other concerned states. This understanding should also provide the framework for possible BMD cooperative projects.

Any formal linkage of this new approach to BMD issues with START negotiations might be counterproductive. But there is no doubt that politically, such BMD agreements would facilitate a follow-on START Treaty.

Eventually such agreements would enhance the possibilities for nuclear arms limitations of other nuclear-weapon states besides the United States and Russia.

3. In parallel to new START and BMD negotiations but without formal linkage, consultations on non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons should

begin. They should start with agreeing on definitions of the subject of the talks. The process would be facilitated by agreements on transparency, starting with an exchange of information on the implementation of the 1991-1992 unilateral initiatives on tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). On this basis various options for the limitation of non-strategic nuclear arms should be discussed, including their reallocation to centralized storages on the national territories of the states owning them.

4. Additionally, negotiations on the revival of conventional arms control in Europe should begin, adapted to new European geostrategic realities.

5. The above four negotiating tracks would provide a far broader space for diplomatic trade-offs and balanced compromises.

6. In order to promote Iranian acceptance of the UN Security Council mandates with regard to those aspects of its nuclear program that are a matter of concern, states should consider national measures that would reinforce the economic steps taken by the European Union. States that import Iranian oil have particular leverage in this regard. Current diplomatic efforts will need to be supplemented by additional incentives and disincentives to encourage Iran to comply with its obligations and to stop moving closer to a nuclear weapon capability. New sanctions against Iran are not a precursor to a new war in the Persian Gulf zone, but are designed to prevent such war.

7. The current Syrian crisis is likely to affect both the Iranian nuclear issue and the prospects for a Conference in 2012 on a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East. The UNSC should undertake more energetic and coordinated efforts to end violence and massive civilian fatalities and allow the introduction of peace-keeping and peace-building efforts and the provision of humanitarian aid. Special concern should be given to absolutely preventing terrorists from gaining access to the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile.

8. Additional economic, political and security incentives should be presented to encourage the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to change its present course. China should be encouraged to persuade the DPRK to cease its threatening posture.

Achieving progress on broader issues, foremost the United States-China-Russia dialogue on strategic stability, may facilitate a more active policy by China.

The final goal is to bring the DPRK back to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state.

9. China, Russia, and The United States, together with other concerned states, should actively promote the establishment of Asia Pacific organizations and regimes of multilateral security and cooperation. Attention should be given to processes of peaceful settlement of territorial disputes in the Asia Pacific region, including arbitration and mediation.

### **Members of the Supervisory and Advisory Councils of the International Luxembourg Forum**

1.     **Viatcheslav KANTOR**                      President of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe; President of the European Jewish Congress; Ph.D. (Russia).
  
2.     **Alexei ARBATOV**                        Head of the Center for International Security of the IMEMO RAS; Scholar-in-Residence of the Carnegie Moscow Center (former Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma, Federal Assembly – Russian Parliament); Academician RAS (Russia).

3.     **Hans BLIX** Ambassador (former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency); Ph.D. (Sweden).
4.     **Francesco CALOGERO** Professor of Theoretical Physics of the Department of Physics, University of Rome "La Sapienza" (former Secretary General of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Italy).
5.     **Vladimir DVORKIN** Head of the Organizing Committee, International Luxembourg Forum; Principal Researcher of the IMEMO RAS; Professor; Major-General, ret. (Russia).
6.     **Victor ESIN** Leading Researcher of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies RAS (former Chief of Armed Service Staff – First Deputy Commander-In-Chief, Strategic Rocket Forces); Colonel General, ret.; Ph.D. (Russia).
7.     **Mark FITZPATRICK** Director of the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Programme, International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (United States).
8.     **Vladimir IAKOVLEV** General of the Army, ret. (former Director of the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Russia).

9. **Catherine KELLEHER** College Park Professor, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland (United States).
10. **Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV** Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments; Professor of the MGIMO (former Chief of the Organizational Analytic Division, RAS); Ph.D.; Full Member of the Russian Academy of Cosmonautics (Russia).
11. **Roald SAGDEEV** Distinguished University Professor, Department of Physics at the University of Maryland; Director Emeritus of the Russian Space Research Institute; Academician RAS (Russia/United States).

## APPENDIX 2

# Normative Documents on Nuclear Non-Proliferation

### 2.1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968; Moscow, London and Washington

*The States concluding this Treaty*, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

*Considering* the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

*Believing* that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

*In conformity* with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

*Undertaking* to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

*Expressing* their support for research, development and other efforts to further the ap-

plication, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

*Affirming* the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

*Convinced* that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,



*Declaring* their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

*Urging* the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

*Recalling* the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

*Desiring* to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

*Recalling* that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

*Have agreed as follows:*

## ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly,

or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

## ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

## ARTICLE III

1. *Each* non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its ju-

isdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

## ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

## ARTICLE V

Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence

as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

## ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

## ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

## ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of rati-

fication by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

## ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States

signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

## ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed

period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

## ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.

**Source:** Roland Timerbaev, *Russia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1945-1968* (Moscow, 1999), pp.354-359.

## 2.2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (North Korea), June 12, 2009; New-York

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695 (2006), and, in particular, resolution 1718 (2006), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41) and 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7),

*Reaffirming* that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

*Expressing* the gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("the DPRK") on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation of resolution 1718 (2006), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons towards the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,

*Stressing* its collective support for the NPT and commitment to strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects, and global efforts towards

nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and recalling that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT in any case,

*Deploring* the DPRK's announcement of withdrawal from the NPT and its pursuit of nuclear weapons,

*Underlining* once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community,

*Underlining* also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK,

*Expressing* its gravest concern that the nuclear test and missile activities carried out by the DPRK have further generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and determining that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

*Reaffirming* the importance that all Member States uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation and flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006), and the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);
2. *Demands* that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology;
3. *Decides* that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;
4. *Demands* that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1718 (2006);
5. *Demands* that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT;
6. *Demands* further that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States Parties to the NPT, and underlines the need for all States Parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;
7. *Calls upon* all Member States to implement their obligations pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), including with respect to designations made by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) ("the Committee") pursuant to the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);
8. *Decides* that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities, shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA;
9. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel;
10. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms, except for small arms and light weapons and their related materiel, and calls upon States to exercise vigilance over the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of small arms or light weapons, and further decides that States shall notify the Committee at least five days prior to selling, supplying or transferring small arms or light weapons to the DPRK;
11. *Calls upon* all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, all cargo to and from the DPRK, in their territory, including sea-ports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8

- (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
12. *Calls upon* all Member States to inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
  13. *Calls upon* all States to cooperate with inspections pursuant to paragraphs 11 and 12, and, if the flag State does not consent to inspection on the high seas, decides that the flag State shall direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities pursuant to paragraph 11;
  14. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraph 11, 12, or 13 in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972, and decides further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;
  15. *Requires* any Member State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11, 12, or 13, or seizes and disposes of cargo pursuant to paragraph 14, to submit promptly reports containing relevant details to the Committee on the inspection, seizure and disposal;
  16. *Requires* any Member State, when it does not receive the cooperation of a flag State pursuant to paragraph 12 or 13 to submit promptly to the Committee a report containing relevant details;
  17. *Decides* that Member States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to DPRK vessels if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, and underlines that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal economic activities;
  18. *Calls upon* Member States, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to paragraphs 8 (d) and (e) of resolution 1718 (2006), to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could con-



- tribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related, or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs or activities, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are associated with such programs or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;
19. *Calls upon* all Member States and international financial and credit institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to the DPRK, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population, or the promotion of denuclearization, and also calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance with a view to reducing current commitments;
  20. *Calls upon* all Member States not to provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related or other WMD-related programs or activities;
  21. *Emphasizes* that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
  22. *Calls upon* all Member States to report to the Security Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution and thereafter upon request by the Committee on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) as well as paragraphs 9 and 10 of this resolution, as well as financial measures set out in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of this resolution;
  23. *Decides* that the measures set out at paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1a and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2a;
  24. *Decides* to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution, including through the designation of entities, goods, and individuals, and directs the Committee to undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within thirty days of adoption of this resolution, and further decides that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report;
  25. *Decides* that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolution 1718 (2006), the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and this resolution, through a work programme covering compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the Council by 15 July 2009, and that it shall also receive and consider reports from Member States pursuant to paragraphs 10, 15, 16 and 22 of this resolution;
  26. *Requests* the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to seven experts ("Panel of Experts"), acting under the direction of



the Committee to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in resolution 1718 (2006) and the functions specified in paragraph 25 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyze information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or Member States, may consider to improve implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution; and (d) provide an interim report on its work to the Council no later than 90 days after adoption of this resolution, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

27. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution;
28. *Calls upon* all Member States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
29. *Calls upon* the DPRK to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest date;
30. *Supports* peaceful dialogue, calls upon the DPRK to return immediately to the

Six Party Talks without precondition, and urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 and the joint documents of 13 February 2007 and 3 October 2007, by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, with a view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;

31. *Expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Council members as well as other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that might aggravate tensions;
32. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and relevant paragraphs of this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at that time in light of the DPRK's compliance with relevant provisions of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution;
33. *Underlines* that further decisions will be required, should additional measures be necessary;
34. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

**Source:** United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874/ United Nations' official site// <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/368/49/PDF/N0936849.pdf?OpenElement>.

