Luxembourg Conference Declaration
|
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE
DECLARATION
On
May 24-25, 2007, fifty seven independent experts in global security,
arms control and disarmament from fourteen countries met at an
international conference in Luxembourg to discuss the prevention of a
nuclear catastrophe and ways of strengthening the nuclear
non-proliferation regime.
Participants of the Luxembourg
Conference concluded that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and the related nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
regimes are facing unprecedented challenges and need high-level
political support to sustain and strengthen them.
First, the
greatest direct threat for the foreseeable future stems from the
possibility that terrorist organizations will gain access to nuclear
explosive devices or nuclear materials. Second, there is a danger that
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the whole
non-proliferation regime will collapse because of a failure to resolve
on-going nuclear crises such as those in Iran and North Korea. Third,
most acute factor is the problem of poor compliance with, and weak
enforcement, of non-proliferation obligations. This includes the lack of
commitment by nuclear weapon states to nuclear disarmament, their
continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence, and the disintegration of the
nuclear arms control and disarmament process.
Conference
participants emphasized that such developments will undercut not only
regional, but also global security, and raise the danger of terrorist
use of nuclear explosive devices or combat employment of nuclear
weapons. The international community must address this situation with
the utmost urgency.
Participants noted that the promotion of
peace, respect of each other's legitimate interests, and good neighborly
relations among states are fundamental to international security and
necessary as a pre-condition for the advancement of the
non-proliferation regime, nuclear arms control and disarmament
agreements.
Experts attending the Conference propose to the
United Nations Secretary General, the Member States of the United
Nations, the Group of Eight, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective
Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and
other authoritative international organizations a roadmap embracing the
following initiatives:
1. Reaffirmation of nuclear-weapon
states' commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament in accordance with
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; reduction of their reliance
on nuclear deterrence; convening a special summit of nuclear-weapon
states on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and a special
session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament; urgent
renewal of the dialogue between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on further nuclear arms reductions and limitations;
enhancement of cooperation on the development of missile defense systems
as provided for by the Joint Declaration on New Strategic Relationship
of 2002; initiation of consultations with the United Kingdom, France and
China on their participation, in a format acceptable to them, in
nuclear forces limitations, as well as in transparency and
confidence-building measures existing between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation; adoption by all nuclear-weapon
states parties to the NPT, of an unconditional obligation on the
non-first use of nuclear weapons against any state party to this Treaty;
initiation of international negotiations on the Code of Conduct on
peaceful space activities and on space security problems.
2.
Signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by
all states, and in particular by the Annex II (44) states that have not
yet done so, to bring about the early entry into force thereof.
3. Acknowledging certain progress achieved so far, all the parties in
the six-party talks should take effective measures to implement the
Joint Document regarding the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea's
nuclear program. The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea should
terminate its nuclear weapons program, return to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and abide by
the international disarmament treaties and export control mechanisms
related to weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. In return,
the international community, and the other five parties of the six-party
talks in particular, should provide adequate security assurances,
energy and humanitarian assistance and help in the development of energy
industry.
4. Closer coordination of the positions of the six
countries negotiating with Iran on the implementation of International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in Iran. Iranian defiance of the United
Nations resolutions is unacceptable. Iran must comply with United
Nations Security Council resolutions and the International Atomic Energy
Agency Board of Governors' resolutions, by resolving all outstanding
issues with the Agency. Foremost, Iran must fulfill the United Nations
Security Council's demand that Iran should without further delay suspend
all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research
and development, to be verified by the IAEA, as well as work on all
heavy-water related projects, including the construction of a research
reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA.
Failure to comply with these provisions will lead to strengthening
sanctions against Iran, as specified in Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, using all appropriate means within the authority of the
United Nations Security Council. Iranian compliance with the United
Nations Security Council resolutions and removal of all non-compliance
issues would make possible provision of a package of incentives,
including assured delivery of low-enriched uranium or nuclear fuel and
removal of irradiated fuel for reprocessing and storage abroad. Other
incentives may include international help with developing the Iranian
oil and gas industries, admittance to the World Trade Organization and,
eventually, resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States of
America. Iranian political circles and population at large should be
informed of the considerable economic and social-political advantages
pursuant to Iranian compliance with the United Nations Security Council
resolutions, and the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of
Governors' resolutions.
5. Encouraging India, Israel and
Pakistan and providing to them incentives to come closer, where
appropriate, to the nuclear non-proliferation regime through concluding
the International Atomic Energy Agency 1997 Additional Protocol, signing
and ratifying in full the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty,
joining negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and
international export control mechanisms, as well as undertaking
confidence- and security-building measures, regarding nuclear weapons.
