Luxembourg Conference Declaration
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE
On May 24-25, 2007, fifty seven independent experts in global security, arms control and disarmament from fourteen countries met at an international conference in Luxembourg to discuss the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe and ways of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Participants of the Luxembourg Conference concluded that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the related nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes are facing unprecedented challenges and need high-level political support to sustain and strengthen them.
First, the greatest direct threat for the foreseeable future stems from the possibility that terrorist organizations will gain access to nuclear explosive devices or nuclear materials. Second, there is a danger that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the whole non-proliferation regime will collapse because of a failure to resolve on-going nuclear crises such as those in Iran and North Korea. Third, most acute factor is the problem of poor compliance with, and weak enforcement, of non-proliferation obligations. This includes the lack of commitment by nuclear weapon states to nuclear disarmament, their continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence, and the disintegration of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process.
Conference participants emphasized that such developments will undercut not only regional, but also global security, and raise the danger of terrorist use of nuclear explosive devices or combat employment of nuclear weapons. The international community must address this situation with the utmost urgency.
Participants noted that the promotion of peace, respect of each other's legitimate interests, and good neighborly relations among states are fundamental to international security and necessary as a pre-condition for the advancement of the non-proliferation regime, nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements.
Experts attending the Conference propose to the United Nations Secretary General, the Member States of the United Nations, the Group of Eight, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other authoritative international organizations a roadmap embracing the following initiatives:
1. Reaffirmation of nuclear-weapon states' commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; reduction of their reliance on nuclear deterrence; convening a special summit of nuclear-weapon states on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament; urgent renewal of the dialogue between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on further nuclear arms reductions and limitations; enhancement of cooperation on the development of missile defense systems as provided for by the Joint Declaration on New Strategic Relationship of 2002; initiation of consultations with the United Kingdom, France and China on their participation, in a format acceptable to them, in nuclear forces limitations, as well as in transparency and confidence-building measures existing between the United States of America and the Russian Federation; adoption by all nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT, of an unconditional obligation on the non-first use of nuclear weapons against any state party to this Treaty; initiation of international negotiations on the Code of Conduct on peaceful space activities and on space security problems.
2. Signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by all states, and in particular by the Annex II (44) states that have not yet done so, to bring about the early entry into force thereof.
3. Acknowledging certain progress achieved so far, all the parties in the six-party talks should take effective measures to implement the Joint Document regarding the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea's nuclear program. The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea should terminate its nuclear weapons program, return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and abide by the international disarmament treaties and export control mechanisms related to weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. In return, the international community, and the other five parties of the six-party talks in particular, should provide adequate security assurances, energy and humanitarian assistance and help in the development of energy industry.
4. Closer coordination of the positions of the six countries negotiating with Iran on the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in Iran. Iranian defiance of the United Nations resolutions is unacceptable. Iran must comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions and the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors' resolutions, by resolving all outstanding issues with the Agency. Foremost, Iran must fulfill the United Nations Security Council's demand that Iran should without further delay suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA, as well as work on all heavy-water related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA. Failure to comply with these provisions will lead to strengthening sanctions against Iran, as specified in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, using all appropriate means within the authority of the United Nations Security Council. Iranian compliance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions and removal of all non-compliance issues would make possible provision of a package of incentives, including assured delivery of low-enriched uranium or nuclear fuel and removal of irradiated fuel for reprocessing and storage abroad. Other incentives may include international help with developing the Iranian oil and gas industries, admittance to the World Trade Organization and, eventually, resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States of America. Iranian political circles and population at large should be informed of the considerable economic and social-political advantages pursuant to Iranian compliance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions, and the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors' resolutions.
5. Encouraging India, Israel and Pakistan and providing to them incentives to come closer, where appropriate, to the nuclear non-proliferation regime through concluding the International Atomic Energy Agency 1997 Additional Protocol, signing and ratifying in full the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, joining negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and international export control mechanisms, as well as undertaking confidence- and security-building measures, regarding nuclear weapons. It should be taken into consideration that Israel has already signed the CTBT. Such steps will be conducive to the broader involvement of these three countries in international peaceful nuclear cooperation programs, and other regional and global endeavors in the economic or security realm.