## 2.3. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 (Iran), June 9, 2010; New-York

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1887 (2009) and *reaffirming* their provisions,

*Reaffirming* its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and *recalling* the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

*Recalling* the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

*Noting* with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15), 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53), 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), 22 February 2007

(GOV/2007/8), 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/22), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), 26 May 2008 (GOV/2008/15), 15 September 2008 (GOV/2008/38), 19 November 2008 (GOV/2008/59), 19 February 2009 (GOV/2009/8), 5 June 2009 (GOV/2009/35), 28 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55), 16 November 2009 (GOV/2009/74), 18 February 2010 (GOV/2010/10) and 31 May 2010 (GOV/2010/28) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor cooperated with the IAEA in connection with the remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747

(2007) and 1803 (2008) and which are essential to build confidence, and *deploring* Iran's refusal to take these steps,

*Reaffirming* that outstanding issues can be best resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme by Iran responding positively to all the calls which the Council and the IAEA Board of Governors have made on Iran,

*Noting* with serious concern the role of elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as "Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution"), including those specified in Annex D and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007) and Annex II of this resolution, in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,

*Noting* with serious concern that Iran has constructed an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and that Iran failed to notify it to the IAEA until September 2009, which is inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement,

*Also noting* the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2009/82), which urges Iran to suspend immediately construction at Qom, and to clarify the facility's purpose, chronology of design and construction, and calls upon Iran to confirm, as requested by the IAEA, that it has not taken a decision to construct, or authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which has as yet not been declared to the IAEA,

*Noting* with serious concern that Iran has enriched uranium to 20 per cent, and did so without notifying the IAEA with sufficient time for it to adjust the existing safeguards procedures,

*Noting* with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA's right to verify design

information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, and *emphasizing* that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the IAEA's right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility,

*Reiterating* its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, and *commending* the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme,

*Expressing* the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,

*Emphasizing* the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes and *noting* in this regard the efforts of Turkey and Brazil towards an agreement with Iran on the Tehran Research Reactor that could serve as a confidence-building measure,

*Emphasizing also*, however, in the context of these efforts, the importance of Iran addressing the core issues related to its nuclear programme,

*Stressing* that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521) and their June 2008 proposals (INFCIRC/730), and

*noting* the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Welcoming* the guidance issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1803 (2008), and *recalling* in particular the need to exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, so as to prevent such transactions contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,

*Recognizing* that access to diverse, reliable energy is critical for sustainable growth and development, while noting the potential connection between Iran's revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and *further noting* that chemical process equipment and materials required for the petrochemical industry have much in common with those required for certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities,

*Having* regard to States' rights and obligations relating to international trade,

*Recalling* that the law of the sea, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), sets out the legal framework applicable to ocean activities,

*Calling* for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by Iran at an early date,

*Determined* to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and

with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran's development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

*Concerned* by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Stressing* that nothing in this resolution compels States to take measures or actions exceeding the scope of this resolution, including the use of force or the threat of force,

*Acting* under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Affirms* that Iran has so far failed to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008);
2. *Affirms* that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme, to resolve outstanding questions and to address the serious concerns raised by the construction of an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and, in this context, *further affirms* its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);
3. *Reaffirms* that Iran shall cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme,

including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the IAEA, and *stresses* the importance of ensuring that the IAEA have all necessary resources and authority for the fulfillment of its work in Iran;

4. *Requests* the Director General of the IAEA to communicate to the Security Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in Iran;
5. *Decides* that Iran shall without delay comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to its Safeguards Agreement, *calls upon* Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on 18 December 2003, *calls upon* Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol, and *reaffirms* that, in accordance with Articles 24 and 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, Iran's Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangement, including modified Code 3.1, cannot be amended or changed unilaterally by Iran, and *notes* that there is no mechanism in the Agreement for the suspension of any of the provisions in the Subsidiary Arrangement;
6. *Reaffirms* that, in accordance with Iran's obligations under previous resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related activities, Iran shall not begin construction on any new uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing construction of any uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility;
7. *Decides* that Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, in particular uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, all heavy-water activities or technology related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and *further decides* that all States shall prohibit such investment in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them;
8. *Decides* that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) ("the Committee"), *decides further* that all States shall prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, *calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;

9. *Decides* that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;
10. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex C, D and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007), Annex I of resolution 1803 (2008) and Annexes I and II of this resolution, or by the Security Council or the Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the provision to Iran of items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1737 (2006), *underlines* that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and *decides* that the measures imposed in this paragraph shall not apply when the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
11. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and to any individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated individuals or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;
12. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as "Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution") individuals and entities specified in Annex II, and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over those transactions involving the IRGC that could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
13. *Decides* that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items in S/2006/814 shall be superseded by the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, and any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and further *decides* that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items contained in S/2006/815 shall be superseded by the list of items contained in S/2010/263;
14. *Calls upon* all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation



agreements, all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

15. *Notes* that States, consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, and *calls upon* all States to cooperate in such inspections if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

16. *Decides* to authorize all States to, and that all States shall, seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 of this resolution, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004),

as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, and *decides* further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;

17. *Requires* any State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 above to submit to the Committee within five working days an initial written report containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if items prohibited for transfer are found, *further requires* such States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

18. *Decides* that all States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or -contracted vessels, including chartered vessels, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, and *underlines* that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal economic activities;

19. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the entities of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) as specified in Annex III and

to any person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, or determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted them in evading the sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

20. *Requests* all Member States to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers or activity by Iran Air's cargo division or vessels owned or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions of, or in violation of the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and requests the Committee to make that information widely available;

21. *Calls upon* all States, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, to prevent the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance, or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services, assets or resources could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction

or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are related to such programmes or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;

22. *Decides* that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in Iran or subject to Iran's jurisdiction, including those of the IRGC and IRISL, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or to violations of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

23. *Calls upon* States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of Iranian banks, and also that prohibit Iranian banks from establishing new joint ventures, taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

24. *Calls upon* States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under



their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

25. *Deplores* the violations of the prohibitions of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007) that have been reported to the Committee since the adoption of resolution 1747 (2007), and *commends* States that have taken action to respond to these violations and report them to the Committee;
26. *Directs* the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, and *recalls* that the Committee may designate individuals and entities who have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, these resolutions;
27. *Decides* that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, including through a work programme covering compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution;
28. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006), as amended by paragraph 14 of resolution 1803 (2008), shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution, including to receive reports from States submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 above;
29. *Requests* the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts ("Panel of Experts"), under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) and paragraph 28 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures; and (d) provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel's appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;
30. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;
31. *Calls upon* all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24;
32. *Stresses* the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote dialogue and consultations, including to resume dialogue with Iran on

the nuclear issue without preconditions, most recently in their meeting with Iran in Geneva on 1 October 2009, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue on the basis of the proposal made by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States on 14 June 2008, which would allow for the development of relations and wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme and, inter alia, starting formal negotiations with Iran on the basis of the June 2008 proposal, and *acknowledges with appreciation* that the June 2008 proposal, as attached in Annex IV to this resolution, remains on the table;

33. *Encourages* the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution, including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks, and *encourages* Iran to respond positively to such proposals;

34. *Commends* the Director General of the IAEA for his 21 October 2009 proposal of a draft Agreement between the IAEA and the Governments of the Republic of France, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation for Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for a Research Reactor in Iran for the Supply of Nuclear Fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor, *regrets* that Iran has not responded constructively to the 21 October 2009 proposal, and *encourages* the IAEA to continue exploring such measures to build

confidence consistent with and in furtherance of the Council's resolutions;

35. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution;

36. *Requests* within 90 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and with other provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

37. *Affirms* that it shall review Iran's actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 36 above, to be submitted within 90 days, and: (a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome; (b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of resolution 1803 (2008), and in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10,

11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board of Governors; (c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and *underlines* that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

38. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

## ANNEX I

### Individuals and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities

#### Entities

1. **Amin Industrial Complex:** Amin Industrial Complex sought temperature controllers which may be used in nuclear research and operational/production facilities. Amin Industrial Complex is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which was designated in resolution 1737 (2006).

Location: P.O. Box 91735-549, Mashad, Iran; Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage Rd., Seyedi District, Mashad, Iran; Kaveh Complex, Khalaj Rd., Seyedi St., Mashad, Iran.

A.K.A.: Amin Industrial Compound and Amin Industrial Company

2. **Armament Industries Group:** Armament Industries Group (AIG) manufactur-

ers and services a variety of small arms and light weapons, including large- and medium-calibre guns and related technology. AIG conducts the majority of its procurement activity through Hadid Industries Complex.

Location: Sepah Islam Road, Karaj Special Road Km 10, Iran; Pasdaran Ave., P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

3. **Defense Technology and Science Research Center:** Defense Technology and Science Research Center (DTSRC) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which oversees Iran's defence R&D, production, maintenance, exports, and procurement.

Location: Pasdaran Ave, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

4. **Doostan International Company:** Doostan International Company (DICO) supplies elements to Iran's ballistic missile program.
5. **Farasakht Industries:** Farasakht Industries is owned or controlled by, or act on behalf of, the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company, which in turn is owned or controlled by MODAFL.

Location: P.O. Box 83145-311, Kilometer 28, Esfahan-Tehran Freeway, Shahin Shahr, Esfahan, Iran

6. **First East Export Bank, P.L.C.:** First East Export Bank, PLC is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Bank Mellat. Over the last seven years, Bank Mellat has facilitated hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions for Iranian nuclear, missile, and defense entities.