It should be taken into consideration that Israel has already signed the
CTBT. Such steps will be conducive to the broader involvement of these
three countries in international peaceful nuclear cooperation programs,
and other regional and global endeavors in the economic or security
realm.
6. In view of the growing threat of nuclear terrorism
much more intensive and broad preventive measures are urgently needed to
enhance physical protection, accounting and control of fissile
materials worldwide, and to accelerate disposition of highly-enriched
uranium by its conversion to low-enriched uranium and application to
peaceful purposes, capitalizing on the positive experience of the
agreement on highly-enriched uranium and low-enriched uranium between
the United States of America and the Russian Federation ("HEU-LEU
deal"). Additional, and if necessary international cooperative measures
to protect nuclear power plants, research reactors and nuclear weapons
storage sites should be undertaken.
7. Further enhancement of
the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive safeguards,
foremost by signing and ratifying the 1997 Additional Protocol to the
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements by all states
that have not yet done so; and for the 31 states - parties to the NPT,
that have not yet concluded safeguards agreements, to do so as soon as
possible. Strengthening barriers against withdrawal from the
Non-Proliferation Treaty by strictly regulating the withdrawal
procedure, inter alia by introducing a requirement for well-founded
motivation for the withdrawal, and ensuring compliance with withdrawal
notice period pursuant to Article X, as well as by adopting regulations
on maintaining International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over any
technologies and materials obtained under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In case of withdrawal, dual-purpose technologies and materials should be
returned to suppliers under the Agency's supervision which should be
ensured by agreeing on corresponding regulations with the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee.
8. Enhancing the role of
the UN Security Council in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation
regime. Making all necessary efforts to consolidate positions of the UN
Security Council permanent member-states in enforcing the NPT
obligations. Improving the efficiency and ensuring compliance with
international law of counter-proliferation measures regarding nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction (pursuant, for example, the
Proliferation Security Initiative, United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1540 and 1673, and the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism).
9. Coordinating international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear
fuel cycle technologies to additional states, while developing a
reliable mechanism for fuel supply assurances and solutions for spent
fuel management and removal. Appointing a high level United Nations
commission to consider various existing proposals on multilateral
nuclear fuel cycle supplies and services, in particular capitalizing on
the practical experience of the Russian Federation and other states in
advancing such projects. Encouraging the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership as a program to provide for the energy needs of emerging
economies, while elevating non-proliferation standards to an equal level
with environmental safety requirements.
10. Starting
consultations on elevating the Missile Technology Control Regime and the
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,
as well as the system of control over the exports of nuclear materials
and technologies within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to the status of
international conventions.
Luxembourg conference participants
consider the implementation of the above-mentioned measures by all
concerned states and international organizations as a way to make a
breakthrough in preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons and
in precluding their accessibility to terrorists, as well as building
global and regional security.
Participants express their intent to
establish a permanent Luxembourg Forum with the purpose of holding
policy-oriented conferences and meetings of experts and issuing
policy-relevant publications on nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament on a regular basis.
1. Uzi ARAD
Director of
the Institute for Policy and Strategy at the Lauder School of
Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya;
Adviser to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee; Professor
(Israel).
2. Alexei ARBATOV
Head of the Center for
International Security of the Institute for World Economy and
International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences;
Scholar-in-Residence of the Carnegie Moscow Center; Corresponding member
of the Russian Academy of Sciences (former Deputy Chairman of the
Defense Committee of the State Duma, Federal Assembly - Russian
Parliament).
3. Vladimir BARANOVSKIY
Deputy Director of the IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences; Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
4. Francesco CALOGERO
Professor of Theoretical Physics of the Department of Physics,
University of Rome "La Sapienza" (former Secretary General of Pugwash
Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Italy).
5. Shahran CHUBIN
Director of Studies and Joint Course Director, International Training
Course in Security Policy, Geneva Centre for Security Policy; Ph.D.
(Switzerland).
6. Joseph CIRINCIONE
Senior Vice President of the National Security and International Affairs at the Center for American Progress (USA).
7. Armand CLESSE
Director of the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies; Ph.D. (Luxembourg).
8. Thomas COCHRAN
Director of the Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council; Ph.D. (USA).
9. Jayantha DHANAPALA
Senior Adviser to the President of Sri Lanka (former United Nations
Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs); Ambassador (Sri
Lanka).
10. Anatoliy DIAKOV
Director of the Center for Arms
Control, Energy and Environmental Studies of the Moscow Institute of
Physics and Technology; Ph.D. (Russia).
