First of all, allow me on behalf of the large group of Russian scientists working on the issue at hand and also on behalf of our Russian-U.S. Joint Committee to cordially greet all of you and thank the Organizing Committee for inviting me to participate in this conference.
Since we have heard a number of comprehensive and well-founded points on the conference subject, naturally, I will not discuss the same points again. I would rather focus on the most acute problems that have been addressed by many international conferences and workshops in recent years.
The first issue is concerned with the possibility that existing conflicts between major powers possessing nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles may be "resolved" by the use of these arsenals in the near future.
Analysis shows that there are no grounds to expect such a scenario. Nevertheless, we certainly should continue to undertake our efforts to decrease stockpiles of nuclear weapons.
The second issue is nuclear terrorism. I think that nuclear terror attacks can be expected, both in the near-term and, more likely, in the distant future.
I believe that discussion of this issue at various conferences, workshops, round tables and meetings of scientists and politicians in the context of the non-proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies and materials has given us deeper insight into the problem and enabled us to design and implement certain measures to ensure the physical security of nuclear sites and materials, tighter customs controls and an improved accountability system thereof. New methods aimed at managing the expanding use of nuclear energy throughout the world have been designed under the aegis of the IAEA.
But this is not enough. Analysis shows that nuclear terrorism does become a possible means of resolving longstanding conflicts in certain regions of the world with which we are all very familiar. In the long run, traditional means of settling these conflicts, i.e. negotiations and local wars using conventional weapons, eventually may escalate into a nuclear catastrophe, employing improvised nuclear devices and products made in undeveloped countries.
The essence of these concerns was expressed by Mr. Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, when he reviewed the results of the May 27, 2005 Conference discussing the efficiency of the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). He expressed the idea perfectly when he said that the world had sleepwalked into a nuclear dead-end. "Sleepwalked" is a very precise word. Indeed, the world is slowly and imperceptibly approaching a nuclear deadlock.
In his welcome remarks during the opening of the conference, Mr. K. Annan underscored that success would depend on the recognition of all nuclear threats, not just dangers related to implementation of the NPT. I agree with that view. Humanity is facing multiple and diverse nuclear threats today. To address them, we should first of all resolve our political issues by strengthening the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies, as well as improving accountability, physical security systems and trafficking control.
I prefer dealing with technical issues related to the undeveloped nations' growing interest in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly in addressing energy matters. Many countries that are fairly undeveloped in terms of science and technology actively seek access to nuclear technologies. As it has been emphasized here, this process is irreversible. In countries where nuclear infrastructure is already available, the number of nuclear power units is increasing. Some countries that already have nuclear infrastructure are multiplying their nuclear units, and countries that lack nuclear capabilities are showing a growing desire to independently produce nuclear materials and build nuclear power stations. We believe it is important to realize that in the future these countries may not confine themselves to creating a peaceful nuclear infrastructure. Accelerated and uncontrolled development of nuclear power can obviously lead to a very dangerous situation in the area of nuclear materials and nuclear technologies, up to the production of nuclear weapons. We think that this has already led the world to a new phase where we will see wide-ranging use of nuclear energy. This new phase will be more dangerous than the previous one, where there was a system of nuclear deterrence created by the Soviet Union and the United States. Today, that system has collapsed, and tremendous efforts are required to develop a new security system. I think an important step towards doing so would be to design a system of incentives for states joining the nuclear club, aimed at voluntarily renouncing the possibility of producing enriched uranium and processing spent nuclear fuel.
The IAEA and Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei as Director General have been actively promoting this idea throughout the world, particularly in Russia, as was mentioned today by Mr. Sergey Kirienko, Head of the Russian Federal Atomic Agency. Therefore, I will not be speaking about this issue, as it has been discussed more than once in connection with the Angarsk nuclear fuel center set-up in Russia to supply enriched uranium. The first steps that have been already taken to involve more countries in creating this center are supported by scientists and specialists in Russia. The general public reacted to this decision unenthusiastically, though without protests, which is very important for Russia. It is good that the overall attitude is not negative, since such decisions can sometimes be blocked by public opinion. I think that Russia has responded positively because of extensive prior preparations.
Let me also remind you that Russia and the United States have directed considerable efforts to the non-proliferation of special nuclear materials and technologies. After the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the presidents of both countries proposed an initiative to broaden cooperation between Russian and U.S. scientists in the area of international security and counter-terrorism. Joint committees have been established linking RosAtom, the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense. The two countries jointly implemented major projects to decommission Russian nuclear submarines, reduce the amount of highly enriched nuclear fuel in nuclear submarines and research reactors, improve the physical security of nuclear sites, provide scientists and specialists of the Russian nuclear complex with employment opportunities in the civilian sector, and resolve other issues covering accountability and control over transportation of sensitive nuclear materials. We are well aware that this program has been sponsored by the European Union, the United States and Japan.
We believe that right now the most important thing is to carry out joint multifaceted research work on possible means to protect key nuclear technologies: uranium enrichment for fuel production and processing spent nuclear fuel assemblies in their countries of origin, internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle. Russia and the United States are working on this in cooperation with the IAEA. The disputes that have arisen indicate that it will be a long time before we have reached unanimous decisions. One of the most difficult issues is the siting of international centers to provide enriched uranium services to countries that want to develop nuclear power but lack the technological capabilities to do so.
A number of countries have taken an aggressive stance in reference to the creation of such centers or accepting such services. Therefore, I believe we should be thorough and tactful, but always persistent, in making this idea, which is supported by the IAEA and its Director General, more acceptable, credible and convincing to those countries that currently oppose it.
Obviously, this project entails significant technical and engineering challenges, such as development of new nuclear power technologies that will be attractive for countries interested in nuclear energy production for peaceful purposes. I will not go into detail on those technical issues. However, I will say that considerable progress has been made in this area. In 2008 we will present a detailed report by a number of scientific communities around the world, including Russia and the United States.
Thank you for your attention, and let me wish all of you success in your efforts to eradicate the threat of nuclear catastrophe.