Location: Unit Level 10 (B1), Main Office Tower, Financial Park Labuan, Jalan Merdeka, 87000 WP Labuan, Malaysia; Business Registration Number LL06889 (Malaysia)

7. **Kaveh Cutting Tools Company:** Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.  
Location: 3rd Km of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi Street, Mashad 91638, Iran; Km 4 of Khalaj Road, End of Seyyedi Street, Mashad, Iran; P.O. Box 91735-549, Mashad, Iran; Khalaj Rd., End of Seyyedi Alley, Mashad, Iran; Moqan St., Pasdaran St., Pasdaran Cross Rd., Tehran, Iran
8. **M. Babaie Industries:** M. Babaie Industries is subordinate to Shahid Ahmad Kazemi Industries Group (formally the Air Defense Missile Industries Group) of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO controls the missile organizations Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated in resolution 1737 (2006).  
Location: P.O. Box 16535-76, Tehran, 16548, Iran
9. **Malek Ashtar University:** A subordinate of the DTRSC within MODAFL. This includes research groups previously falling under the Physics Research Center (PHRC). IAEA inspectors have not been allowed to interview staff or see documents under the control of this organization to resolve the outstanding issue of the possible military dimension to Iran's nuclear program.  
Location: Corner of Imam Ali Highway and Babaei Highway, Tehran, Iran
10. **Ministry of Defense Logistics Export:** Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX) sells Iranian-produced arms to customers around the world in contravention of resolution 1747 (2007), which prohibits Iran from selling arms or related materiel.  
Location: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, Iran; located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran
11. **Mizan Machinery Manufacturing:** Mizan Machinery Manufacturing (3M) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SHIG.  
Location: P.O. Box 16595-365, Tehran, Iran  
A.K.A.: 3MG
12. **Modern Industries Technique Company:** Modern Industries Technique Company (MITEC) is responsible for design and construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor in Arak. MITEC has spearheaded procurement for the construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor.  
Location: Arak, Iran  
A.K.A.: Rahkar Company, Rahkar Industries, Rahkar Sanaye Company, Rahkar Sanaye Novin
13. **Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine:** The Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (NFRPC) is a large research component of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which was designated in resolution 1737 (2006). The NFRPC is AEOI's center for the development of nuclear fuel and is involved in enrichment-related activities.  
Location: P.O. Box 31585-4395, Karaj, Iran  
A.K.A.: Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine; Karaji Agricultural and Medical Research Center
14. **Pejman Industrial Services Corporation:** Pejman Industrial Services Corporation is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.  
Location: P.O. Box 16785-195, Tehran, Iran
15. **Sabalan Company:** Sabalan is a cover name for SHIG.  
Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran
16. **Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO):** SAPICO is a cover name for SHIG.

Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran

17. **Shahid Karrazi Industries:** Shahid Karrazi Industries is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.

Location: Tehran, Iran

18. **Shahid Satarri Industries:** Shahid Sattari Industries is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.

Location: Southeast Tehran, Iran

A.K.A.: Shahid Sattari Group Equipment Industries

19. **Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries:** Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries (SSSI) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.

Location: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Shahid Babaii Expressway, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran; Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835, Iran; Babaei Highway — Next to Niru M.F.G, Tehran, Iran

20. **Special Industries Group:** Special Industries Group (SIG) is a subordinate of DIO.

Location: Pasdaran Avenue, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

21. **Tiz Pars:** Tiz Pars is a cover name for SHIG. Between April and July 2007, Tiz Pars attempted to procure a five axis laser welding and cutting machine, which could make a material contribution to Iran's missile program, on behalf of SHIG.

Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran

22. **Yazd Metallurgy Industries:** Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is a subordinate of DIO.

Location: Pasdaran Avenue, Next To Telecommunication Industry, Tehran 16588, Iran; Postal Box 89195/878, Yazd, Iran; P.O. Box 89195-678, Yazd, Iran; Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, Iran

A.K.A.: Yazd Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries, Directorate of Yazd Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries

## INDIVIDUALS

**Javad Rahiqi:** Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (additional information: DOB: 24 April 1954; POB: Marshad).

## ANNEX II

### Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

1. **Fater (or Faater) Institute:** Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA) subsidiary. Fater has worked with foreign suppliers, likely on behalf of other KAA companies on IRGC projects in Iran.
2. **Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem:** Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem is owned or controlled by KAA.
3. **Ghorb Karbala:** Ghorb Karbala is owned or controlled by KAA.
4. **Ghorb Nooh:** Ghorb Nooh is owned or controlled by KAA.
5. **Hara Company:** Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
6. **Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute:** Owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, KAA.
7. **Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters:** Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) is an IRGC-owned company involved in large scale civil and military construction projects and other engineering activities. It undertakes a significant amount of work on Passive Defense Organization projects. In particular, KAA subsidiaries were heavily involved in the construction of the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.

8. **Makin:** Makin is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.
9. **Omran Sahel:** Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
10. **Oriental Oil Kish:** Oriental Oil Kish is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
11. **Rah Sahel:** Rah Sahel is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
12. **Rahab Engineering Institute:** Rahab is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.
13. **Sahel Consultant Engineers:** Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
14. **Sepanir:** Sepanir is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
15. **Sepasad Engineering Company:** Sepasad Engineering Company is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.

### ANNEX III

#### Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)

##### 1. Irano Hind Shipping Company

Location: 18 Mehrshad Street, Sadaghat Street, Opposite of Park Mellat, Valie-Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran; 265, Next to Mehrshad, Sedaghat St., Opposite of Mellat Park, Vali Asr Ave., Tehran 1A001, Iran

##### 2. IRISL Benelux NV

Location: Noorderlaan 139, B-2030, Antwerp, Belgium; V.A.T. Number BE480224531 (Belgium)

##### 3. South Shipping Line Iran (SSL)

Location: Apt. No. 7, 3rd Floor, No. 2, 4th Alley, Gandhi Ave., Tehran, Iran; Qaem Magham Farahani St., Tehran, Iran

### ANNEX IV

#### Proposal to the Islamic Republic of Iran by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the European Union

*Presented to the Iranian authorities on 14 June 2008 Teheran*

#### Possible Areas of Cooperation with Iran

In order to seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of the Iranian nuclear issue consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and building further upon the proposal presented to Iran in June 2006, which remains on the table, the elements below are proposed as topics for negotiations between China, France, Germany, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, joined by the High Representative of the European Union, as long as Iran verifiably suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, pursuant to OP 15 and OP 19(a) of UNSCR 1803. In the perspective of such negotiations, we also expect Iran to heed the requirements of the UNSC and the IAEA. For their part, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative state their readiness:

to recognize Iran's right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations;

to treat Iran's nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme is restored.

#### Nuclear Energy

— Reaffirmation of Iran's right to nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes



in conformity with its obligations under the NPT.

- Provision of technological and financial assistance necessary for Iran's peaceful use of nuclear energy, support for the resumption of technical cooperation projects in Iran by the IAEA.
- Support for construction of LWR based on state-of-the-art technology.
- Support for R&D in nuclear energy as international confidence is gradually restored.
- Provision of legally binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees.
- Cooperation with regard to management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

### **Political**

- Improving the six countries' and the EU's relations with Iran and building up mutual trust.
- Encouragement of direct contact and dialogue with Iran.
- Support Iran in playing an important and constructive role in international affairs.
- Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security and stabilization issues.
- Work with Iran and others in the region to encourage confidence-building measures and regional security.
- Establishment of appropriate consultation and cooperation mechanisms.
- Support for a conference on regional security issues.
- Reaffirmation that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.

– Reaffirmation of the obligation under the UN Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

– Cooperation on Afghanistan, including on intensified cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, support for programmes on the return of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan; cooperation on reconstruction of Afghanistan; cooperation on guarding the Iran-Afghan border.

### **Economic**

Steps towards the normalization of trade and economic relations, such as improving Iran's access to the international economy, markets and capital through practical support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade Organization, and to create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran and trade with Iran.

### **Energy Partnership**

Steps towards the normalization of cooperation with Iran in the area of energy: establishment of a long-term and wide-ranging strategic energy partnership between Iran and the European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications/measures.

### **Agriculture**

– Support for agricultural development in Iran.

Facilitation of Iran's complete self-sufficiency in food through cooperation in modern technology.

### **Environment, Infrastructure**

– Civilian Projects in the field of environmental protection, infrastructure, science and technology, and high-tech:

- Development of transport infrastructure, including international transport corridors.

- Support for modernization of Iran's telecommunication infrastructure, including by possible removal of relevant export restrictions.

**Source:** United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929/ United Nations' official site// <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/396/79/PDF/N1039679.pdf?OpenElement>.

### **Civil Aviation**

- Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on manufacturers exporting aircraft to Iran:

- Enabling Iran to renew its civil aviation fleet;

- Assisting Iran to ensure that Iranian aircraft meet international safety standards.

Economic, social and human development/humanitarian issues

- Provide, as necessary, assistance to Iran's economic and social development and humanitarian need.

- Cooperation/technical support in education in areas of benefit to Iran.

- Supporting Iranians to take courses, placements or degrees in areas such as civil engineering, agriculture and environmental studies;

- Supporting partnerships between Higher Education Institutions e.g. public health, rural livelihoods, joint scientific projects, public administration, history and philosophy.

- Cooperation in the field of development of effective emergency response capabilities (e.g. seismology, earthquake research, disaster control etc.).

- Cooperation within the framework of a "dialogue among civilizations".

### **Implementation mechanism**

- Constitution of joint monitoring groups for the implementation of a future agreement.



