



**THE INTERNATIONAL  
LUXEMBOURG FORUM SEMINAR  
ON REVIEWING THE RESULTS  
AND LOOKING ON THE PROSPECTS  
OF THE PREPCOM FOR THE 2010 NPT  
REVIEW CONFERENCE**

**FINAL DOCUMENT**

**ROME, JUNE 12, 2008**





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On June 12, 2008 a meeting of the Luxembourg Forum was held in Rome with a focus on the results of the 2008 NPT PrepCom session and LF proposals for the 2009 PrepCom session on the principle issues of the preparation for the 2010 NPT Review conference. The above seminar was organized cooperatively by the Luxembourg Forum and Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs while all participants acted in their personal capacity.

The participants of the Rome seminar took into consideration the P-5 Joint statement and the Chairman's Report related to the 2008 PrepCom session. While endorsing P-5 Joint Statement emphasis on Treaty based multilateralism, partnership and relevant initiatives as the mechanism to address the proliferation challenges of the present and foreseeable future participants of the meeting noted with regret the virtual absence of any mention of the subject of nuclear disarmament in the P-5 Joint Statement.

This stance of the P-5 was viewed as contradictory to their commitment to article VI of the NPT and thus undermining the goals of the enhancement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and, in particular, the prospects for the 2010 NPT Review conference.

The participants of the Rome seminar unanimously endorsed the call and supported the initiative of the four prominent American statesmen calling for the revival of the vision of the nuclear-free world as an ultimate guarantee of nuclear weapons non – proliferation for practical steps leading toward this goal and for prevention of any deliberate or accidental use of nuclear weapons.

The alternative futures are either the transition to a nuclear-weapon-free world (NFWF) or a catastrophic breakdown of the overall nonproliferation regime. The time scale for the bifurcation between the routes leading to these two alternative futures — a NFWF or unrestrained proliferation of nuclear weapons — is measured in years rather than in decades.

1) With respect to the revitalization of the process of nuclear disarmament the participants of the Rome seminar propose:

Urgent ratification of the CTBT by the United States, China, India, Pakistan and other of the forty four states necessary in order for this Treaty to acquire full legal force as soon as possible.

The United States and Russia should carry out joint comprehensive analyses of existing and projected missile threats and the utility of BMD for countering these threats. If these analyses determine that BMD systems are useful, development and deployment of such

programs should proceed on the basis of collaboration between the United States and Russia and without undermining the legitimate defense and security interests of China and other countries. China should be invited to join the U.S. and Russia in dialogue on how to make ballistic missile defenses compatible with strategic stability.

Follow-on negotiations to address the implementation of US and Russian commitments of 2002 and 2008 on the joint operation, development and deployment of BMD systems and components in order to provide BMD protection to the US, Russia and their allies without damaging the security of China and other responsible and law-abiding NPT-member states in compliance with their treaty obligations.

US and Russia resumption of active efforts to negotiate a follow-on to START-1 Treaty which expires in December 2009, with a goal of achieving further deep reductions of strategic nuclear forces at least down to 1500 warheads for each side.

Other nuclear weapons possessors should agree not to build up their nuclear forces. Also they should be encouraged to voluntarily providing for maximum acceptable transparency of their forces and modernization programs, borrowing from the provisions of US-Russian START-1 Treaty.

Considering reductions and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons should begin as soon as political circumstances allow — in particular, in conjunction with the mutually acceptable agreements on the controversial issues of NATO extension and the adaptation of the CFE Treaty.

Resumption of the FMCT at the CD should be revitalized. To ensure verification of the eventual FMCT relevant nuclear sites of the P-5 should be opened for the IAEA safeguards.

2) The LF regrets the lack of progress in resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis. Although some cooperative political gestures on the part of Teheran do represent a positive trend, the overall situation becomes more acute insofar as Iran is advancing its nuclear program, despite four resolutions by UN SC (including three resolutions which imposed sanctions on Iran). The limited sanctions implemented to date do not appear to have convinced Iran's leaders to comply with the UN mandate, in particular to stop its uranium enrichment program. On the contrary, Iran has declared its plan to increase the number of Natanz centrifuges from 3,000 to 9,000 and introduce the advanced type centrifuges. Of significance is the declared intention of a number of states in the Middle East and elsewhere to embark on nuclear power programs. If such plans were to include fuel cycle facilities such facilities could become a surrogate for a nuclear weapons deterrence capacity.

The LF proposes that:

The global community should continue to exert pressure on Iran in order to secure its compliance with the terms of the UN Security Council resolutions. Foremost, IAEA safeguards and activities should be restored in the format of Additional Protocol Plus. An important tool for achieving these goals would be more effective sanctions by the UN SC and certain states in the investment, trade and other areas. At the same time, Iran should be offered a detailed list of more compelling and innovative political and economic incentives to forgo development of sensitive fuel cycle technologies while there remains a lack of confidence about its intentions.

Renewed efforts should be made to persuade Iran to acquire fuel cycle services from the international market, including joining the multilateral uranium enrichment project in Angarsk (Russia), as a much more reliable, non-controversial and cost-effective alternative to Iranian facility in Natanz.