6. In view of the growing threat of nuclear terrorism much more intensive and broad preventive measures are urgently needed to enhance physical protection, accounting and control of fissile materials worldwide, and to accelerate disposition of highly-enriched uranium by its conversion to low-enriched uranium and application to peaceful purposes, capitalizing on the positive experience of the agreement on highly-enriched uranium and low-enriched uranium between the United States of America and the Russian Federation ("HEU-LEU deal"). Additional, and if necessary international cooperative measures to protect nuclear power plants, research reactors and nuclear weapons storage sites should be undertaken.
7. Further enhancement of the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive safeguards, foremost by signing and ratifying the 1997 Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements by all states that have not yet done so; and for the 31 states - parties to the NPT, that have not yet concluded safeguards agreements, to do so as soon as possible. Strengthening barriers against withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty by strictly regulating the withdrawal procedure, inter alia by introducing a requirement for well-founded motivation for the withdrawal, and ensuring compliance with withdrawal notice period pursuant to Article X, as well as by adopting regulations on maintaining International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over any technologies and materials obtained under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In case of withdrawal, dual-purpose technologies and materials should be returned to suppliers under the Agency's supervision which should be ensured by agreeing on corresponding regulations with the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee.
8. Enhancing the role of the UN Security Council in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Making all necessary efforts to consolidate positions of the UN Security Council permanent member-states in enforcing the NPT obligations. Improving the efficiency and ensuring compliance with international law of counter-proliferation measures regarding nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (pursuant, for example, the Proliferation Security Initiative, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673, and the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism).
9. Coordinating international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear fuel cycle technologies to additional states, while developing a reliable mechanism for fuel supply assurances and solutions for spent fuel management and removal. Appointing a high level United Nations commission to consider various existing proposals on multilateral nuclear fuel cycle supplies and services, in particular capitalizing on the practical experience of the Russian Federation and other states in advancing such projects. Encouraging the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership as a program to provide for the energy needs of emerging economies, while elevating non-proliferation standards to an equal level with environmental safety requirements.
10. Starting consultations on elevating the Missile Technology Control Regime and the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, as well as the system of control over the exports of nuclear materials and technologies within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to the status of international conventions.
Luxembourg conference participants consider the implementation of the above-mentioned measures by all concerned states and international organizations as a way to make a breakthrough in preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons and in precluding their accessibility to terrorists, as well as building global and regional security.
Participants express their intent to establish a permanent Luxembourg Forum with the purpose of holding policy-oriented conferences and meetings of experts and issuing policy-relevant publications on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on a regular basis.
1. Uzi ARAD
Director of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya; Adviser to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee; Professor (Israel).
2. Alexei ARBATOV
Head of the Center for International Security of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences; Scholar-in-Residence of the Carnegie Moscow Center; Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (former Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma, Federal Assembly - Russian Parliament).
3. Vladimir BARANOVSKIY
Deputy Director of the IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences; Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
4. Francesco CALOGERO
Professor of Theoretical Physics of the Department of Physics, University of Rome "La Sapienza" (former Secretary General of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Italy).
5. Shahran CHUBIN
Director of Studies and Joint Course Director, International Training Course in Security Policy, Geneva Centre for Security Policy; Ph.D. (Switzerland).
6. Joseph CIRINCIONE
Senior Vice President of the National Security and International Affairs at the Center for American Progress (USA).
7. Armand CLESSE
Director of the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies; Ph.D. (Luxembourg).
8. Thomas COCHRAN
Director of the Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council; Ph.D. (USA).
9. Jayantha DHANAPALA
Senior Adviser to the President of Sri Lanka (former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs); Ambassador (Sri Lanka).
10. Anatoliy DIAKOV
Director of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology; Ph.D. (Russia).
11. Vladimir DVORKIN
Principal researcher of the IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences; Major-General, ret.; Professor; full member of the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences, Academies of Military Sciences, the Russian Engineering Academy, the International Engineering Academy, Russian Academy of Astronautics (former Director of the 4th Major Institute of the Ministry of Defense, Russia).
12. Andrey FEDOROV
Member of Presidium, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russia).