## 2.4. Statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council, April 16, 2012; New-York

At the 6752nd meeting of the Security Council, held on Monday, 16 April 2012, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council strongly condemns the 13 April 2012 (local time) launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The Security Council underscores that this satellite launch, as well as any launch that uses ballistic missile technology, even if characterized as a satellite launch or space launch vehicle, is a serious violation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).

The Security Council deplores that such a launch has caused grave security concerns in the region.

The Security Council demands that the DPRK not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology and comply with resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) by suspending all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this

context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches.

The Security Council agrees to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006), as modified by resolution 1874 (2009). The Security Council directs the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to undertake the following tasks and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days:

- (a) Designate additional entities and items;
- (b) Update the information contained on the Committee's list of individuals, entities, and items (S/2009/205 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part.1), and update on an annual basis thereafter;
- (c) Update the Committee's annual workplan.

The Security Council further agrees that, if the Committee has not acted pursuant to the paragraph above within fifteen days, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust these measures within an additional five days.

The Security Council demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under Security Council resolutions

1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), including that it: abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests or any further provocation.

The Security Council calls upon all Member States to implement fully their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).

The Security Council expresses its determination to take action accordingly in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test."

**Source:** Statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council, April 16, 2012/ United Nations' official site// <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UN-DOC/GEN/N12/295/91/PDF/N1229591.pdf?OpenElement>.

## 2.5. Camp David Declaration, May 18-19, 2012; Camp David, Maryland, United States

### PREAMBLE

1. We, the Leaders of the Group of Eight, met at Camp David on May 18 and 19, 2012 to address major global economic and political challenges.

### THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

2. Our imperative is to promote growth and jobs.
3. The global economic recovery shows signs of promise, but significant headwinds persist.
4. Against this background, we commit to take all necessary steps to strengthen and reinvigorate our economies and combat financial stresses, recognizing that the right measures are not the same for each of us.
5. We welcome the ongoing discussion in Europe on how to generate growth, while maintaining a firm commitment to implement fiscal consolidation to be assessed on a structural basis. We agree on the importance of a strong and cohesive Eurozone for global stability and recovery, and we affirm our interest in Greece

remaining in the Eurozone while respecting its commitments. We all have an interest in the success of specific measures to strengthen the resilience of the Eurozone and growth in Europe. We support Euro Area Leaders' resolve to address the strains in the Eurozone in a credible and timely manner and in a manner that fosters confidence, stability and growth.

6. We agree that all of our governments need to take actions to boost confidence and nurture recovery including reforms to raise productivity, growth and demand within a sustainable, credible and non-inflationary macroeconomic framework. We commit to fiscal responsibility and, in this context, we support sound and sustainable fiscal consolidation policies that take into account countries' evolving economic conditions and underpin confidence and economic recovery.
7. To raise productivity and growth potential in our economies, we support structural reforms, and investments in education and in modern infrastructure, as appropriate. Investment initiatives can be financed using a range of mechanisms, including leveraging the private sector.

Sound financial measures, to which we are committed, should build stronger systems over time while not choking off near-term credit growth. We commit to promote investment to underpin demand, including support for small businesses and public-private partnerships.

8. Robust international trade, investment and market integration are key drivers of strong sustainable and balanced growth. We underscore the importance of open markets and a fair, strong, rules-based trading system. We will honor our commitment to refrain from protectionist measures, protect investments and pursue bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral efforts, consistent with and supportive of the WTO framework, to reduce barriers to trade and investment and maintain open markets. We call on the broader international community to do likewise. Recognizing that unnecessary differences and overly burdensome regulatory standards serve as significant barriers to trade, we support efforts towards regulatory coherence and better alignment of standards to further promote trade and growth.
9. Given the importance of intellectual property rights (IPR) to stimulating job and economic growth, we affirm the significance of high standards for IPR protection and enforcement, including through international legal instruments and mutual assistance agreements, as well as through government procurement processes, private-sector voluntary codes of best practices, and enhanced customs cooperation, while promoting the free flow of information. To protect public health and consumer safety, we also commit to exchange information on rogue internet pharmacy sites in accordance with national law and share best practices on combating counterfeit medical products.

## ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE

10. As our economies grow, we recognize the importance of meeting our energy needs from a wide variety of sources ranging from traditional fuels to renewables to other clean technologies. As we each implement our own individual energy strategies, we embrace the pursuit of an appropriate mix from all of the above in an environmentally safe, sustainable, secure, and affordable manner. We also recognize the importance of pursuing and promoting sustainable energy and low carbon policies in order to tackle the global challenge of climate change. To facilitate the trade of energy around the world, we commit to take further steps to remove obstacles to the evolution of global energy infrastructure; to reduce barriers and refrain from discriminatory measures that impede market access; and to pursue universal access to cleaner, safer, and more affordable energy. We remain committed to the principles on global energy security adopted by the G-8 in St. Petersburg.
11. As we pursue energy security, we will do so with renewed focus on safety and sustainability. We are committed to establishing and sharing best practices on energy production, including exploration in frontier areas and the use of technologies such as deep water drilling and hydraulic fracturing, where allowed, to allow for the safe development of energy sources, taking into account environmental concerns over the life of a field. In light of the nuclear accident triggered by the tsunami in Japan, we continue to strongly support initiatives to carry out comprehensive risk and safety assessments of existing nuclear installations and to strengthen the implementation of relevant conventions to aim for high levels of nuclear safety.

12. We recognize that increasing energy efficiency and reliance on renewables and other clean energy technologies can contribute significantly to energy security and savings, while also addressing climate change and promoting sustainable economic growth and innovation. We welcome sustained, cost-effective policies to support reliable renewable energy sources and their market integration. We commit to advance appliance and equipment efficiency, including through comparable and transparent testing procedures, and to promote industrial and building efficiency through energy management systems.
13. We agree to continue our efforts to address climate change and recognize the need for increased mitigation ambition in the period to 2020, with a view to doing our part to limit effectively the increase in global temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, consistent with science. We strongly support the outcome of the 17th Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Durban to implement the Cancun agreements and the launch of the Durban Platform, which we welcome as a significant breakthrough toward the adoption by 2015 of a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force applicable to all Parties, developed and developing countries alike. We agree to continue to work together in the UNFCCC and other fora, including through the Major Economies Forum, toward a positive outcome at Doha.
14. Recognizing the impact of short-lived climate pollutants on near-term climate change, agricultural productivity, and human health, we support, as a means of promoting increased ambition and complementary to other CO<sub>2</sub> and GHG emission reduction efforts, comprehensive actions to reduce these pollutants, which, according to UNEP and others, account for over thirty percent of near-term global warming as well as 2 million premature deaths a year. Therefore, we agree to join the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-lived Climate Pollutants.
15. In addition, we strongly support efforts to rationalize and phase-out over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption, and to continue voluntary reporting on progress.

## FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION

16. For over a decade, the G-8 has engaged with African partners to address the challenges and opportunities afforded by Africa's quest for inclusive and sustainable development. Our progress has been measurable, and together we have changed the lives of hundreds of millions of people. International assistance alone, however, cannot fulfill our shared objectives. As we move forward, and even as we recommit to working together to reduce poverty, we recognize that our task is also to foster the change that can end it, by investing in Africa's growth, its expanding role in the global economy, and its success. As part of that effort, we commit to fulfill outstanding L'Aquila financial pledges, seek to maintain strong support to address current and future global food security challenges, including through bilateral and multilateral assistance, and agree to take new steps to accelerate progress towards food security and nutrition in Africa and globally, on a complementary basis.
17. Since the L'Aquila Summit, we have seen an increased level of commitment to global food security, realignment of as-

sistance in support of country-led plans, and new investments and greater collaboration in agricultural research. We commend our African partners for the progress made since L'Aquila, consistent with the Maputo Declaration, to increase public investments in agriculture and to adopt the governance and policy reforms necessary to accelerate sustainable agricultural productivity growth, attain greater gains in nutrition, and unlock sustainable and inclusive country-led growth. The leadership of the African Union and the role of its Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) have been essential.

18. Building on this progress, and working with our African and other international partners, today we commit to launch a New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition to accelerate the flow of private capital to African agriculture, take to scale new technologies and other innovations that can increase sustainable agricultural productivity, and reduce the risk borne by vulnerable economies and communities. This New Alliance will lift 50 million people out of poverty over the next decade, and be guided by a collective commitment to invest in credible, comprehensive and country-owned plans, develop new tools to mobilize private capital, spur and scale innovation, and manage risk; and engage and leverage the capacity of private sector partners – from women and smallholder farmers, entrepreneurs to domestic and international companies.
19. The G-8 reaffirms its commitment to the world's poorest and most vulnerable people, and recognizes the vital role of official development assistance in poverty alleviation and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. As such, we welcome and endorse the Camp David

Accountability Report which records the important progress that the G-8 has made on food security consistent with commitments made at the L'Aquila Summit, and in meeting our commitments on global health, including the Muskoka initiative on maternal, newborn and child health. We remain strongly committed to reporting transparently and consistently on the implementation of these commitments. We look forward to a comprehensive report under the UK Presidency in 2013.

## **AFGHANISTAN'S ECONOMIC TRANSITION**

20. We reaffirm our commitment to a sovereign, peaceful, and stable Afghanistan, with full ownership of its own security, governance and development and free of terrorism, extremist violence, and illicit drug production and trafficking. We will continue to support the transition process with close coordination of our security, political and economic strategies.
21. With an emphasis on mutual accountability and improved governance, building on the Kabul Process and Bonn Conference outcomes, our countries will take steps to mitigate the economic impact of the transition period and support the development of a sustainable Afghan economy by enhancing Afghan capacity to increase fiscal revenues and improve spending management, as well as mobilizing non-security assistance into the transformation decade.
22. We will support the growth of Afghan civil society and will mobilize private sector support by strengthening the enabling environment and expanding business opportunities in key sectors, as well as promote regional economic cooperation to enhance connectivity.