3) A great threat of actual use of nuclear weapon for the foreseeable future stems from the possibility that terrorist organizations will gain access to nuclear explosive devices or nuclear materials. It must be recognized, to begin with, that there do exist terrorist groups who might well perform such a deed if they could (after 9/11 few doubt this). The easiest route for a terrorist group who wants to destroy a city with a nuclear explosion is to build the nuclear explosive device in the target city. Doing so will be feasible if the terrorists manage to get hold of a sufficient quantity of "weapon-grade" highly enriched uranium (HEU), enormous quantities of which are available in Russia and the United States. Smaller but significant quantities of HEU also can be found in many other countries.

The LF proposes:

Undertaking coordinated national and international measures to enhance physical protection, accounting and control of fissile materials worldwide. To facilitate these activities technically and financially a special international foundation should be created under the auspices of the UN, to which all of the P-5 and other responsible states should contribute. This being a new and complex project, additional elaboration of it is required.

Acceleration and expansion of existing programs to dispose of highly-enriched uranium by its conversion to low-enriched uranium and application to peaceful purposes, capitalizing on the positive experience of the agreement on highly-enriched uranium and low-enriched uranium between the United States of America and the Russian Federation ("HEU-LEU deal"). Large quantities of low-enriched uranium accumulated in this way should be used to contribute to the LEU bank proposed by the IAEA for assured supply to states that develop nuclear energy and that have bona fide non-proliferation credentials.

International cooperative measures must be undertaken to protect nuclear power plants, research reactors and nuclear weapons storage sites. All non-weapon uses of HEU (i.e. research, reactors, naval propulsion) should be phased out as soon as possible or converted for the use of LEU.

4) There is an urgent need for coordinating international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear fuel cycle technologies to additional states, while developing a reliable mechanism for fuel supply assurances and solutions for spent fuel management and removal. However as the 2008 PrepCom discussion revealed, there is no consensus or even convergence of views regarding the goals and mechanisms for implementing multinational fuel arrangements.

The LF proposes:

A comprehensive international study should be initiated and staffed with most authoritative representatives of the leading nuclear countries of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to consider various existing proposals on multilateral nuclear fuel cycle supplies and services, in particular capitalizing on the practical experience of the Russian Federation and other states in advancing such projects. Comprehensive international consultations should be initiated with participation of the representatives of the leading countries of the nuclear suppliers group and of the prospective states acquirers of fuel cycle technologies in order to explore what sort of international arrangements could satisfy the interests of those who are newly entering this field.

As a follow-on to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership a new program should be initiated to provide for the energy needs of emerging economies, while elevating non-proliferation standards to an equal level with environmental safety and commercial efficiency requirements.

5) One of the principal tools for strengthening the NPT regime is further enhancement of the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive safeguards, foremost by signing and ratifying the 1997 Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements by all states that have not yet done so; and for the 31 states — parties to the NPT, that have not yet concluded safeguards agreements, to do so as soon as possible.

The LF proposes:

All Nuclear Supplier Group members should endorse the principle that future peaceful nuclear cooperation must be made conditional on the ratification of the Additional Protocol by the participating countries.

The IAEA capability to detect undeclared activities should be enhanced by increasing its financial, technical and experienced personal resources.

It is impractical to amend the NPT. However, efforts should be made to strengthen Article X through agreed understandings and common interpretations by NPT states so as to provide for much more strict regulations of the withdrawal procedure. This should include, inter alia, a requirement for well-founded motivation for the withdrawal at the Special Conference of the NPT states, mandatory consideration of the matter by the UN SC under the provisions of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The goal of these measures is to ensure without putting in doubt the right of states to withdraw from NPT that this right is not abused by withdrawal to conceal violations of the NPT, or to use the fruits of peaceful nuclear cooperation under NPT Article IV to create nuclear weapons. It would be desirable to adopt regulations on maintaining International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over any technologies and materials obtained under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.



## **Members of the Supervisory and Advisory Councils of the International Luxembourg Forum**

1. **Uzi ARAD** — Director of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya; Adviser to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee; Professor (Israel).
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3. **Vladimir BARANOVSKIY** — Deputy Director of the IMEMO; Corresponding member (RAS, Russia).
4. **Hans BLIX** — Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency); Ph.D (Sweden).
5. **Francesco CALOGERO** — Professor of Theoretical Physics of the Department of Physics, University of Rome "La Sapienza" (former Secretary General of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Italy).
6. **Anatoliy DIAKOV** — Director of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology; Ph.D. (Russia).
7. **Vladimir DVORKIN** — Principal Researcher of the IMEMO (RAS, former Director of the 4th Major Institute of the Ministry of Defense); Professor; Full Member of the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences, Academies of Military Sciences, the Russian Engineering Academy, the International Engineering Academy, Russian Academy of Astronautics; Major-General, ret (Russia).
8. **Mark FITZPATRICK** — Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK).
9. **Carlo JEAN** — President of the Society for the Management of Nuclear Plants «SOGIN» (former Military Adviser to the President of Italy); General, ret. (Italy).
10. **Viatcheslav KANTOR** — President of the International Luxembourg Forum; President of the European Jewish Congress; President of the Russian Jewish Congress; Ph.D. (Russia).

11. **Alexander NIKITIN** — Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, the Moscow State Institute for International Relations; President of the Russian Political Science Association; Professor (Russia).
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13. **George PERKOVICH** — Vice President for Studies – Global Security and Economic Development and Director of the Non-Proliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Ph.D. (USA).
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16. **Carlo SCHAERF** — Professor of Physics of the University of Rome "Tor Vergata" (former President of the National Commission for Nuclear Physics, Italy).