11. Vladimir DVORKIN
Principal researcher of the IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences;
Major-General, ret.; Professor; full member of the Russian Academy of
Rocket and Artillery Sciences, Academies of Military Sciences, the
Russian Engineering Academy, the International Engineering Academy,
Russian Academy of Astronautics (former Director of the 4th Major
Institute of the Ministry of Defense, Russia).
12. Andrey FEDOROV
Member of Presidium, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russia).
13. Trevor FINDLAY
Director of the Canadian Center for Treaty Compliance; Associate
Professor of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
(Canada).
14. Mark FITZPATRICK
Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK).
15. Henry GAFFNEY
Director for Strategy and Concepts of the Center for Naval Analyses, CNA Corporation (USA).
16. Rose GOTTEMOELLER
Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center (former Assistant Secretary for
Non-Proliferation and National Security of the U.S. Department of
Energy).
17. Arnold HORELICK
Professor Emeritus of Political Science of the University of California at Los Angeles (USA).
18. Carlo JEAN
President of the Society for the Management of Nuclear Plants «SOGIN»
(former Military Adviser to the President of Italy); General ret.
(Italy).
19. Alexander KALIADIN
Principal Researcher of the IMEMO, Russian Academy of Sciences; Ph.D. (Russia).
20. Viatcheslav KANTOR
President of the European Jewish Congress; President of the Russian Jewish Congress, Ph.D. (Russia).
21. Sergey KARAGANOV
Chairman of Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy;
Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences;
Professor (Russia).
22. Catherine KELLEHER
College Park Professor at the University of Maryland; Senior Fellow of the Center for Naval Analysis, CNA Corporation (USA).
23. Isaak KHALATNIKOV
Director Emeritus of the Landau Institute for Theoretical Physics, Russian Academy of Sciences; Academician (Russia).
24. Anton KHLOPKOV
Executive Director of the PIR Center (Russia).
25. Byungki KIM
Vice Dean and Professor of International Relations at the Graduate
School of International Studies, Korea University (Republic of Korea).
26. Alexander KONOVALOV
President of the Institute for Strategic Assessments; Professor of the
Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO, Russia).
27. Michael KREPON
Founding President of the Henry L. Stimson Center (USA).
28. Robert LEGVOLD
Professor of the Columbia University (USA).
29. Alexander NIKITIN
Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, MGIMO; President of
the Russian Political Science Association; Professor (Russia).
30. Robert NURICK
Senior Fellow of the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (USA).
31. Vladimir ORLOV
President of the PIR Center; Co-Director of the European Training
Course in Security Policy at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy;
Ph.D. (Russia).
32. Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV
Director of the
Institute for Strategic Assessments; Professor of the MGIMO and the
Higher School of Economics, full member of the Russian Academy of
Cosmonautics, the World Academy of Sciences for Complex Security (former
Chief of the Organizational Analytic Division, Russian Academy of
Sciences).
33. Zhenqiang PAN
Vice-President of the China
Foundation for International Studies and Academic Changes; Professor of
International Relations at the Institute for Strategic Studies,
University of National Security; Major-General ret. (China).
34. George PERKOVICH
Vice President for Studies-Global Security and Economic Development and
Director of the Non-Proliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace; Ph.D. (USA).
35. Alexander PIKAEV
Vice-chairman of the Committee of Academics for International Security; Head of the Department, IMEMO; Ph.D. (Russia).
36. William POTTER
Director James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies and
Professor of Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies; Ph.D. (USA).
37. Vasantha RAO RAGHAVAN
Director of the Delhi Policy Group; President of the Centre for Security Analysis; Lieutenant General, ret. (India).
38. Roald SAGDEEV
Distinguished Professor of Physics and Director of the "East-West"
Center, University of Maryland; Director Emeritus of the Russian Space
Research Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences; Academician
(Russia/USA).
39. Evgeniy SATANOVSKIY
President of the Institute of the Middle East; Ph.D. (Russia).
40. Vladimir SAZHIN
Senior Associate of the Institute for Oriental Studies (RAS); Professor (Russia).
41. Carlo SCHAERF
Professor of Physics of the University of Rome "Tor Vergata" (former
President of the National Commission for Nuclear Physics, Italy).
42. John STEINBRUNER
Professor of the School of Public Policy; Director of the Center for
International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland.
43. Roland TIMERBAYEV
Chairman of the Board of the PIR-Center (former Permanent USSR/Russia's
Representative to International Organizations in Vienna); Ambassador
(Russia).
44. Jon WOLFSTHAL
Senior Fellow (International Security Program) of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (USA).
*) Having endorsed the principal ideas and the general thrust of this Declaration some participants of the Luxembourg Conference have reserved their objections with respect to some of its particular recommendations. Personally these experts are: Thomas Cochran, George Perkovich, Vasantha Raghavan, Roland Timerbaev.