23. We will also continue to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in its efforts to meet its obligation to protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, including in the rights of women and girls and the freedom to practice religion.
24. We look forward to the upcoming Tokyo Conference in July, as it generates further long-term support for civilian assistance to Afghanistan from G-8 members and other donors into the transformation decade; agrees to a strategy for Afghanistan's sustainable economic development, with mutual commitments and benchmarks between Afghanistan and the international community; and provides a mechanism for biennial reviews of progress being made against those benchmarks through the transformation decade.

## **THE TRANSITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

25. A year after the historic events across the Middle East and North Africa began to unfold, the aspirations of people of the region for freedom, human rights, democracy, job opportunities, empowerment and dignity are undiminished. We recognize important progress in a number of countries to respond to these aspirations and urge continued progress to implement promised reforms. Strong and inclusive economic growth, with a thriving private sector to provide jobs, is an essential foundation for democratic and participatory government based on the rule of law and respect for basic freedoms, including respect for the rights of women and girls and the right to practice religious faith in safety and security.
26. We renew our commitment to the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition, launched at the G-8 Summit last May. We welcome the steps already taken, in partnership with others in the region, to support economic reform, open government, and trade, investment and integration.
27. We note in particular the steps being taken to expand the mandate of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to bring its expertise in transition economies and financing support for private sector growth to this region; the platform established by international financial institutions to enhance coordination and identify opportunities to work together to support the transition country reform efforts; progress in conjunction with regional partners toward establishing a new transition fund to support country-owned policy reforms complementary to existing mechanisms; increased financial commitments to reforming countries from international and regional financial institutions, the G-8 and regional partners; strategies to increase access to capital markets to help boost private investment; and commitments from our countries and others to support small and medium-sized enterprises, provide needed training and technical assistance and facilitate international exchanges and training programs for key constituencies in transition countries.
28. Responding to the call from partner countries, we endorse an asset recovery action plan to promote the return of stolen assets and welcome, and commit to support the action plans developed through the Partnership to promote open government, reduce corruption, strengthen accountability and improve the regulatory environment, particularly for the growth of small- and medium-sized enterprises. These governance reforms will foster the inclusive economic growth, rule of law and job creation needed for the success

of democratic transition. We are working with Partnership countries to build deeper trade and investment ties, across the region and with members of the G-8, which are critical to support growth and job creation. In this context, we welcome Partnership countries' statement on openness to international investment.

29. G-8 members are committed to an enduring and productive partnership that supports the historic transformation underway in the region. We commit to further work during the rest of 2012 to support private sector engagement, asset recovery, closer trade ties and provision of needed expertise as well as assistance, including through a transition fund. We call for a meeting in September of Foreign Ministers to review progress being made under the Partnership.

## POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES

30. We remain appalled by the loss of life, humanitarian crisis, and serious and widespread human rights abuses in Syria. The Syrian government and all parties must immediately and fully adhere to commitments to implement the six-point plan of UN and Arab League Joint Special Envoy (JSE) Kofi Annan, including immediately ceasing all violence so as to enable a Syrian-led, inclusive political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system. We support the efforts of JSE Annan and look forward to seeing his evaluation, during his forthcoming report to the UN Security Council, of the prospects for beginning this political transition process in the near-term. Use of force endangering the lives of civilians must cease. We call on the Syrian government to grant safe and unhindered access of humanitarian personnel to populations in need of assistance in accordance with international law. We welcome

the deployment of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria, and urge all parties, in particular the Syrian government, to fully cooperate with the mission. We strongly condemn recent terrorist attacks in Syria. We remain deeply concerned about the threat to regional peace and security and humanitarian despair caused by the crisis and remain resolved to consider further UN measures as appropriate.

31. We remain united in our grave concern over Iran's nuclear program. We call on Iran to comply with all of its obligations under relevant UNSC resolutions and requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of Governors. We also call on Iran to continuously comply with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including its safeguards obligations. We also call on Iran to address without delay all outstanding issues related to its nuclear program, including questions concerning possible military dimensions. We desire a peaceful and negotiated solution to concerns over Iran's nuclear program, and therefore remain committed to a dual-track approach. We welcome the resumption of talks between Iran and the E3+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union High Representative). We call on Iran to seize the opportunity that began in Istanbul, and sustain this opening in Baghdad by engaging in detailed discussions about near-term, concrete steps that can, through a step-by-step approach based on reciprocity, lead towards a comprehensive negotiated solution which restores international confidence that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. We urge Iran to also comply with international obligations to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, and end interference with the



media, arbitrary executions, torture, and other restrictions placed on rights and freedoms.

32. We continue to have deep concerns about provocative actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that threaten regional stability. We remain concerned about the DPRK's nuclear program, including its uranium enrichment program. We condemn the April 13, 2012, launch that used ballistic missile technology in direct violation of UNSC resolution. We urge the DPRK to comply with its international obligations and abandon all nuclear and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. We call on all UN member states to join the G-8 in fully implementing the UNSC resolutions in this regard. We affirm our will to call on the UN Security Council to take action, in response to additional DPRK acts, including ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests. We remain concerned about human rights violations in the DPRK, including the situation of political prisoners and the abductions issue.
33. We recognize that according women full and equal rights and opportunities is crucial for all countries' political stability, democratic governance, and economic growth. We reaffirm our commitment to advance human rights of and opportunities for women, leading to more development, poverty reduction, conflict prevention and resolution, and improved maternal health and reduced child mortality. We also commit to supporting the right of all people, including women, to freedom of religion in safety and security. We are concerned about the reduction of women's political participation and the placing at risk of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, including in Middle East and North Africa countries emerging from conflict or undergoing political transitions. We condemn and avow to stop violence directed against, including the trafficking of, women and girls. We call upon all states to protect human rights of women and to promote women's roles in economic development and in strengthening international peace and security.
34. We pay tribute to the remarkable efforts of President Thein Sein, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and many other citizens of Burma/Myanmar to deliver democratic reform in their country over the past year. We recognize the need to secure lasting and irreversible reform, and pledge our support to existing initiatives, particularly those which focus on peace in ethnic area, national reconciliation, and entrenching democracy. We also stress the need to cooperate to further enhance aid coordination among international development partners of Burma/Myanmar and conduct investment in a manner beneficial to the people of Burma/Myanmar.
35. We recognize the particular sacrifices made by the Libyan people in their transition to create a peaceful, democratic, and stable Libya. The international community remains committed to actively support the consolidation of the new Libyan institutions.
36. We condemn transnational organized crime and terrorism in all forms and manifestations. We pledge to enhance our cooperation to combat threats of terrorism and terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida, its affiliates and adherents, and transnational organized crime, including individuals and groups engaged in illicit drug trafficking and production. We stress that it is critical to strengthen efforts to curb illicit trafficking in arms in the Sahel area, in particular to eliminate the Man-Portable Air Defense Sys-

tems proliferated across the region; to counter financing of terrorism, including kidnapping for ransom; and to eliminate support for terrorist organizations and criminal networks. We urge states to develop necessary capacities including in governance, education, and criminal justice systems, to address, reduce and undercut terrorist and criminal threats, including "lone wolf" terrorists and violent extremism, while safeguarding human rights and upholding the rule of law. We underscore the central role of the United Nations and welcome the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and efforts of the Roma-Lyon Group in countering terrorism. We reaffirm the need to strengthen the implementation of the UN Al-Qaida sanctions regime, and the integrity and implementation of the UN conventions on drug control and transnational organized crime.

37. We reaffirm that nonproliferation and disarmament issues are among our top priorities. We remain committed to fulfill all of our obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and, concerned about the severe proliferation challenges, call on all parties to support and promote global nonproliferation and disarmament efforts.
38. We welcome and fully endorse the G-8 Foreign Ministers Meeting Chair's Statement with accompanying annex.

## CONCLUSION

39. We look forward to meeting under the presidency of the United Kingdom in 2013.

**Source:** Camp David Declaration// Official site of the White House. — Washington D.C. — <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/19/camp-david-declaration>.

## **2.6. Statement by Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-president of the Commission, Following the Talks of E3+3 with Iran in Baghdad; May 24, 2012; Brussels**

First of all, I would like to thank the Iraqi government, and in particular Foreign Minister Zebari, for the excellent hospitality and organisation of these talks.

The E3+3 remain firm, clear and united in seeking a swift diplomatic resolution of the international community's concerns on the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, based on the NPT, and the full implementation of UN Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions. We expect Iran to take concrete and practical steps to urgently meet the concerns of the international community, to build confidence and to meet its international obligations.

We have met with our Iranian counterparts over the last two days in very intense and detailed discussions.

In line with our agreement in Istanbul, the E3+3 laid out clear proposals to address the Iranian nuclear issue and, in particular, all aspects of 20% enrichment.

We also put ideas on the table on reciprocal steps we would be prepared to take.

Iran declared its readiness to address the issue of 20% enrichment and came with its own

five-point plan, including their assertion that we recognise their right to enrichment.

Having held in-depth discussions with our Iranian counterparts over two days — both in full plenary sessions and bilaterals — it is clear that we both want to make progress, and that there is some common ground. However, significant differences remain. Nonetheless, we do agree on the need for further discussion to expand that common ground.