13. Trevor FINDLAY
Director of the Canadian Center for Treaty Compliance; Associate Professor of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (Canada).
14. Mark FITZPATRICK
Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK).
15. Henry GAFFNEY
Director for Strategy and Concepts of the Center for Naval Analyses, CNA Corporation (USA).
16. Rose GOTTEMOELLER
Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center (former Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation and National Security of the U.S. Department of Energy).
17. Arnold HORELICK
Professor Emeritus of Political Science of the University of California at Los Angeles (USA).
18. Carlo JEAN
President of the Society for the Management of Nuclear Plants «SOGIN» (former Military Adviser to the President of Italy); General ret. (Italy).
19. Alexander KALIADIN
Principal Researcher of the IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences; Ph.D. (Russia).
20. Viatcheslav KANTOR
President of the European Jewish Congress; President of the Russian Jewish Congress, Ph.D. (Russia).
21. Sergey KARAGANOV
Chairman of Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences; Professor (Russia).
22. Catherine KELLEHER
College Park Professor at the University of Maryland; Senior Fellow of the Center for Naval Analysis, CNA Corporation (USA).
23. Isaak KHALATNIKOV
Director Emeritus of the Landau Institute for Theoretical Physics, Russian Academy of Sciences; Academician (Russia).
24. Anton KHLOPKOV
Executive Director of the PIR Center (Russia).
25. Byungki KIM
Vice Dean and Professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University (Republic of Korea).
26. Alexander KONOVALOV
President of the Institute for Strategic Assessments; Professor of the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO, Russia).
27. Michael KREPON
Founding President of the Henry L. Stimson Center (USA).
28. Robert LEGVOLD
Professor of the Columbia University (USA).
29. Alexander NIKITIN
Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, MGIMO; President of the Russian Political Science Association; Professor (Russia).
30. Robert NURICK
Senior Fellow of the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (USA).
31. Vladimir ORLOV
President of the PIR Center; Co-Director of the European Training Course in Security Policy at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy; Ph.D. (Russia).
32. Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV
Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments; Professor of the MGIMO and the Higher School of Economics, full member of the Russian Academy of Cosmonautics, the World Academy of Sciences for Complex Security (former Chief of the Organizational Analytic Division, Russian Academy of Sciences).
33. Zhenqiang PAN
Vice-President of the China Foundation for International Studies and Academic Changes; Professor of International Relations at the Institute for Strategic Studies, University of National Security; Major-General ret. (China).
34. George PERKOVICH
Vice President for Studies-Global Security and Economic Development and Director of the Non-Proliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Ph.D. (USA).
35. Alexander PIKAEV
Vice-chairman of the Committee of Academics for International Security; Head of the Department, IMEMO; Ph.D. (Russia).
36. William POTTER
Director James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies and Professor of Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies; Ph.D. (USA).
37. Vasantha RAO RAGHAVAN
Director of the Delhi Policy Group; President of the Centre for Security Analysis; Lieutenant General, ret. (India).
38. Roald SAGDEEV
Distinguished Professor of Physics and Director of the "East-West" Center, University of Maryland; Director Emeritus of the Russian Space Research Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences; Academician (Russia/USA).
39. Evgeniy SATANOVSKIY
President of the Institute of the Middle East; Ph.D. (Russia).
40. Vladimir SAZHIN
Senior Associate of the Institute for Oriental Studies (RAS); Professor (Russia).
41. Carlo SCHAERF
Professor of Physics of the University of Rome "Tor Vergata" (former President of the National Commission for Nuclear Physics, Italy).
42. John STEINBRUNER
Professor of the School of Public Policy; Director of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland.
43. Roland TIMERBAYEV
Chairman of the Board of the PIR-Center (former Permanent USSR/Russia's Representative to International Organizations in Vienna); Ambassador (Russia).
44. Jon WOLFSTHAL
Senior Fellow (International Security Program) of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (USA).
*) Having endorsed the principal ideas and the general thrust of this Declaration some participants of the Luxembourg Conference have reserved their objections with respect to some of its particular recommendations. Personally these experts are: Thomas Cochran, George Perkovich, Vasantha Raghavan, Roland Timerbaev.