We will go back to our respective capitals and consult. We will maintain intensive contacts with our Iranian counterparts to prepare a further meeting in Moscow with arrival on 17th June, with talks on 18th and 19th June.

As we have already agreed, the talks will be based on a step-by-step approach and reciprocity.

We remain determined to resolve this problem in the near term through negotiations, and will continue to make every effort to that end.

**Source:** Statement by Catherine Ashton// Official site of the European Commission. — Brussels. — <http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/ebs/schedule.cfm>.

## 2.7. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, August 30, 2012; Vienna

A report of the International Atomic Energy Agency Director General

### A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement<sup>9</sup> and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).
2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions<sup>10</sup> are binding on Iran.<sup>11</sup> The relevant provisions of the
3. By virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations,<sup>13</sup> the Agency is required to cooperate with the Security Council in the exercise of the Council's

afforementioned Security Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are mandatory, in accordance with the terms of those resolutions.<sup>12</sup>

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affirmed, inter alia, that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required by the Board in GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82; reaffirmed Iran's obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme; decided that Iran shall, without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements; and called upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of its Additional Protocol and to ratify it promptly (operative paras 1–6).

<sup>9</sup> The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

<sup>10</sup> The Board of Governors has adopted 11 resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran: GOV/2003/69 (12 September 2003); GOV/2003/81 (26 November 2003); GOV/2004/21 (13 March 2004); GOV/2004/49 (18 June 2004); GOV/2004/79 (18 September 2004); GOV/2004/90 (29 November 2004); GOV/2005/64 (11 August 2005); GOV/2005/77 (24 September 2005); GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006); GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009); and GOV/2011/69 (18 November 2011).

<sup>11</sup> In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council:

<sup>12</sup> The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).

<sup>13</sup> The Agreement Governing the Relationship between the United Nations and the IAEA entered into force on 14 November 1957, following approval by the General Conference, upon recommendation of the Board of Governors, and approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is reproduced in INFCIRC/11 (30 October 1959), Part I.A.

responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. All Member States of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council,<sup>14</sup> and in this respect, to take actions which are consistent with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

4. This report addresses developments since the last report (GOV/2012/9, 24 February 2012), as well as issues of longer standing. It focuses on those areas where Iran has not fully implemented its binding obligations, as the full implementation of these obligations is needed to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

## B. Clarification of Unresolved Issues

5. As previously reported, on 18 November 2011 the Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2011/69 in which, *inter alia*, it stressed that it was essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding those issues, including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran. In that resolution, the Board also called on Iran to engage seriously and without preconditions in talks aimed at restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. In light of this, the Agency and Iranian officials held talks in Tehran and Vienna,<sup>15</sup> during which a structured approach to the clarification of all outstanding issues was discussed, focusing on the issues outlined in the Annex to the Director General's November 2011 re-

port and the Agency's request for access to the Parchin site. Issues related to the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations, other than those included in the Annex to the November 2011 report, were to be addressed separately. During the talks in Vienna on 14 and 15 May 2012, Iran stated that access to the Parchin site would not be possible before agreement had been reached on a structured approach.<sup>16</sup>

6. As also previously reported, on 21 May 2012 the Director General held meetings with senior Iranian officials in Tehran to discuss issues of mutual interest.<sup>17</sup> Although some differences between Iran and the Agency on the document resulting from the talks on 14 and 15 May 2012 remained, H.E. Mr Saeed Jalili, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, made clear during a meeting with the Director General that these were not obstacles to reaching agreement on a structured approach.
7. Further talks between the Agency and Iranian officials were held in Vienna on 8 June 2012 and 24 August 2012 with a view to finalizing the structured approach, based on the document resulting from the talks in May 2012. However, important differences remain and no agreement could be reached on the structured approach.
8. Despite the intensified dialogue between the Agency and Iran since January 2012, efforts to resolve all outstanding substantive issues have achieved no concrete results: Iran, in an initial declaration,<sup>18</sup> simply dismissed the Agency's concerns in connection with the issues identified in Section C of the Annex to GOV/2011/65; Iran has not responded to the Agency's

<sup>14</sup> The Charter of the United Nations, Article 25.

<sup>15</sup> GOV/2012/23, paras 5 and 7.

<sup>16</sup> GOV/2012/23, para. 7.

<sup>17</sup> GOV/2012/23, para. 9.

<sup>18</sup> GOV/2012/9, para. 8.

initial questions on Parchin and the foreign expert; Iran has not provided the Agency with access to the location within the Parchin site to which the Agency has requested access; and Iran has been conducting activities at that location that will significantly hamper the Agency's ability to conduct effective verification. Notwithstanding Mr Jalili's statement referred to above, agreement on the structured approach has yet to materialize.

### C. Facilities Declared under Iran's Safeguards Agreement

9. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 16 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).<sup>19</sup> Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared material at these facilities and LOFs.

### D. Enrichment Related Activities

10. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities in the declared facilities referred to below. All of these activities are under Agency safeguards, and all of the nuclear material, installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations at those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.<sup>20</sup>
11. Iran has stated that the purpose of enriching UF<sub>6</sub> up to 5% U-235 is the production

of fuel for its nuclear facilities<sup>21</sup> and that the purpose of enriching UF<sub>6</sub> up to 20% U-235 is the manufacture of fuel for research reactors.<sup>22</sup>

12. Since Iran began enriching uranium at its declared facilities, it has produced at those facilities approximately:
  - 6876 kg (+ 679 kg since the previous report) of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235 (see Figures 1 and 2);
  - 189.4 kg (+ 43.8 kg since the previous report) of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 (see Figures 3 and 4).

### D.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant

13. **Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP):** FEP is a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU) enriched up to 5% U-235, which was first brought into operation in 2007. The plant is divided into Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to design information submitted by Iran, eight units are planned for Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit. No detailed design information has yet been provided for Production Hall B.
14. As of 21 August 2012, Iran had fully installed 55 cascades in Production Hall A, of which 54 were declared by Iran as be-

<sup>19</sup> All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.

<sup>20</sup> In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are not subject to containment and surveillance.

<sup>21</sup> As declared in Iran's Design Information Questionnaires (DIQs) for the Fuel Enrichment Plant.

<sup>22</sup> GOV/2010/10, para. 8; H.E. Mr Fereydoun Abbasi, Vice President of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, reportedly made a statement to the effect that Iran plans to build four to five new reactors in the next few years in order to produce radioisotopes and carry out research ('Iran will not stop producing 20% enriched uranium', Tehran Times, 12 April 2011). He was also quoted by the Iranian Student's News Agency as saying "To provide fuel for these (new) reactors, we need to continue with the 20 per cent enrichment of uranium" ('Iran to build new nuclear research reactors – report', Reuters, 11 April 2011).

ing fed with natural UF<sub>6</sub>,<sup>23</sup> and partially installed one other cascade. Preparatory installation work had been completed for another 34 cascades, and was ongoing in relation to 54 others (see Figure 5). All the centrifuges installed in Production Hall A are IR-1 machines. During a design information verification (DIV) on 11 August 2012, the Agency noted that Iran had started general preparatory work in Production Hall B. In a letter dated 23 August 2012, the Agency requested that Iran provide an updated DIQ for FEP including information for Production Hall B.

15. As previously reported,<sup>24</sup> the Agency has verified that, as of 16 October 2011, 55 683 kg of natural UF<sub>6</sub> had been fed into the cascades since production began in February 2007, and a total of 4871 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235 had been produced. Iran has estimated that, between 17 October 2011 and 6 August 2012, a total of 23 698 kg of natural UF<sub>6</sub> was fed into the cascades and a total of approximately 2005 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235 had been produced, which would result in a total production of 6876 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235 since production began.
16. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February 2007<sup>25</sup> and other verification

23 Not all of the 9156 centrifuges in the cascades that were being fed with UF<sub>6</sub> may have been working.

24 GOV/2012/9, para. 14.

25 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 30 March 2012. Since the plant was first brought into operation, the Agency has taken a large number of environmental samples at FEP, the results of which have indicated a level of enrichment of uranium of less than 5% U-235. A small number of particles from environmental samples taken in the cascade area continue to be found with enrichment levels above 5%, which are higher than the level stated in the DIQ for FEP. As noted in GOV/2010/46, paragraph 7, the Agency assesses that these results refer to a known technical phenomenon associated with the start-up of centrifuge cascades.

activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

17. **Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP):** PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility, and a pilot LEU production facility, which was first brought into operation in October 2003. It has a cascade hall that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated for the production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area designated for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5) (see Figure 6).

18. *Production area:* As of 21 August 2012, Iran was feeding low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> into two interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6).

19. As previously reported,<sup>26</sup> the Agency has verified that, as of 13 September 2011, 720.8 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235 produced at FEP had been fed into the cascades in the production area since production began in February 2010, and that a total of 73.7 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 had been produced. Iran has estimated that, between 14 September 2011 and 21 August 2012, a total of 364 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235 at FEP was fed into the cascades in the production area and that approximately 50.4 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced. This would result in a total production of 124.1 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 at PFEP since production began.

20. *R&D area:* Since the previous report, Iran has been intermittently feeding natural UF<sub>6</sub> into IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges, sometimes into single machines and sometimes into small or larger cascades. Iran has yet to install three new types of centrifuge (IR-5, IR-6 and IR-6s) as it had

26 GOV/2011/65, para. 15.



indicated it intends to do.<sup>27</sup> Iran has also been intermittently feeding one cascade with depleted UF<sub>6</sub> instead of natural UF<sub>6</sub>.

21. Between 19 May 2012 and 21 August 2012, a total of approximately 3.4 kg of natural UF<sub>6</sub> and 20.3 kg of depleted UF<sub>6</sub> was fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails were recombined at the end of the process.
22. Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP<sup>28</sup> and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

## D.2. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant

23. The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) is, according to the DIQ of 18 January 2012,<sup>29</sup> a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 and the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235. Additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this facility, particularly in light of the difference between the original stated purpose of the facility and the purpose for which it is now being used.<sup>30</sup> The facility, which was first brought into operation in 2011, is being built to contain 16 cascades, equally divided between Unit 1 and Unit 2, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges.<sup>31</sup> To date, all of the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines.

24. As of 18 August 2012, Iran had installed all eight cascades in Unit 2, four of which

(configured in two sets of two interconnected cascades) it was feeding with UF<sub>6</sub> enriched to 3.5% U-235. In Unit 1, Iran had completely installed four cascades and partially installed a fifth cascade, none of which it was feeding with UF<sub>6</sub> (see Figure 7).

25. Iran has estimated that, between 14 December 2011, when feeding of the first set of two interconnected cascades began, and 12 August 2012, a total of 482 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235 was fed into cascades at FFEP, and that approximately 65.3 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced, 50 kg of which has been withdrawn from the process and verified by the Agency.
26. With regard to the presence of particles with enrichment levels above 20% U-235,<sup>32</sup> Iran's explanation is not inconsistent with the further assessment made by the Agency since the previous report.<sup>33</sup> The Agency and Iran have exchanged views on ways to avoid a recurrence of transient enrichment levels above the level stated in the DIQ.

## D.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities

27. The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided.<sup>34</sup> Iran has not provided information, as requested by the Agency, in connection with its announcement on

27 GOV/2012/23, para. 20.

28 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 21 April 2012.

29 To date, Iran has provided the Agency with an initial DIQ and three revised DIQs (GOV/2012/9, para. 24).

30 GOV/2009/74, para. 14.

31 GOV/2009/74, para. 9.

32 GOV/2012/23, para. 28.

33 On 11 April 2012, Iran disconnected the product cylinder from the process and the Agency verified that the enrichment level of the UF<sub>6</sub> contained in the product cylinder was 19.2%, i.e. within the level stated in the DIQ.

34 'Iran Specifies Location for 10 New Enrichment Sites', Fars News Agency, 16 August 2010.



7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology.<sup>35</sup> As a result of Iran's lack of cooperation on those issues, the Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.

### E. Reprocessing Activities

28. Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.<sup>36</sup> In a letter to the Agency dated 15 February 2008, Iran stated that it "does not have reprocessing activities". In that context, the Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)<sup>37</sup> and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.<sup>38</sup> The Agency carried out an inspection and DIV at TRR on 6 August 2012, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 8 August 2012. It is only with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access that the Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran.

### F. Heavy Water Related Projects

29. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on

all heavy water related projects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor at Arak, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor), which is under Agency safeguards.<sup>39</sup>

30. On 1 August 2012, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed that, as part of the facility's ongoing construction, cooling and moderator circuit piping was being installed. As previously reported, Iran has stated that the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is due to commence in the third quarter of 2013.<sup>40</sup>

31. Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency has not been provided with further access to the plant. As a result, the Agency is again relying on satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on recent images, the plant appears to be in operation. To date, Iran has not permitted the Agency to take samples from the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF).<sup>41</sup>

### G. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

32. Although it is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects, Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF, the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) and the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) at Esfahan, as indicated below, which are in contravention of those obligations, although the facilities are under Agency safeguards. Iran has stated that it is conducting these activities in order to make

35 Cited on the website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 February 2010, at <http://www.president.ir/en/?ArtID=20255>.

36 S/RES/1696 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.

37 TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.

38 The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.

39 S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.

40 GOV/2012/23, para. 32.

41 GOV/2010/10, paras 20 and 21.

fuel for research reactors.<sup>42</sup>

33. According to the latest information available to the Agency, Iran has produced:

- at UCF: 550 tonnes of natural  $\text{UF}_6$ , 91 tonnes of which has been sent to FEP; and
- at FMP and FPPF: seven fuel items containing uranium enriched up to 20% U-235, two fuel items containing uranium enriched to 3.34% U-235 and five fuel items containing natural uranium (see Figure 8).

34. **Uranium Conversion Facility:** Between 5 and 9 March 2012, the Agency carried out a physical inventory verification (PIV) at UCF, the results of which are now being evaluated by the Agency. As previously reported, the Agency has verified that Iran produced 24 kg of uranium in the form of  $\text{UO}_2$  during R&D activities involving the conversion of  $\text{UF}_6$  enriched up to 3.34% U-235 into  $\text{UO}_2$ , and that 13.6 kg of uranium in the form of  $\text{UO}_2$  was subsequently transferred to FMP.<sup>43</sup> As of 10 August 2012, Iran had resumed these R&D activities, but had not produced additional uranium in the form of  $\text{UO}_2$ . As of the same date, Iran, through the conversion of uranium ore concentrate (UOC), had produced about 3340 kg of natural uranium in the form of  $\text{UO}_2$ , of which the Agency has verified that Iran transferred 1272 kg to FMP (see Figure 9).

35. On 22 April 2012, Iran introduced into the UCF process area 25 drums containing approximately 6560 kg of domestically produced UOC, and 25 drums containing approximately 9180 kg of UOC taken from Iran's stockpile of imported UOC.<sup>44</sup> Iran has mixed together the UOC from these 50 drums and used it for the

production of natural  $\text{UO}_2$ .

36. **Fuel Manufacturing Plant:** On 22 August 2012, the Agency carried out a DIV and an inspection at FMP and confirmed that the manufacture of pellets for the IR-40 Reactor using natural  $\text{UO}_2$  was ongoing. While Iran was continuing to manufacture dummy fuel assemblies for the IR-40 Reactor,<sup>45</sup> it was not manufacturing fuel assemblies containing nuclear material.

37. **Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant:** As previously reported,<sup>46</sup> Iran has combined into one facility the activities involving the conversion of  $\text{UF}_6$  enriched up to 20% U-235 into  $\text{U}_3\text{O}_8$  and the manufacture of fuel assemblies made of fuel plates containing  $\text{U}_3\text{O}_8$ . Between the start of conversion activities on 17 December 2011 and 12 August 2012, Iran has fed into the process 71.25 kg of  $\text{UF}_6$  enriched up to 20% U-235 and produced 31.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235 in the form of  $\text{U}_3\text{O}_8$ .

## H. Possible Military Dimensions

38. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.<sup>47</sup> Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.

39. The Annex to the Director General's No-

42 As declared in Iran's DIQs for FPPF.

43 GOV/2012/23, para. 35.

44 GOV/2003/75, Annex I, para. 8.

45 A dummy assembly is similar to a fuel assembly except that it contains non-nuclear material.

46 GOV/2012/23, para. 38.

47 GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10, paras 40–45; GOV/2009/55, paras 18–25; GOV/2008/38, paras 14–21; GOV/2008/15, paras 14–25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras 35–42; GOV/2011/65, paras 38–45 and Annex.

vember 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency, indicating that Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information, which comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency's own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that, prior to the end of 2003 the activities took place under a structured programme; that some continued after 2003; and that some may still be ongoing. Since November 2011, the Agency has obtained more information which further corroborates the analysis contained in the aforementioned Annex.

40. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran's obligations to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.<sup>48</sup> In its resolution GOV/2011/69 of 18 November 2011, the Board of Governors, *inter alia*, expressed its deep and increasing concern about the unresolved issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions.

41. Parchin: As stated in the Annex to the Director General's November 2011 report,<sup>49</sup> information provided to the Agency by

Member States indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. The information also indicates that this vessel was installed at the Parchin site in 2000. The location at the Parchin site of the vessel was only identified in March 2011. The Agency notified Iran of that location in January 2012.

42. Satellite imagery available to the Agency for the period from February 2005 to January 2012 shows virtually no activity at or near the building housing the containment vessel. However, since the Agency's first request for access to this location, satellite imagery shows that extensive activities and resultant changes have taken place at this location. A number of satellite images of the location since February 2012 show: large amounts of liquid 'run off' emanating from the building in which the vessel is housed; equipment in open storage immediately outside the building; the removal of external fixtures from the building itself; and the presence of light and heavy vehicles. Satellite imagery shows that, as of May 2012, five other buildings or structures at the location had been demolished, and power lines, fences and all paved roads had been removed. Significant ground scraping and landscaping have been undertaken over an extensive area at and around the location, with new dirt roads established. Satellite images from August 2012 show the containment vessel building shrouded. In light of these extensive activities, the Agency's ability to verify the information on which its concerns are based has been adversely affected and, when the Agency gains access to the location, its ability to conduct effective verification will have been significantly hampered.

43. In a letter to the Agency dated 29 August 2012, Iran stated that the allegation

<sup>48</sup> S/RES/1929, paras 2 and 3.

<sup>49</sup> GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 49.

of nuclear activities at the Parchin site is "baseless" and that "the recent activities claimed to be conducted in the vicinity of the location of interest to the Agency, has nothing to do with specified location by the Agency".

44. The activities observed and Iran's letter of 29 August 2012 further strengthen the Agency's assessment that it is necessary to have access to the location at Parchin without further delay.

### I. Design Information

45. Contrary to its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran's Safeguards Agreement,<sup>50</sup> which provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases. Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement that is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code

3.1. It is important to note that the absence of such early information reduces the time available for the Agency to plan the necessary safeguards arrangements, especially for new facilities, and reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities.<sup>51</sup>

46. Iran last provided the Agency with some updated information on the IR-40 Reactor in 2007, but has not provided a DIQ for the facility since 2006. Since 2007, Iran has conducted significant additional design and construction work on the reactor, but has not provided further information, as required pursuant to modified Code 3.1 of Iran's Subsidiary Arrangements General Part. The lack of up-to-date information on the IR-40 Reactor is now having an adverse impact on the Agency's ability to effectively verify the design of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach. On 1 August 2012, the Agency conducted a survey of the site in order to identify which safeguards equipment it would need to install at the IR-40 Reactor and where it should be located. Although Iran provided the Agency with some relevant technical details during that visit, it did not provide an updated DIQ.
47. As previously reported, Iran's response to Agency requests that Iran confirm or provide further information regarding its stated intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it would provide the Agency with the required information in "due time" rather than as required by the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.<sup>52</sup>

### J. Additional Protocol

48. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of

<sup>50</sup> In accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, as previously explained in the Director General's reports (see, for example, GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007), the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by operative paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) to "comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1".

<sup>51</sup> GOV/2010/10, para. 35.

<sup>52</sup> GOV/2011/29, para. 37; GOV/2012/23, para. 29.

the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.<sup>53</sup>

## K. Other Matters

49. As previously reported,<sup>54</sup> the Agency found a discrepancy of 19.8 kg between the amount of nuclear material declared by the operator and that measured by the Agency in connection with conversion experiments carried out by Iran at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) between 1995 and 2002.<sup>55</sup> Following further analysis and measurement of the relevant material by the Agency and evaluation of clarifications and corrections provided by Iran, the Agency has been able to reduce its initial estimate of the discrepancy. The Agency and Iran have agreed to conduct further analysis with a view to resolving the discrepancy.

50. In June 2012, Iran started using one of the fuel assemblies consisting of 19 fuel plates containing  $U_3O_8$  enriched up to 20% U-235 as an integral part of the core of TRR. In August 2012, Iran also started using in the core of TRR one of the control fuel assemblies consisting of 14 fuel plates containing  $U_3O_8$  enriched up to

20% U-235. Iran has also continued to use a fuel assembly containing 12 rods of  $UO_2$  enriched to 3.34% U-235 as one of the control assemblies in the core of TRR. On 9 July 2012, the Agency verified the receipt at TRR of one control fuel assembly containing 14 plates and two fuel rods containing natural  $UO_2$ . As requested, Iran has provided the Agency with further information about the irradiation of nuclear material received from FMP, as well as the TRR operator's plans for irradiating such material.

51. As previously reported,<sup>56</sup> according to Iran, commissioning activity at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) commenced on 31 January 2012. On 29 and 30 July 2012, the Agency conducted an inspection at BNPP while the reactor was operating at 75% of its nominal power.

## L. Summary

52. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.<sup>57</sup>

53. Despite the intensified dialogue between the Agency and Iran since January 2012,

<sup>53</sup> Iran's Additional Protocol was approved by the Board on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

<sup>54</sup> GOV/2012/9, para. 46.

<sup>55</sup> This material had been under Agency seal since 2003; GOV/2003/75, paras 20–25 and Annex 1; GOV/2004/34, para. 32, and Annex, paras 10–12; GOV/2004/60, para. 33, Annex, paras 1–7; GOV/2011/65, para. 49.

<sup>56</sup> GOV/2012/9, para. 49.

<sup>57</sup> The Board has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the nondiversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49).

no concrete results have been achieved in resolving the outstanding issues. Given the nature and extent of credible information available, the Agency considers it essential for Iran to engage with the Agency without further delay on the substance of the Agency's concerns. In the absence of such engagement, the Agency will not be able to resolve concerns about issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.

54. It is a matter of concern that the activities which have taken place since February 2012 at the location within the Parchin site to which the Agency has requested access will have an adverse impact on the Agency's ability to undertake effective verification. The Agency reiterates its request for access to that location without further delay.

55. The Director General continues to urge Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and mandatory Security Council resolutions, to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, and to urge Iran to engage with the Agency to achieve concrete results on all outstanding substantive issues.

56. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

**Source:** Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran// Site of the Institute for Science and International Security // [http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Iran\\_report\\_--\\_August\\_30\\_2012.pdf](http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Iran_report_--_August_30_2012.pdf).

## APPENDIX 3

### Acronyms

ABM	anti-ballistic missile
BMD	ballistic missile defense
BTWC/BWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Biological Weapons Convention, BWC)
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTC	Counter-Terrorist Committee
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction, Nunn-Lugar Program
CW	chemical weapon/warfare
CWC	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction
DoD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
DoE	Department of Energy (U.S.)
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FATF	Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
G8	Group of Eight
GDP	gross domestic product
GNEP	Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
HEU	highly-enriched uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IMEMO	Institute for World Economy and International Relations (Russia)

IMO	International Maritime Organization
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces
INFCE	International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Estimation
LEU	low-enriched uranium
LNG	liquefied natural gas
MAD	mutual assured destruction
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology (U.S.)
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
NNWS	non-nuclear-weapon state
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NTI	Nuclear Threat Initiative
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P5	five permanent members of the UN Security Council
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
RAS	Russian Academy of Sciences
R&D	research and development
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TNT	trinitrotoluol
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicles
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCOM	UN Special Commission (Iraq)
USEC	United States Enrichment Corporation
WCO	World Customs Organization
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	weapon of mass destruction
WMDC	Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission



## APPENDIX 4

### List of Participants in the Conference

1. **Viatcheslav KANTOR** President of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe; Ph.D. (Russia).
2. **Fred TANNER** Director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy; Ambassador (Switzerland).
3. **Alexei ARBATOV** Head of the Center for International Security of the IMEMO RAS; Scholar-in-Residence of the Carnegie Moscow Center (former Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma, Federal Assembly – Russian Parliament); Academician RAS (Russia).
4. **David ATWOOD** Associate Fellow of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (former Director of the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva); Ph.D. (United States).
5. **Hans BLIX** Ambassador; Member of the Supervisory Council of the International Luxembourg Forum (former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency); Ph.D. (Sweden).
6. **Francesco CALOGERO** Professor of Theoretical Physics of the Department of Physics, University of Rome "La Sapienza" (former Secretary General of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Italy).

7. **Arne DALHAUG** Commandant of the NATO Defence College in Rome; Lieutenant-General (NATO).
8. **Mohammad Hassan DARYAEI** Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva; Ph.D. (Iran).
9. **Vladimir DVORKIN** Chairman of the Organizing Committee, International Luxembourg Forum; Principal Researcher of the IMEMO RAS; Professor; Major-General, ret. (Russia).
10. **Victor ESIN** Leading Researcher of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies RAS (former Chief of Armed Service Staff – First Deputy Commander-In-Chief, Strategic Rocket Forces); Colonel General, ret.; Ph.D. (Russia).
11. **Vladimir EVSEEV** Head of the Research Planning Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Senior Associate of the IMEMO RAS; Ph.D. (Russia).
12. **Mark FITZPATRICK** Director of the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Programme, International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (United States).
13. **Amandeep Singh GILL** Minister (Disarmament), Permanent Mission of India to the Conference on Disarmament (India).
14. **Alain GUIDETTI** Diplomat-in-Residence of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Former Swiss Ambassador to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan); Ambassador (Switzerland).
15. **Theresa HITCHENS** Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (United States).

16. **Vladimir  
IAKOVLEV** General of the Army, ret. (former Director of the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Russia).
17. **Catherine  
KELLEHER** College Park Professor, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland (United States).
18. **Anton  
KELLER** Former Parliamentary Adviser in the Swiss Parliament (Switzerland).
19. **Shafqat Ali  
KHAN** Deputy Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the United Nations Office in Geneva (Pakistan).
20. **Benno  
LAGGNER** Ambassador for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation and Head of the Division for Security Policy and Crisis Management, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Switzerland).
21. **Gustav  
LINDSTROM** Head of the Emerging Security Challenges Programme, Director of the European Training Course in Security Policy, Geneva Centre for Security Policy; Ph.D. (Sweden).
22. **Sujata  
MEHTA** Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament; Ambassador (India).
23. **Sergey  
OZNOBISHCHEV** Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments; Professor of the MGIMO (former Chief of the Organizational Analytic Division, RAS); Ph.D.; Full Member of the Russian Academy of Cosmonautics (Russia).

24. **Bruno PELLAUD** Former Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Switzerland).
25. **Roald SAGDEEV** Distinguished University Professor, Department of Physics at the University of Maryland; Director Emeritus of the Russian Space Research Institute; Member of the Supervisory Council of the International Luxembourg Forum; Academician RAS (Russia/United States).
26. **Jarmo SAREVA** Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Director of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations Office at Geneva (Finland).
27. **Pal SIDHU** Head of the WMD and Disarmament Programme, Geneva Centre for Security Policy; Ph.D. (India).
28. **Peter STEINER** Military Adviser, Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations Office at Geneva; Ph.D.; Colonel (Austria).
29. **Christian STROHAL** Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations Office at Geneva; Ambassador; Ph.D. (Austria).
30. **Viktor VASILIEV** Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office at Geneva (Russia).
31. **Barbara ZANCHETTA** Visiting Fellow on Disarmament of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy; Ph.D. (Italy).







